











Title of Dissertation: STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
BROADCASTING: A GROUNDED ANALYSIS OF 
COMMUNICATION VALUES ACROSS CULTURES 
  
  
Brecken Chinn Swartz, Doctor of Philosophy, 2006 
  
  
Dissertation directed by: Professor Deborah Cai 




This dissertation is a cross-cultural examination of strategic communication 
values that drive journalistic decision-making.  Several issues are addressed:   
1) developing tools to engage in systematic producer-centered qualitative media 
research across cultures , 2) testing a comprehensive grounded category scheme to 
characterize media producers’ strategic presentational values, 3) broadening 
discussion of the influence of culture on media decision-making by moving beyond 
national culture and looking also at age, gender, organization, and level of training,  
4) working methodologically with a three-tiered inductive approach to structure 
analysis of interview data, and 5) examining the utility of these qualitative tools 
cross-culturally by testing the framework with both Western and Chinese 
international broadcasters.   
  
Fifty American, British, and Chinese international feature reporters were 
interviewed at the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, and state-run Chinese 
international broadcast agencies (China Central Television, China Radio 
International, and the Xinhua News Agency) to identify patterns in their journalistic 
decision-making.  Journalists completed semi-structured int rviews along with a 
freelisting task and a selection task to further characterize their strategic 
presentational values within simulated free and constrained contexts.   
This study moves beyond classical gatekeeping research to prop se a set of 
ten strategic communication categories (aesthetics, breadth, convenience, depth, 
emotionality, freshness, germaneness, helpfulness, incisiveness, a d justice) that 
facilitate discussion of content and presentational style beyond the yes/no of story 
selection based on newsworthiness criteria.  The gatekeeping paradigm is extended by 
comparing the complex decisions driving the production of mediat  messages to the 
multi-faceted process of preparing food for the consumption of others, as both are 
strategic endeavors that profoundly affect the wellbeing of individuals and 
communities. 
This research provides a new direction to debates on cross- ultural differences 
in mass communication.  Data in this study reveal a not ble pattern for Chinese 
journalists (both in China and in the West) to emphasize the value of justice in their 
responses, although data suggest that Chinese journalists tend to quate this value 
with complete objectivity and neutrality in contrast with Western journalists’ 
tendency to consider issues of broader social justice.  Developments in modern 









STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING:  A GROUNDED 













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 











Professor Deborah Cai, Chair 
Professor Linda Aldoory 
Professor Michael Gurevitch 
Professor Lee Thornton 
























© Copyright by 
 


















To my family 
who surround me with all the love and support I could ever ne d. 
 
And to the international journalists  










I am immensely grateful to the international journalists at the Voice of America, the 
BBC World Service, and with the Chinese official media in Beijing who gave me the 
time and access I needed to complete this dissertation.   
 
At the Voice of America, special thanks to Zhang Huchen and Li Su for welcoming 
me to the agency, to Hu Wei, my first colleague and dear mentor, to Rob Sivak for 
helping me access the amazing English features team, and to my many wonderful 
colleagues in the Mandarin Chinese Service for their unbelievable kindness, 
especially my friendly neighbor Yuan Ye for invaluable transl tion support. 
 
At the BBC World Service, a special thanks to Commissioner Neil Curry, Chinese 
Service Chief Lorna Ball, and Mandarin Features Editor Lu Jiang for giving me space 
to operate in Bush House, to Finn Aberdein and Didier James for arranging my 





In China, special thanks to my dear friends at the Xinhua News Agency, China 
Central Television, and China Radio International, especially Dai Ming and Yang 
Jianxiang for so many kindnesses that made me feel at home in China. 
 
At the University of Maryland, special thanks to my three outstanding translators, 
Yao Shuo, Jiang Hua, and Shen Hongmei, for their generous and unfailing patience in 
helping me wade through dozens of hours of Chinese interview material. 
 
An extra special thanks to my advisor, Deb Cai, my dear mentor and friend, for her 
unbelievable support and encouragement in both academics and in life.  Thanks also 
to my wonderful committee, Michael Gurevitch, Lee Thornt n, Andrew Wolvin, and 
Linda Aldoory, for their time and their insights, and to Ed Fink for his role in creating 
the warmest and most collegial departmental community at he University of 
Maryland.   
 
And most of all, thanks to Bill for his invaluable help as a ounding board, editor, 
formatting consultant, and I.T. specialist, and for his central role in keeping me afloat 
during this long journey.  And finally, thanks to Dad for feeding and supporting and 
loving me, and to Mom and Lauren for encouraging me in every way.   
 
Also, thanks to Shmooga and Smally, the loveliest cats in the world, for staying off 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables ................................................................................................ vii 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ................................................................................. 1 
Reaching Outside of Ourselves.............................................................................. 1 
Media Nontransparency.................................................................................... 3 
Some Relevant Background ..........................................................................4 
Ingredients in the “Daily Feed” ....................................................................7 
“Cooks” as Vendors or Public Servants? ...................................................... 10 
The “Public Interest” Principle in Broadcasting ................................................... 15 
Gaining Traction on the “Asian Values” Debate............................................ 16 
 
Chapter 2:  Theoretical Overview....................................................................19 
Assumptions......................................... .................................................... 19 
“Control Analysis” ..................................................................................... 20 
From a Transmission to a Cultural View of Media Production............................. 23 
Gatekeeping Theory ....................................................................................... 27 
Examining Producer Intent ........................................................................ 31 
Extending Gatekeeping....................................................................................33 
From Newsworthiness to Strategic Decision-Making ....... ............................. 35 
The Journalist within the Value Environment ................................................ 43 
Research Rationale.................................................................................. 44 
 
Chapter 3:  The Development of International Broadcasting.................................... 46 
The Origins of Propaganda..........................................................................46 
Connotations of Propaganda............................................................................ 47 
The Development of Western Broadcasting.................................................. 49 
British International Broadcasting ................................................................... 51 
U.S. International Broadcasting ................................................................. 55 
The Development of Chinese Broadcasting ......................................................... 60 
Pre-revolutionary Chinese Media..................................................................... 60 
Communist Revolution....................................................................................64 
Modern Chinese Media ................................................................................... 69 
Chinese Views of Propaganda ......................................................................... 71 
Comparing East and West ............................................................................74 
Modern Directions in Propaganda............................................................. 76 
 
Chapter 4:  The Study ................................... .............................................. 77 
A Hybrid Approach................................................................................... 77 
Reflecting on the Self as a Research Instrument ........ ..................................... 79 
Confessions of an Involved Researcher.................................................... 81 
Grounded Theory ..................................................................................... 84 
Coding Category Scheme .............................................................................86 






Follow-up Focus Groups .....................................................................................98 
 
Chapter 5:  Freelisting ................................................................................ 100 
The Inductive Sandwich .......................................................................... 100 
Freelisting ............................................................................................... 102 
Judging Value by External and Internal Standards ................................. 105 
Patterns .............................................................................................. 107 
Freelisting by Age .......................................................................................107 
Freelisting by Gender ..............................................................................110 
Freelisting by Journalistic Training................................................................ 113 
Freelisting by National Origin .................................................................. 118 
Freelisting by Organization ..................................................................... 124 
In Summary.............................................................................................. 127 
 
Chapter 6:  Selection Task......................................................................... 128 
Forced-Choice Scenario .............................. ............................................128 
Selection Task by Age............................................................................. 131 
Selection Task by Training ...................................................................... 134 
Selection Task by Gender ....................................................................... 138 
Selection Task by National Origin ................................................................. 143 
Justice East and West ............................................................................147 
Selection Task by Organization ..................................................................... 154 
In Summary ................................................................................................. 161 
 
Chapter 7:  Qualitative Analysis .....................................................................162 
Exploring Context ................................................................................... 162 
Becoming an International Broadcaster ...................................................... 163 
Who Benefits Most?..................................................................................... 168 
Propaganda or Public Service? .................................................................. 176 
Story Selection ............................................................................................. 188 
Characterizing the Daily Feed ........................................................................... 197 
What is World-Class Journalism?...................................................................... 207 
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusion..................................................................................... 211 
Major Findings........................................................................................ 211 
Contributions....................................................................................... 215 
The Meaning of Justice ....................................................................................217 
Limitations................................................................................................... 220 
Future Research Directions.......................................................................224 
Parting Words ........................................ ................................................ 227 
 
Appendix A................................................................................................. 229 
Appendix B................................................................................................. 231 




LIST OF TABLES  
 
 
Table 4.1.  Description of Communication Value Scheme ....................................... 87 
Table 4.2.  Demographics of Participant Samples............................................ 95 
Table 4.3.  Selection Task Categories with Descriptions........ ................................. 97 
Table 5.1.  Sample Freelisted Responses by Category .......... ..........................103 
Table 5.2.  Freelisted Responses by Age.................................................................108 
Table 5.3.  Freelisted Responses by Gender...................................................111 
Table 5.4.  Freelisted Responses by Level of Journalistic Tra ning .........................114 
Table 5.5.  Freelisted Responses by National Origin........ .................................119 
Table 5.6.   Freelisted Responses by Organization.........................................125 
Table 6.1.  Value Categories and Descriptions Used in Selection Task ...................129 
Table 6.2.  Normalized Selection Task Scores by Age........ .............................132 
Table 6.3.  Normalized Selection Task Scores by Journalistic Training ..................135 
Table 6.4.  Normalized Selection Task Scores by Gender ......... ..........................139 
Table 6.5.  Normalized Selection Task Scores by National Origin ..........................144 












Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Reaching Outside of Ourselves 
At this moment, circling around our planet flies an invisible multitude of 
words.  Broken into tiny digital bits sent through computers and satellite transmitters, 
the words carry ideas across mountains, forests, deserts, and seas into the eyes and 
ears of unseen others, a vast web of infinite complexity connecting minds and hearts 
across the world.  We are transcending space, using air as  medium to convey 
ourselves. 
Seeking to be understood is an enduring characteristic of the human race.  
From the first time we smile and see the delighted reaction of our parents, humans 
become enamored with this ability to reach out to others and connect.  Without 
communication, we are confined to living solely within ourselves, but insofar as we 
are capable of inducing others to see things as we see them and understand the world 
as we understand it, we are capable of potentially motivating others to action.  In this 
way, we band together and create the circumstances of our lives.  Thus, not only how 
we go about constructing, conveying, and interpreting messages, but also what effects 
we attempt to achieve and why we set out to communicate comprise the most basic 
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building blocks of communication.  If we can understand better what we truly hope to 
achieve, perhaps we can figure out better ways to accomplish it. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop tools for conducting systematic 
producer-centered qualitative media research across cultures. A new grounded 
category scheme is proposed and tested through interviews with fifty Chinese and 
Western international broadcasters to examine the effect of culture on strategic 
considerations that underlie journalistic decision-making. A three-tiered inductive 
framework based on interviews, freelisting, and a selection task is used to elicit 
journalists' strategic communication values and to structure data analysis in such a 
way that illuminates patterns across various demographic factors: national origin, 
gender, age, training, and organization. Finally, a cross-cultural food metaphor is 
explored with participants to provide terms of conceptual clarity of 
how journalists communicate strategically for the consumption of others. 
There are three main research questions driving this study. First, how well 
does the new grounded category scheme work to characterize strat gies in 
broadcasting, particularly across cultures? Second, whenthe category scheme is 
applied, what patterns emerge in the data by national origin, gender, age, training, and 
organization? Third, is the food metaphor a useful heuristic for facilitating discussion 
about strategic communication values in broadcasting across ultures? Because this 
dissertation is designed to lay the groundwork for a new direction in characterizing 
producer intent for comparative purposes, emphasis in this study is placed on 
discovering the extent to which the proposed three-tiered analytical 




Fundamental to the study of mass communication is the assumption that 
media do not merely reflect reality, but represent it—that they are symbolic systems 
that turn tangible elements from the world around us into signs that carry meaning to 
those who watch and interpret them.  If the media were clear “windows on the 
world,” simply transmitting “reality” from one point to another, studying them would 
be as meaningless as studying clear panes of glass.  “Media stu y is based on an 
assumption of media nontransparency, on an assumption that the media shape the 
subjects they present in characteristic forms.  From the assumption that the media 
represent, rather than reflect reality, all else flows” (Masterman, 1997, p. 41). 
Media messages, because they are constructed, carry a subtext of who and 
what is important—at least to the person or persons creating them (Thoman, 1995).  
Why is it that media producers choose certain topics over th rs?  How do they select 
the various elements that make up their programs?  What effec s are they hoping to 
achieve, and why?  Do cultural factors bear strongly on such decisions?  If so, what 
exactly is meant by “cultural?”  As world media systems continue to globalize, will 
cultural factors produce differences in the “flavor” of media products and mediated 
communication patterns in different societies?  Such questions must be addressed by 
meaningful analysis of the motivations of media producers themselves, with our 
understanding of their choices grounded squarely in their own world. 
As humans have developed technology to aid us in communicating with 
others, particularly across space and time, possibilities for contact become 
increasingly mind-boggling.  Not only can we convey written words to each other, 
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but we can also send sound, visual images, music—the tangible artifacts of emotion 
itself.  And we can do it in real-time.  With the aid of cameras, microphones, and 
digital systems, we communicate directly with vast numbers of people all at once.  
When we hold such a public microphone and engage in “mass communication,” 
especially with unknown recipients in another part of the world, what do we choose 
to say and why?  What role do we imagine we play, and whatstrategies do we use to 
make sure our messages meet our own standards of effectiven ss? 
For better or worse, the majority of people on our planet are tuned into mass 
media in some way—radio, television, the Internet.  And just as we humans receive 
our physical nourishment from the foods we eat, our minds are fed and developed by 
the messages we consume—our “food for thought,” so to speak.  It is widely known 
that media systems are engaged in a process of rapid globalization as we make our 
way into the 21st century, a dramatic development in our world’s history that will 
undoubtedly carry untold implications for all the residnts of this planet we live on.  
As these strategic “battles for the hearts and minds” rage, both publicly and privately, 
it is time to seriously consider what we are doing to each other, and what this will 
mean for the ways we live together, both now and in the future.   
Some Relevant Background 
One of my life’s formative experiences (and one that has directly led to the 
undertaking of this dissertation) was being hired as a cameraperson for the Tokyo 
Broadcasting System’s Washington Bureau several years ago.  At the time, I had 
virtually no experience with professional videorecording, and certainly no experience 
in a newsroom setting, so hiring me seemed to be an odd choice for TBS.  However, 
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the company had hired seasoned professional American cameramen to work with 
them in the past, but they found cultural differences to be too difficult to overcome in 
forming a cohesive team.  Thus, they decided to hire someone like me who spoke 
Japanese and had lived in Japan, but who had no camera experience, expecting to 
train me in the ways of the organization from a relatively clean slate. 
After being taught the technical aspects of shooting and editing a  TBS, I was 
sent to shoot footage of press conferences and other major W shington news events, 
sometimes in the company of my Japanese trainer, and sometimes on my own.  Along 
with the standard shots of dignitaries giving speeches and shaking hands, we were 
asked to also shoot some “b-roll,” extra footage that would later be used to 
supplement each story visually.  The b-roll that my trainer and I wanted to film was 
often remarkably different.  I tended to focus on “people shots” and spontaneously 
occurring human interaction—facial expressions, body langu ge, and novel elements 
that I felt contextualized the story and made it more int resting.  My trainer, however, 
insisted that we stick to wide shots of the room we were in, still shots of the official 
agency sign outside, and other formalized elements in which I could hardly imagine 
an audience would be interested.  I could not help but feel hat something cultural was 
going on.  But “cultural” in what sense?  Was it because I was American and my 
trainer was Japanese?  Or was it our difference in gender?  A difference in our age, or 
in our level of training?  In a larger sense, was it an issue of “development,” or just a 
difference in taste?  If it was indeed just a matter of taste, could these differences be 
patterned across cultures?  I wanted to know if making choices about communication 
is somehow similar to choosing between steak or sushi.  With the increasing 
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globalization of media in today’s world, it may be important to explore what sorts of 
“flavors” to expect on the media menu of the future, and why.  As the technologies of 
communication develop and the people of our planet come into closer contact, is the 
world’s globalizing media system on an inevitable trajectory oward some sort of 
fusion “Mc-Kung-Pao-Chicken-Sandwich” in the end? 
As an American, I grew up watching television for fun, listening to the radio 
for news and music, and reading the newspaper only when I had to.  There was no 
Internet.  Media, for me as a young girl, provided my window on the world outside 
my hometown, and I never doubted the messages I consumed.  I learned in school 
about the fundamental importance of the Constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the 
press in fostering accuracy in media and a healthy democracy, and I believed that the 
American press system was undoubtedly the most free and benevolent in the world. 
Entering college and finally having chances to travel outside of the Western 
world (mostly to Asia), I became much more media literat  and aware of the 
differences between public and commercial media, realizing that as a frequent 
consumer of commercial media, my eyes and mind were regularly being sold to 
advertisers.  Through my travels, I discovered that the Am rican view of the world I 
had grown up with was blatantly one-sided, and I developed a deep int rest in 
comparative research through which to seek out alternate points of view.  I came to 
like publicly-funded media and documentaries, since they were more prone to expand 
my world view through presenting perspectives of which I had been unaware.  Over 
time, I developed a deeper interest in broadcasting as providing an educational 
function in society and committed myself to finding ways to enhance this function.  
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Ingredients in the “Daily Feed” 
On a recent trip, my schedule necessitated that I eat lunch at the airport.  In the 
limited amount of time I had, my possible choices were a g neric airport deli or 
Burger King.  Part of me wanted the predictable convenience of a cheeseburger, but 
something caused me to opt for a tuna sandwich on multigrain b ead at the deli 
instead.  Later at the airport newsstand, I faced a similar decision—to buy a Readers’ 
Digest for its quick stories and easy reading, or to choose something like Scientific 
American, with its in-depth coverage of cutting-edge science.  Most w uld certainly 
agree that the field of an individual’s choices, both for fo d and for information, is 
tremendous, and that in different contexts, we will choose different products to fill 
our bellies or our minds depending on our perceived needs at the time.  I may want 
fast food when I am rushing to work in the morning, but thenchoose a healthy 
homemade dinner in the evening.  As human beings, we feed ourselves in complex, 
often difficult-to-model ways, and thus studying the choices w  make and why is a 
complicated yet meaningful endeavor as we seek to understand how we communicate 
and engage each other as a species. 
Human beings are consumers; we spend significant amounts of time, 
resources, and energy each day to acquire both physical food as well as mental “food 
for thought.”  Those who feed us tend to respond to our complex tastes by supplying 
what we want, when and where we want it, as evidenced by the tremendous 
proliferation of tasty convenience foods available just about anywhere in the 
developed (and now the developing) world.  The process of feeding and being fed is, 
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by nature, an iterative process, with a whole host of “cultural” factors catering to local 
traditions—tortillas in Mexico, bread in France, gari in Nigeria, rice in Japan, etc. 
In the highly competitive world of the “daily feed,” culinary metaphors 
already abound.  Responding to the perceived needs of our modern society, 
journalists and other media producers strive to suit our “tastes” to get us to 
“consume” their messages.  They often “spice up” otherwise “bland” reporting, or 
make efforts to add more “meat” or more “juicy tidbits” to a piece.  “Sweet” stories 
are nice, as long as they do not become “syrupy” or “saccharine.”  Of course, “stale” 
news must be avoided, as well as topics that might cause “indigestion” for the 
audience.  Some reporters clearly act as “short-order cooks,” simply assembling 
details from prescribed sets of story elements, whereas other journalists style 
themselves more as professional “chefs,” striving for the complexity and creativity 
that will suit the “taste” of a more elite market.  Judging by our discourse, food 
metaphors already seem to apply readily to the process by which we produce and 
consume media products. 
Any form of communication can be strategic in nature insofar as a 
communicator seeks to have his or her meaning absorbed and apprehended by others.  
Whether communication takes place in a dyad, a group, or am ng multinational 
masses, strategic value considerations come into play that drive the crafting of 
messages in accordance with communicator intent.  Althoug  the food metaphor 
could apply to virtually any communicative experience, in th s study it will be limited 
to the mass communication context because of the overtly strategic nature of the 
enterprise.  Particularly in the case of international st te-sponsored broadcasting, with 
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its emphasis on accomplishing tangible political objectiv s, journalists and editors 
must work within time and resource limitations for maximum effect.  Using the food 
metaphor in this communication environment is useful becaus it highlights the 
personal value considerations on the part of the journalist in such a way that the role 
of culture on the individual can be examined explicitly in a more value-neutral way. 
Although the food metaphor can be overextended if applied recklessly to any 
communicative experience, using it to systematically characterize journalistic intent 
has a number of benefits.  First, everyone on the planet eats, thus calling upon value 
constructs used in feeding and being fed provides a conceptual framework rooted in 
terms already familiar to people everywhere, regardless of cultural or professional 
background.  This makes the paradigm accessible to communicators at all stages of 
the developmental process, which may be especially useful for those in the process of 
gaining expertise in public communication.  Further, highlighting he strategic nature 
of both preparing food and crafting messages for the consumption of others links 
strategic considerations to culinary concepts in such a way that can make both 
scholars and practitioners more reflexive about the role they play in their 
communicative environment.  Finally, using this framework as a training tool for 
journalism students or working journalists reminds them of their vital role in 
providing the information and commentary that feeds the mental landscape of those 
who consume their products.  Comparing the provision of food (n urishment for the 
body) to the provision of media messages (food for thug t) makes salient the role of 




Thus, as we seek to understand the dynamics of the “dailyfeed,” this study 
provides tools to look carefully into the intentions of those who produce and market 
the foods and messages we consume.  Certainly there are those media outlets that 
deliberately produce mental “junk food” simply because it slls, whereas others 
consciously try to serve up a nourishing balance of information to promote both 
individual and societal health and wellbeing.  The extent to which reporters are aware 
of their role in influencing the mental and social health of their audience is an 
important question, especially considering the amount of time people across the world 
now spend tuned into media.  Although the thought of having some worldwide 
regulatory body overseeing the “health content” of the messages we consume is rather 
terrifying, if media producers were individually and collectively to view themselves 
as feeding their audience instead of just entertaining them—merely gaining attention 
for the purpose of selling it to advertisers—subtle shift might occur in our media that 
could lead to significant developments over time. 
“Cooks” as Vendors or Public Servants? 
As researchers study cultural differences in communication, differences in 
“taste” are an especially rich metaphor to explore.  Metaphors such as these are 
useful, not only as interesting rhetorical devices, but as conceptual structures that 
define how people experience our everyday realities.  For example, when we describe 
the activity of arguing by using concepts such as “make indefensibl  claims,” “shoot 
down an argument,” “attack a weak point,” etc., we define arguing as an activity that 
we win or lose, like a war (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 4).  However, as Lakoff and 
Johnson suggest, what if there were a culture in which “an argument is viewed as a 
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dance, the participants seen as performers, and the goal is t  perform in a balanced 
and aesthetically pleasing way (p. 5)?”  Wouldn’t we expect social relations in such a 
culture to play out differently than in societies in which argument is conceived of as 
war?   Schön (1993) goes even further by noting that metaphorically describing an 
activity in an alternate way from its usual conceptualization allows us to entertain 
implications that can be very useful to the policy-making enterprise.  Words thus not 
only reflect reality; they can in fact create reality. 
So, how should the multitude of words being broadcast around r planet 
right now be metaphorically conceptualized?  Are they armies marching in battle; are 
they partners dancing in an intricate international dance?  There is no doubt that deep 
political and economic motivations underlie the tremendous c sts of producing and 
transmitting words and images across significant distances, thus dancing may be a 
naively glib metaphor.  However, as we dig deeply into our fundamental beliefs about 
the nature of humanity and the trajectory we are on as a species, can we continue to 
be satisfied with 20th-century metaphors describing “battles for the hearts and 
minds?”  Because the 20th century was, by most accounts, the bloodiest century in 
recorded history, is there work we can do to progress our understanding of how and 
why we communicate between nations? 
Today, the dominant paradigm describing the words and images that fill our 
sky is as products to be bought and sold.  Most literature examining the mass media 
from an international perspective tends to focus on the global political economy of 
the media-making business.  As international media executiv s consider ways to 
“deliver” their “product” to foreign markets, modes of deliv ry such as satellite, 
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cable, website, and even cell phones are resulting in an i creasing consciousness of 
the demands of modern life around the world.  Messages must be shorter, more 
colorful, more appealing, and less complex to ensure that they will be “consumed” by 
desired audiences.  Fast food thus seems in many cases to provide an appropriate set 
of metaphors.  As companies like McDonalds, Coca-Cola, and Starbucks dominate 
today’s consumer landscape and fill niches in our lives with their carefully packaged, 
heavily branded products, the extent of our need as consumer  to regularly alter our 
brain and body chemistry simply to “get through the day” and fill our bellies most 
conveniently becomes apparent.  In the same way, as we mov  through our day and 
become increasingly exposed to programs and advertising in just abou  every 
imaginable venue—from trains to elevators to doctors’ offices—we are in need of 
better ways to conceptually understand this processes of nearly constant 
communication on our minds and lives. 
The media tend to operate as a supply-side business, with the main economic 
decisions being made in corporate offices between programmers and advertisers 
rather than directly between programmers and consumers.  A good example of 
demand-side business would be buying food.  In this instance, consumers “vote” with 
cash, and those items which sell out first need to be repl nished, thus reflecting the 
direct impact of demand on supply.  However, in the media business, because of the 
high costs of media production and the rather clumsy mechanisms available to 
determine demand (Nielsen ratings and so forth), much morew rk needs to be done 
by producers and editors to “psych out” audiences and figure out what they want to 
watch or hear based on “gut instincts” of indirect reads on consumer preferences. 
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The “supply-side” nature of the media business is evidenced by the fact that, 
even when we don’t want to watch something (e.g. “infotainment” on an airplane or 
in an elevator), the supply is still there.  The money is being paid by advertisers to 
programmers, thus direct consumer decisions are less rel vant to the business.  This 
reality provides a compelling reason to develop tools to carefully study producer 
intent, and to look at the human factors that determine what goes into the mental 
“food for thought” people consume via mediated messages.  Particularly in media 
arrangements in which producers are very distant from consumers, such as in the case 
of international broadcasting, there is much to learn from how behind-the-scenes 
programming decisions are made and why. 
The fact that the development of media of mass communication, still less than 
a century old, emerged from competitive conditions of wartime and commercial gain 
clearly underlies our conceptual understanding of media as a “business” supplying a 
“product.”  One implication of such a conceptualization, at least under the capitalist 
paradigm, is that media industries should be “free to conduct business” as they see fit 
under the market principles of supply and demand.  Whatever is good for business 
must be good for society, the reasoning goes.  A second implication stemming from 
the historical emergence of mass communication research du ing the Cold War is that 
media communication is often viewed as a “free speech” issue.  Maintaining a free 
press has been a fundamental principle of liberal democracy, and citizens are rightly 
concerned about the implications of censorship.  Free commerce and free speech are 
thus considered by most, at least in the Western world and increasingly in the East, to 
constitute essential elements of a healthy civil society. 
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As media researchers consider issues of globalization, commercialization, 
development, and press freedom, then, it is important to carefully consider whether 
these indeed operate on a single world continuum.  For instance, Herbert Schiller 
(2000) points out a common concern among media scholars: 
In the transformation of the world’s capitalist system and its communication 
component, in recent decades, a few features stand out.  There is, visibly and 
palpably, a gargantuan concentration of capital, best illusrated by, but by no 
means exclusive to, the United States….  The outcome, though we are unable 
to predict it with specificity, will certainly be a handful of global economic 
giants in the various sectors of the world economy.  (Schiller, 2000, p. 116) 
Within this global business paradigm, conceiving of the media business as a 
supplier of intellectual “food” provides a new framework as supply-side issues in 
media production and distribution are considered.  Are we ind ed on the high road to 
the complete “McDonaldsization” of the media world, as many expect?  It is not a 
new idea that media “consumption” can indeed affect the health of a society (see 
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signiorelli, 1980, and Jhally, 1990), and FDA-like 
government guidelines on media (restrictions, ratings, labeling, etc.) established in the 
U.S. by the Federal Communications Commission and other media regulatory bodies 
provide evidence that society expects at least some degree of informed warning on 
the messages people consume.  Yet despite increasing interest in physical health in 
both developed and developing societies, the discussion of media content as an 
ingredient in the “health” of communities seems to be waning. 
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The “Public Interest” Principle in Broadcasting 
Hoover (2000) points out that the “public interest” principle in broadcasting 
has come upon perilous times as TV is being increasingly conceived as “just another 
service, another commodity.”  The conceptualization of media as an important 
vehicle for civil discourse is giving way to commercial considerations that rely solely 
on the bottom line.  Hoover points out that, 
In the American context, which came to be definitive worldwide, this shift in 
logic was well put by Mark Fowler, the Federal Communications Commission 
chairman under Ronald Reagan.  Reflecting on the time-honored tradition of 
the “public interest” principle in broadcasting, Fowler tu ned the phrase 
around. “The public interest,” he is credited with saying, “is whatever the 
public is interested in.”  The citizen becomes the consumer, the medium 
becomes commodified, and the market logic is the logic whi h prevails.  
(Hoover, 2000, p. 4.) 
Further, Hoover notes, in considering whether services such as broadcasting 
should receive special funding and licensing considerations due to their operation on 
scarce public airwaves, FCC Chairman Fowler brushed such concern aside with the 
comment that television is nothing more than an appliance, “a toaster with pictures.”  
Despite his apparent intent to trivialize, Fowler’s appliance metaphor places us 
squarely in the kitchen, preparing food.  Paying attention to Fowler’s logic, the 
conclusion that television content has no need of licensing may not be so apparent.  
Indeed, people rely strongly on their governments’ ability to carefully monitor and 
control the health and safety of the food supply.  If people demand standards about 
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the things we eat, then why not look more seriously at the process by which our 
“mental food” is produced, as well? 
Taking Fowler’s toaster metaphor one step further, it is notable that in other 
cultures of the world, people don’t eat toast or even bread, but rice, or tortillas, or 
some other staple food.  This may seem an obvious point, yet i  can carry important 
implications.  It is true that people eat to satisfy nutritional needs, which may be 
broken down analytically by grams of fiber, protein, carbohydrates, etc.—quantifiable 
elements of food that must be noted in fostering dietary health.  However, as the 
global food market stretches increasingly around the world, it is also necessary to 
understand more about the ritual patterns and functions of foods in different societies.  
Both wheat and rice are staple foods with nutrients that sustain life—yet which we 
choose to eat has more to do with our culture than purported nutritional value.  Mr. 
Fowler’s use of the “toaster” metaphor reveals that his logic, most likely 
inadvertently, is very centered on Western norms.  He may speak to the life 
experience of the television consumer in Burbank or Boston, but not necessarily in 
Burundi or Bangladesh.  And as the global reach of media networks lengthens and 
brings cultures into increasing contact, it is more important than ever to seriously 
consider the ways in which media products make their way among the people of the 
world. 
Gaining Traction on the “Asian Values” Debate 
As the debate rages about whether or not there exist distinct cultural norms, 
such as the oft-debated “Asian values,” underlying the conduct of mass 
communication (see Bublie & Sitarama, 1998; Chandran & Atkins, 1998; Chang, 
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Wang, & Chen, 1998; Elliott, 1998; Ha, 1994; Kitagawa, Salwen, & Driscoll, 1994; 
Lee & Yang, 1995; Zhu, Weaver, Lo, Chen, & Wu, 1997), it is necessary to clarify 
our conceptualization beyond quantifiable content to a broader understanding of 
qualitative strategic differences that defy traditional analysis.  Recent studies 
examining whether or not there is an identifiable “Asian-ness” to be found within 
media messages (e.g., Massey & Chang, 2002; Natarajan & Hao, 2003) rely solely on 
observed content—counting story topics, examining their ove all valence, identifying 
the presence or absence of “conflict,” “supportiveness,” etc. This may be likened to a 
laboratory analysis performed by a scientist removed from the context in which the 
news is actually prepared or consumed.  Although laboratory nalysis can reveal 
something about the quantitative composition of news—its grams of protein and 
carbohydrates, so to speak—little is learned about actual cultural differences.  It is no 
wonder that these authors have found few quantifiable diffrences between Asian and 
Western journalism, despite the fact that even untrained observers find such 
differences obvious in terms of quality.  The difference between barbecued chicken 
and curried chicken may be obvious when we taste it, but it may be difficult to 
describe the difference in analytical terms.  In order to undertake an analysis at the 
taste level, it is important to step out of the laboratory into the actual “kitchens” 
where mass communication is produced, and talk to the “chefs” t mselves. 
Using the metaphor of cooks or chefs to describe those who work as 
journalists implies that they are purposeful creators, combining ingredients in such a 
way as to make their stories palatable to consumers.  At what cost do they avoid 
making a story “dry?”  How spicy is too spicy?  The best place to begin to answer 
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such questions is in the kitchen, among the chefs who go “shopping” for stories in 
search of the perfect dish, or the editors who attempt to combine dishes into the 
perfect “menu.”  What do journalists from very different cultural and societal 
backgrounds consider to be a palatable and healthful presentation of mental “food?”  
Does their national origin growing up in a more libertarian or a more authoritarian 
society impact their way of conceiving their role as mass communicators?  If so, what 







Chapter 2:  Theoretical Overview 
 
Assumptions 
This research begins with the observation that all media producers work under 
constraints.  Not all aspects of the surrounding world can go into a program; choices 
must always be made.  The first constraint that governs p oduction decisions is time, 
both time required to produce a program and the number of minutes available in the 
program itself.  The second constraint facing producers is access to resources, 
including staff resources, funding, and places and people available for filming and 
providing sound.  Both of these constraints are faced by producers everywhere, and as 
such they are expected to appear universally in various forms across cultures.  
However, some constraints may vary across settings or cultures, such as institutional 
context, which involves the values, norms, and circumstances that govern operations 
within a media organization, and market context, which involves the values, norms, 
and circumstances that govern life among media consumers.  The value environment 
of media producers is situated at the juncture between the organizations that fund and 
support their activities and the market(s) to which they ar striving to communicate.  
How do these role conceptions differ across cultures?  How does culture inform how 
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institutional and market contexts are perceived, and in turn, how does this influence 
the choices made to conform to these expectations? 
To understand how producers go about making their media messages 
palatable to their target audiences, the unstated subtext that guides various levels of 
production decisions needs to be made explicit.  The goal-directed perception of the 
world required to produce media “is the product of mental activity in which humans 
construe form, select what is salient or significant, d confer meaning on it” (Eisner, 
1981, p. 275).  Because the busy grind of day-to-day media work rarely affords 
opportunities to articulate underlying values that drive production choices, a major 
goal of this project is to help journalists reach a level of introspection and self-
awareness about their work that can help them make their cultural communication 
values explicit. 
Conceiving of the organizational context surrounding the messag  production 
process as a “kitchen” in which ingredients are selected and arranged into pleasing 
packages for audiences to consume, it is possible to examine how traditional and 
modern values converge to meet the political, economic, and personal demands of a 
given market context.  Rather than just assuming media producers’ intent through 
analysis of the media products they produce, it is helpful to step through the doors of 
media organizations and connect with producers as key partici nts in the process of 
making media messages that play their own living roles in society. 
“Control Analysis” 
Looking back on the first half of the 20th century, it is notable that mass media 
research made its main entry onto the world stage largely during wartime.  Political 
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ambitions on all sides, from Hitler to Roosevelt to Stalin, were on alert with regard to 
the high-stakes issues of propaganda, national security, and ideological control.  
Hitler’s early propaganda images of Nazi rallies chilled au iences worldwide and set 
the stage for concentrated attention on the powerful and potentially dangerous effects 
of mass media. Thus, early motivations to study the effects of the mass media charged 
this research with a sense of urgency and a distinct moral imperative.  Throughout the 
Cold War, with its attending spirit of suspicion and animosity, the intents of media 
producers “on the other side” simply had to be assumed. 
Lasswell’s (1948) classic media model was well-suited to the times: Who  
Says what  To whom   In which channel   With what effect?  In the post-
WWII climate with mass communication research developing under funding from the 
U.S. government in response to concern over Hitler’s uses of mass media, this linear 
framework served as a simple but powerful model for studying media effects.  It 
pointed to variables that could be studied empirically in a laboratory setting in pursuit 
of answers about how the “black box” of the human mind works when presented with 
mediated messages.  Lasswell’s model later provided a useful groundwork for 
Shannon and Weaver’s (1964) slightly more elaborated approach: Information source 
   Message   Transmitter   Signal  Channel  Receiver.  This time period in 
which Shannon and Weaver’s model emerged was driven by major innovations in 
broadcasting: television and radio were becoming household realities; computers 
were being conceived; learning how to transmit information effectively with minimal 
noise was a major priority.  Thinking analytically about how to break down 
communication into discrete, analyzable parts was useful.  Government and business 
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leaders needed answers to pressing questions about what medi did to people, and 
what effects it had on their attitudes and behaviors.  Studying media products rather 
than media producers was more direct and useful, at least on the surface. 
The constant march of technological advances makes the need increasingly 
pressing, however, to understand how the values of those who produce the media 
affect what they produce.  Developing tools to clarify this process will produce results 
with practical applications such as discovering how markets may become structured 
demographically and what effect this patterning may have on social organization 
between and within regions.  Even more significantly, what is learned may fuel larger 
philosophical debates such as those centering around distinct cultural values and, 
more generally, the balance between the public interest p inciple in broadcasting and 
profit-oriented market economies. 
Recent mass communication research has produced a great deal of work on 
purported social and psychological effects of the mass media, but to date insufficient 
empirical work has been done to examine producer-side elements of the media 
process, taking into account the value-laden cultural process by which production 
decisions are made.  A review of how mass media literature has developed over the 
past decades reveals that research questions have moved backward through 
Lasswell’s media model—from effects analysis, to audience analysis, to channel 
analysis, to the more current vogue, content or discourse analysis.  Examining the 
trajectory of mass media research over the past century i  terms of Lasswell’s (1948) 
framework, “Who says what to whom in what channel with what effect?,” a general 
shift in emphasis has moved backwards from effects research (1930s-1950s), 
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followed by channel research (1940s-1960s), followed by audience rsearch (1960s-
1980s), into the message dimension of content or discourse analysis (1980s-present).  
There is still insufficient research that carefully addresses the beginning of the 
process—what Lasswell (1964) termed “control analysis.”  The fact that he should 
term it thus perhaps reveals the Cold War habit of viewing mediated messages as 
being produced under controlled conditions, or even controllig conditions.  
However, with more communicative technologies available than ever before, such as 
email, the World Wide Web, and increasingly accessible travel, researchers are in an 
enhanced position to address the “who” part of the media model by exploring the 
values and real-life work contexts of media producers through contact and substantive 
dialogue. 
From a Transmission to a Cultural View of Media Production 
Studying media-making as a culturally-situated process requires a careful 
consideration of the very fundamentals of how communication is conceived.  
Especially in exploring the producer side of the media, the way in which the 
communication process itself is modeled metaphorically hs significant implications 
for how “control analysis” is conducted. 
Dominant in the traditional American view of communication is the concept 
of communication as transportation, as in the locomotion of goods or ideas from one 
place to another.  This view underpins classic American media theories such as the 
linear models suggested by Lasswell (1948) and Shannon and Weaver (1964), with 
their focus on reducing “noise” and maximizing communicated information, and it is 
still popular in mainstream American communication textbooks today (Gamble & 
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Gamble, 2005).  The foundation of this model rests upon notions of moral order in 
which ideas and authority transcend space to spread the boundaries of political units 
and ideologies through space and time, as in today’s concept of “battles for the hearts 
and minds” of people around the world.  Carey (1989) notes that this view has deep 
roots in European and American colonization, in that “democratic migration in space 
was above all an attempt to trade an old world for a new and represented the profound 
belief that movement in space could be in itself a redemptive act.  It is a belief that 
Americans have never quite escaped” (Carey, 1989, p. 15). 
Ironically, however, this linear transmission view of cmmunication also 
shares a similar footing with notions that are deeply rooted in Chinese civilization.  
The Chinese word for traffic or transportation, jiaotong, is frequently used to refer to 
communication, and Confucian notions of society usually situate communications 
within linear, hierarchical relationships—ruler and subject, teacher and student, 
husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and friend and friend.  This 
conception of communication for the purpose of transmitting, imparting, and 
distributing correct views is not solely found in the West, but in fact has existed 
wherever a dominant society has sought to spread its world view among others.  
Carey (1989) points out that 
From the time upper and lower Egypt were unified under the First Dynasty 
down through the invention of the telegraph, transportatin and 
communication were inseparably linked.  Although messages might be 
centrally produced and controlled, through monopolization of writing or the 
rapid production of print, these messages, carried in the hands of a messenger 
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or between the bindings of a book, still had to be distributed, if they were to 
have their desired effect, by rapid transportation.  Thetelegraph ended the 
identity but did not destroy the metaphor.  Our basic orientation to 
communication remains grounded, at the deepest roots of our thinking, in the 
idea of transmission: communication is a process whereby messages are 
transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people.  
(Carey, 1989, pp. 14-15) 
Carey (1989) posits that this transmission view of communication is 
fundamental in Western cultures—perhaps in all industrial culture—and that the 
center of this idea rests on the transmission of signals or messages for the purpose of 
control.  It is a view of communication that derives from one of the most ancient of 
human dreams: the desire to increase the speed and efficacy of messages as they 
travel in space. 
Carey (1989) suggests, however, that there is an important theoretical 
alternative, namely, what he terms a “ritual view” of c mmunication, wherein 
communication is likened less to linear transmission and rooted more in community 
life through notions such as “sharing,” “participation,” “association,” “fellowship,” 
and “the possession of a common faith.”  Carey argues that communication may be 
conceptualized, not merely as the extension of messages in space, but as the 
maintenance of society in time.  Thus, communicating is viewed not as the act of 
imparting information, but as a distillation of shared beliefs and experiences.  
Drawing on the symbolic interactionist paradigm, Carey suggests that to study 
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communication is to examine the actual social processes wh rein significant symbolic 
forms are created, apprehended, and used. 
Taking research in this direction commits us to the constructivist human 
action perspective on communication theory, in which humans are viewed as 
purposeful actors in a world of constructed symbols.  People are both creators and 
apprehenders of meaning who “construct reality by interpreting the symbols they 
encounter; they create meaning with their constructions t make sense of the world” 
(Infante, Rancer, & Womack, 1997, p. 81).  Because exchanges tak  place through 
symbols, it is necessary to study the rules or context learned within a society or 
culture and the way that these are then encoded into messages.  It is important, 
therefore, to start with individuals, carefully examining the perceptual categories or 
constructs (Kelly, 1955) they create in search of meaning—“meaning” which, under 
Carey’s ritual view of communication, can then be processed and shared with a 
society through the media of mass communication. 
To study media from a cultural perspective, it is important o bring out the 
human voice of the source as a key player in the creation nd application of symbols 
in the shared process of meaning.  Studying media under the classic transmission 
view is incomplete without a full understanding of the eff ct of both culture and 
context.  Media scholars working cross-culturally thus need tools to identify and 
consider the values of mass communicators in a systematic, grounded, meaningful 
way.  Stepping into the metaphorical “kitchens” wherein the “daily feed” is both 
consumed and created in a perpetually iterative process, it i  possible to not only learn 
about how elements are selected and assembled, but to gain a seat at the “table” 
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where people gather, sustain themselves, and engage in culture-building at a 
fundamental level. 
Gatekeeping Theory 
Media research that addresses the process by which events and people in the 
world become “news” is called gatekeeping.  Gatekeeping is the process “by which 
the vast array of potential news messages are winnowed, shaped, and prodded into 
those few that are actually transmitted in the news media” (Shoemaker, Eicholz, Kim, 
& Wrigley, 2001, p. 233).  Most commonly, gatekeeping research examines the 
winnowing process by carefully observing the main decision poi ts (or “gates”) at 
which potential news items are either admitted or halted as they pass along news 
channels from the source to a reporter to a series of edit rs to the general public.  
Gaye Tuchman (1978) calls this the “news net”—the gathering device, admittedly 
filled with holes, by which people troll the world of meaning for items to publish for 
others. 
The father of gatekeeping theory, Kurt Lewin, died befor  his unfinished 
manuscript was published in 1947, in which he paired the terms gatekeeping and 
communication for the first time (Shoemaker, 1991).  As a part of his larger work in 
field theory defining individual life spaces as causally connected to human social 
action (Hample, 1997), Lewin’s theory of channels and gatekeepers, as it came to be 
called, was developed as a means of understanding social changes in a community 
through the metaphor of food choices.  Lewin pointed out that food reaches a family’s 
table through channels such as the garden, the grocery store, and the refrigerator.  At 
each stage of the production process, decisions are made about harvesting, storage, 
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preparation, etc., and at any juncture an individual item may be accepted or rejected 
and never make it to the dinner table.  The key to Lewin’s a alysis was the 
examination of forces acting upon the selection decisions made by the gatekeepers 
along the way, which Lewin felt could be measured and modeled psychologically in 
the same way that models of physical forces are used in physics.  Although a 
physicist by training, Lewin (1951) made the connection of this application of field 
theory to communication when he wrote in another posthumously published 
manuscript that the gatekeeping process “holds not only for food channels but also for 
the traveling of a news item through certain communication channels in a group, for 
movement of goods, and the social locomotion of individuals in many organizations” 
(p. 187). 
Lewin’s gatekeeping theory was first notably applied in the classic “Mr. 
Gates” study by David Manning White (1950), who spent time with a small-city 
newspaper editor whom he dubbed “Mr. Gates,” examining the rationale behind the 
decisions he made about individual news items.  White had also been a journalist,  a 
general assignment reporter at The Times in Davenport, Iowa in 1938, for the 
domestic news bureau of the Office of War Information during World War II, and as 
copy editor for the Peoria Journal in 1947.  White received his doctorate in English 
from the University of Iowa, where he had been a close student of Wilbur Schramm, 
whom he described as “my mentor, my ego ideal, my friend” a  whose conception 
of the sender/receiver model of communication White thoroughly internalized.  
(Reese and Ballinger, 2001).  While at Iowa, White also becam  acquainted with Kurt 
Lewin and was influenced by his scientific approach to social-psychological “forces” 
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that he felt could be modeled mathematically in the same way that gravity could be.  
White’s methodological orientation was shaped in an academic nvironment that 
conceived of the mediated communication process in linear terms, thus White 
undertook his famous Mr. Gates study as an early test of Lewin’s theory.  White 
recalled, 
One day I happened to run across a paper by Kurt Lewin in which he oined 
the term “gatekeeper.”  I thought that the complex serie of “gates” a 
newspaper report went through from the actual event to the finished story in a 
newspaper would make an interesting study, and thus pursued it.  Dur ng the 
summer of 1947 I worked on the copy desk of the Peoria Journal, with 
primary responsibility for the editorial page…   The next semester I began to 
“study” the way the same AP or UPI story appeared in a number of 
newspapers throughout the country.  The genesis of what bec me my 
Gatekeeper study had begun, for I soon discerned quantitative ( nd 
qualitative) differences in the very same story.  This meant that “gatekeepers” 
were operative, or so it seemed to me.  (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 646). 
For this pioneering gatekeeper study, White enlisted the help of a wire editor 
for the Peoria Star to keep a record of his rationale for choosing stories from the wire 
services to print in his newspaper.  The editor, dubbed “Mr. Gates,” received 
approximately 12,000 inches of text from three news services per week, but selected 
only about one-tenth of that information, thus the basis of White’s study centered on 
the editor’s rationale for selecting certain stories over others.  The reasons given by 
“Mr. Gates” for his preferences included such rejection criteria as “b.s.” and 
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“propaganda,” and his tendency to accept stories was based on their “clarity,” 
“conciseness,” and “angle,” particularly those which were “slanted to conform to our 
editorial policies” (White, 1950, p. 390).  White concluded that e editor’s choices 
showed “how highly subjective, how reliant upon value-judgments based on the 
gatekeeper’s own set of experiences, attitudes, and expectations the communication 
of ‘news’ really is” (White, 1950, p. 386). 
Although White was clearly aware of the wide qualitative range of values that 
underpin a news worker’s decision-making process, he chose to focus his study on 
which stories and lines made it through the “gates” into the newspaper.  This concern 
was likely due to influences he had received from Wilbur Schramm and Kurt Lewin 
at Iowa toward being able to model these forces mathematically.  This dichotomous 
“yes/no” orientation is understandable in the context of early mass media research, 
when the dominant American models of the mediated communication process were 
largely linear and digital, along the lines of the engineering models proposed by early 
communication scholars such as Claude Shannon, Warren Weaver, and Norbert 
Weiner.  These early theories “treated information as a general concept, which could 
be expressed mathematically and, thus, could unify questions in human 
communication, computers, biology, spanning across mass and interpersonal 
communication, regardless of the ‘channel’” (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 643).  This 
early tendency to conduct media research in nearly mathematical terms had to leave 
out much information about the dynamic context-bound personal forces at work in 
gatekeeping in order to simplify the process of understanding whether certain stories 
or facts made it through to publication or not. 
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Gatekeeping studies after White, such as those by Gieber (1956), McNelly 
(1959), Snider (1967), Bass (1969), and McQuail and Windahl (1981), kept with 
White’s tradition of examining the news item selection process, focusing on the 
simple yes or no of whether an item was accepted or not.  Although Chibnall’s (1977) 
work did make the important theoretical leap of conceiving of news personnel as 
creators rather than mere gatherers of the news, gatekeeping theory still has not lived 
up to its potential of helping us understand the complexities of communicators’ 
dynamic “life spaces,” as proposed by Lewin. 
Examining Producer Intent 
Gans (1979) and Gitlin (1980) suggest that research addressing factorstha  
influence journalistic decision-making can be organized into five basic approaches: 
1)  Mirror approach:  Media content reflects a basically accurate depiction of 
social reality with little influence on the part of the journalist. 
2)  Communicator-centered approach:  Media content is influenced by 
journalists’ socialization and attitudes as formed by psychological, 
personal, political, and professional attitudes intrinsic to the individual 
journalist. 
3)  Organizational routine approach:  Media content is influenced by the way 
workers are organized and trained within their organizations. 
4)  Social forces approach:  Media content is driven by factors external to both 
the communicator and the organization, namely social, economic, and 
cultural forces inherent in the media market. 
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5) Ideological approach:  Media content is influenced by the ideology of those 
in power in society, who directly or indirectly drive mass media 
content through hegemonic pressures that ensure status quo interests 
will be upheld. 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) provide seminal work comprehensively 
exploring these various sources of influence on media content, yet in characterizing 
intrinsic forces acting on the individual journalist, they focus mainly on gender, 
sexual orientation, and ethnicity (i.e., minority groups within the United States), to 
the exclusion of issues of culture related to national origin.  For Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996), the nation as a variable is linked more to market context insofar as media 
markets are controlled and regulated by government strictures, and although some 
other nations are mentioned in passing, the bulk of focus goes to characterizing the 
media landscape of the United States. 
Because internal, organizational, external, and ideological factors do not act as 
discrete, unconnected factors on decision-making, but rather interact in complex ways 
that may be difficult for a journalist to articulate, his study temporarily suspends 
these labels for the purpose of focusing on taking the journalist’s perspective.  
Although the approach in this study is largely communicator-centered in that the 
analysis takes place at the level of the individual communicator, it does seek to 
inductively link journalistic decision-making to broader issues involving 
organizations, nations, and ultimately ideologies.  However, rather than being a study 
of mass media content, this project is a qualitative examination of producer intent, 




The recent work of Shoemaker et al. (2001) typifies traditional gatekeeping 
research by describing news items as having “forces” that “either facilitate or 
constrain their passage through the gatekeeping process” (p. 233).  They characterize 
these forces as varying in intensity as well as in polarity, i.e., having varying degrees 
of positive or negative valence.  For a story to pass through a news gate, it must have 
a sufficiently positive valence and intensity to project it through whatever limitations 
on capital or resources may be required to produce or airit.  These forces can be 
examined at many different levels of analysis, such as individuals, routines of 
communication work, organizational characteristics, social institutions, and the 
overall social system, but the theoretical conception of forces at work in the 
gatekeeping process has placed the force within the news it m itself.  A news item is 
deemed newsworthy if the positive force behind it is high enough to make it through 
various gates in the news channel.  This places the theoretical emphasis on the 
message instead of the meaning, and on the product instead of the producer and his or 
her “life space.” 
Although significant work has been done on the decisions made by message 
producers within media organizations (Allan, 1999; Chan, 2002; Dayan & Katz, 
1992; Epstein, 1973; Fishman, 1980; Franklin & Murphy, 1998; Galtung & Ruge, 
1981; Gans, 1979; Hartley & Montgomery, 1985; Hofstetter, 1976; Jacobs, 1996; 
Pozner, 1991; Reese, 1991; Roshco, 1975; Scott, 1994; Tuchman, 1978; Turow, 
1983; Xu., 2000), few studies on producer intentions appear to have been conducted 
cross-culturally, especially with cultures that have ben distant as a result of the Cold 
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War.  Instead, assumptions about what others intend are based on interpretations of 
their programming, as in content and framing analysis.  Because the underpinnings of 
gatekeeping research characterize newsworthiness as existing within pieces of news 
themselves, few tools exist to examine cultural or contextual factors that affect how 
news is created and shaped into “food for thought” by different media producers 
around the world. 
Recent studies are beginning to critically examine the intercultural validity of 
the newsworthiness concept, because, as Schwarz (2005) pointed ut, 
“Comprehensive and comparative empirical studies within the context of news factors 
and newsworthiness that examine this problem are rare” (p. 2).  In his examination of 
German and Mexican newspapers, Schwarz found weak support for hyp theses about 
the correlation between empirically-designated newsworthiness factors, news 
selection, and the space and prominence assigned for stories, both textually and 
visually, although qualitative differences between Mexican and German orientations 
to potential and actual problem-solving were apparent.  Tai (2000) found cultural and 
contextual differences in news selection rankings among mainland Chinese, 
Taiwanese, and Japanese editors, and Hanitzsch (2004) found cultural differences in 
self-perception and role behavior among journalists within the culturally 
heterogeneous country of Indonesia.  However, because stdi s such as these are 
conducted from an external gatekeeping perspective, still few tools are available with 
which to understand journalists’ values as contextually situated.  Without terms 
grounded solidly within the reasoning processes of the journalists themselves, 
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contextual understanding of the effect of culture on the communication process is 
limited. 
From Newsworthiness to Strategic Decision-Making 
Although the gatekeeping paradigm has been successfully applied to describe 
the process of news selection, it still is lacking in sufficient richness to fully 
characterize the complex, multilayered process of media production.  In his 
explication of the gatekeeping paradigm, Lewin (1951) describes gatekeeping in food 
terms as the process by which each individual item of food makes it to a family’s 
table.   “Do I keep this item or throw it away?  Do I keep that item or throw it away?”  
However, anyone who has ever prepared a meal knows that cooking is much more 
artful and complex; humans do not operate digitally via yes or no.  Thus, a fuller 
vocabulary is needed to describe the multi-faceted strategic decisions made in not 
only selecting, but also in preparing a message for the consumption of others. 
Previous studies delineating factors or forces that influence journalistic 
decision-making, consistent with White’s (1950) early Mr. Gates study, have focused 
mainly on newsworthiness, the basic yes/no of story selection.  One classic example 
is the pioneering work in the study of newsworthiness factors conducted by Galtung 
and Ruge (1965), who explored the news values of editors at four newspapers in 
Norway.  Their now oft-cited model was published around the same time as Shannon 
and Weaver’s (1964) classic linear noise-reduction framework: Information source    
Message   Transmitter   Signal  Channel  Receiver.  In their 
conceptualization, Galtung and Ruge (1965) used a telecommunicatio s metaphor 
that identified the actual message source as a signal (as in a radio signal) that either 
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would or would not be recorded by a media agency and delivered to the news-
consuming public based on factors inherent within the messag  itself.   
Galtung and Ruge’s (1970) framework suggests the following: 
Imagine the world can be likened to an enormous set of broadcasting stations, 
each one emitting its signal or its programme at its proper wavelength….  The 
set of world events, then, is like a cacophony of sound one gets by scanning 
the dial of one’s radio receiver, and … becomes meaningful only if one station 
is tuned in and listened to for some time before one switches to the next one.  
(Galtung & Ruge, 1970, p. 261) 
Based on this metaphorical framework, the pioneering propositions set forth 
by Galtung and Ruge (1965) imply that the forces propelling messag  to be 
consumed are inherent within the messages themselves, as in physical forces that 
operate according to an objective set of standards.  Their propositions focus on the 
signal or message rather than the news producer. 
1) Frequency:  If the frequency of the signal is outside the dial it will not be 
recorded. 
2) Threshold:  The stronger the signal, the greater the amplitude, the more 
probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to. 
3) Unambiguity:  The more clear and unambiguous the signal (the less noi e
there is), the more probable it will be recorded as worth listening to. 
4) Meaningfulness:  The more meaningful the signal, the more probable that it 
will be recorded as worth listening to. 
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5) Consonance:  The more consonant the signal is with the mental im ge of 
what one expects to find, the more probable that it will be recorded as 
worth listening to. 
6) Unexpectedness:  The more unexpected the signal, the more probable that 
will be recorded as worth listening to. 
7) Continuity:  If one signal has been tuned in to the more likely it will 
continue to be tuned into as worth listening to. 
8) Composition:  The more a signal has been tuned into, the more probable 
that a different kind of signal will be recorded as worth listening to. 
9) Reference to elite nations:  The more an event concerns elite nations, the 
more probable that it will become a news item. 
10) Reference to elite people:  The more the event concerns elite people, the 
more probable that it will become a news item. 
11) Reference to persons:  The more the event can be seen in personal terms, 
as due to the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it 
will become a news item. 
12) Reference to something negative:  The more negative the event in its 
consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item. 
(Galtung & Ruge, 1965) 
In providing these propositions, no information is provided about the method 
Galtung and Ruge used to devise these newsworthiness factors.  They state that to test 
the validity of their propositions, “the proper thing to do would be to observe 
journalists at work or radio listeners operating with the dial—and we have no such 
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data.  For want of this the factors should be anchored in general reasoning and social 
science findings,” although the latter they provide only in endnotes “since they are 
not essential to our reasoning” (Galtung & Ruge, 1970, p. 262).  In other words, the 
newsworthiness factors on which much of the extant gatekeeping literature is based 
are not derived from the perspectives of journalists. 
By 1974, almost ten years after the publication of Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) 
study, Chaudhary (1974) reviewed the gatekeeping literature to date and discovered 
that there had not been “any comprehensive, systematic studie  on comparative news 
judgment on any two countries” (p. 236).  She set out to examine the influence of 
culture on perceptions of newsworthiness factors by comparing  sample of thirty 
English-speaking journalists from the U.S. and India according to their ranking of 
news headlines.  Chaudhary performed her analysis of nine newsworthiness factors: 
timeliness, proximity, human interest, impact, conflict, prominence, ovelty, 
sensationalism, and unusualness, although she provided no reasoning or justification 
for selecting these nine factors other than that they had appeared in (unspecified) 
textbooks.  As a result of the research, Chaudhary (1974) found that American and 
Indian gatekeepers used similar criteria for selecting news based on headlines, and 
concluded that, at least in the case of the U.S. and India, “English language 
newspapers in democratic countries, even though they may be culturally quite 
dissimilar, use the same news values, and their newsmen use similar criteria in their 
judgment” (p. 246).  Despite this general similarity of criteria, however, Chaudhary 
did find that American and Indian reporters differed in their rating of stories for 
human interest, impact, prominence, novelty, and sensationalism, and that they 
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interpreted conflict differently.   She also noted that education and experience 
appeared to exert an effect across cultures on different rankings on the factors of 
timeliness, proximity, sensationalism, novelty, andconflict.  Thus, Chaudhary’s work 
forms the basis for an expectation that there may be cultural differences in news 
judgment, and that educational and experiential factors shuld be given consideration 
for their effect on news judgment.  However, in terms of pecific findings, the lack of 
grounding within this small sample size and the fact that the journalists were 
operating in English-speaking cultures in which democratic ideals are emphasized 
sheds limited light on the issue of how and why culture may influence news selection. 
Five years later, Peterson (1979) applied Galtung and Ruge’s newsworthiness 
factors to examine the news selection behavior of journalists working both at home 
and abroad for The Times (London) using a set of ten “properties of events” as news 
values: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness (cultural proximity and 
relevance), domestic news, consonance, unexpectedness, elitism, personalization, and 
negativity.  A survey was administered to 73 home office staff, sta f correspondents, 
and stringers (part-time or freelance correspondents), asking them to rank the 
newsworthiness of potential news items.  Peterson hypothesized that home office staff 
would select events with higher objective newsworthiness scores than stringers 
without a European or North American background.  Although the findings revealed 
slight differences by the values of consonance, meaningfulness, domestic news, and
personalization, a majority of the respondents selected events with hig er 
newsworthiness as suggested by Galtung and Ruge (1965).  A more detail d analysis 
of the respondents’ origin showed that cultural differences between sub-groups did 
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explain disagreement more than did their organizational positions, but because of the 
nature of the survey method, no culturally grounded theory was developed.  
Nonetheless, these results were sufficient for Peterson (1979) to conclude that 
“Newsmen socialized to the news norms of Europe and North America, but born and 
educated in other parts of the world, diverge somewhat in the r news norms” (p. 125), 
giving support to the notion that culture has an effect on communication criteria. 
Lange (1984) took this line of research a step further, by examining the effect 
of national development on perceptions of newsworthiness by comparing headlines 
from domestic newspapers in the U.S., England, South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya, 
Zambia, Ghana, and Uganda.  The eight newsworthiness factors he used for the study 
were direct exhortation, orientation toward the future, cooperation, positive 
evaluation, involvement of elites, positive news of government officials, positive 
evaluation of news subjects, and personalization.  Lange discovered that the less 
developed countries published significantly more domestic news stories with direct 
exhortation, orientation toward the future, positive evaluation, involvement of elites, 
and personalization than more developed countries.  Lange concluded that a nation’s 
level of development does strongly affect perceptions of what constitutes proper 
news, although because the study was conducted through content a alysis of 
headlines without the involvement of actual journalists, no theory was drawn to 
explain the findings.  Lange (1984)  noted that his study “does not assume conscious 
intent on the part of journalists or their bosses,” because “indeed, most people are 
only dimly aware of the connections that their cultural values make between 
environment and behavior” (p. 83).  Thus, although this study provided reason to 
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correlate news judgment with national development, this research was not positioned 
to offer grounded answers as to why. 
More recently, Allan (1999) reviewed the extant media litera ure and gleaned 
a comprehensive list of 12 newsworthiness factors that were most consistently cited 
between studies: conflict, relevance, timeliness, simplification, personalization, 
unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite 
persons, cultural specificity, and negativity.  Newsworthiness factors such as these 
have endured since the 1960s because they have a degree of predictive power and 
have proven useful in accounting for newsroom decision-making behavior.  However, 
they are limited in that they imply a lesser degree of agency on the part of the 
journalist, conveying the assumption that there is something obvious and inherent in
the piece of news itself that makes it worthy of being broadcast.  However, as 
sociologists Molotsch and Lester (1974) point out, there are no free-standing 
newsworthy events “out there,” only occurrences that are promoted to the status of 
“events” through how they are presented to the public, often via the media.  
The newsworthiness approach leaves little room for chara te izing creative, 
constructive engagement on the part of the journalist.  The received newsworthiness 
factors that media scholars continue to work with are limited in that they cannot 
account for the full range of prosocial engagement on the part of the reporter, such as 
individual aesthetic sense or a desire for one’s work to positively affect the lives of 
the audience.  In other words, the current approach leaves insufficient room for the 
human judgment or values of the communicator.  Thus, attention should be removed 
from the message for a moment, for the sake of looking back to the beginning of 
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Lasswell’s media model, from the “Says what” of the mssage to the “Who” that is 
communicating, to more fully account for the subtle human forces at work in media 
decision-making. 
Little agreement is evident in the media literature on a definitive set of 
newsworthiness factors that can be tested across cultures.  Because most of the 
research conducted to date has been performed quantitatively using the traditional 
“yes/no” gatekeeping formula, and because the newsworthiness factors were 
determined in a relative vacuum by each researcher, few tools are available with 
which to systematize research on producer intent in various cultures and settings.   
Thus, to address the entire repertoire of taste that media producers may draw from to 
make their stories appealing to their audiences, the lists of newsworthiness factors 
utilized so far should be reworked to account for the strategic presentational style of 
those who produce them. 
To understand what makes newsworthiness worthy, media workers should be 
consulted on why things like simplification and personalization count as strategic 
factors.  What is it about conflict that makes a piece interesting to readers?  Speaking 
of relevance means relevance to what, or to whom?  To the agency’s agend , to 
someone’s conception of the current flow of news events, to the everyday lives of 
media consumers?  Why is reference to elite nations important?  Listening to the 
discourse of journalists provides meaningful insight into cultura ly influenced 





The Journalist within the Value Environment 
Because journalists usually execute their work within organizations, and 
because communication patterns exist within organizations hat form expectations for 
role relations, human interaction, and stated or unstated organizational values and 
goals, it is important that a journalist’s organizational environment be taken as a level 
of culture.  Shoemaker and Reese (1996) define an organization a formally-structured 
entity that is “goal-directed, composed of interdependent parts, and bureaucratically 
structured—members perform specialized functions, in standardized roles” (p. 144).  
Although the primacy of economic goals is often considere  to provide the most 
salient directive for media organizations (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Turow, 1984; 
Bagdikian, 1992; Epstein, 1973; Auletta, 1994), larger ideological concerns also 
influence expectations at the societal level, governing “the way we perceive our 
world and ourselves,” controlling “what we see as ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’” (Becker, 
1984, p. 69).   
Stuart Hall (1989) points out that it is the media’s ability to “define” situations 
that gives them their ideological power.  Yet what paradigms “define” situations in 
the minds of media workers themselves?  Political economists such as Murdock and 
Golding (1977) argue that analysis of underlying values in news production must give 
attention to the economic context as well as the class base of control mechanisms 
governing organizational funding, mandates, and policy.  As Altheide (1976) notes, 
“the organizational, practical, and other mundane features of newswork promote a 
way of looking at events which fundamentally distorts them” (p. 24). 
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For the purposes of this study, journalists are studied at a level that, at least in 
immediate terms, seems to dissociate them from their organizations for the purposes 
of examining a fuller range of possible influences on the intent that underlies their 
strategic presentational decision-making.  However, as patterns emerge that 
illuminate the role conceptions and constraints that drive the ways journalists craft 
stories for the consumption of others, organizational and ideological patterns can be 
observed inductively that link this work to studies that take the organization or nation 
as the level of analysis.   
Research Rationale 
The traditional focus in gatekeeping research is to conceive of psychological 
forces and role relationships in quantifiable, analytical terms, a tendency heavily 
influenced by the prevailing methodologies of the early days in which this theoretical 
orientation emerged.  However, this study suggests that this research may be 
enhanced by a more thorough exploration of context and values guiding not only 
yes/no gatekeeping choices, but also strategic decisions ab uthow messages are 
crafted and why.   
Speaking metaphorically using Tuchman’s (1978) “news net” metaphor, this 
study moves beyond examining what comes home in gatherers’ nets.  Examining the 
gatekeeping process from the perspective of newsworthiness values implies that the 
food jumps into the net itself based on the “forces” inherent in its own makeup.  
However, to better understand the cultural and contextual factors that bear on news 
decisions from day to day in newsrooms around the world, it is important to also 
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consider the needs of those who make the nets and plan the trajectory of the gathering 
expeditions to better understand what public communicators seek to catch and why. 
With the present-day ability to communicate directly with media producers 
worldwide, better tools are needed to explore the process by which meaning is made 
and coded into media messages across cultures.  Knowing whether a message is to be 
broadcast is helpful, but understanding how and why it is to be presented is another 
issue altogether.  The creative environment in which newsmakers produce meaning is 
dynamic, so the tools used to understand the process must be similarly open and 






Chapter 3:  The Development of International Broadcasting 
 
The Origins of Propaganda 
Communication that functions to disseminate knowledge or promote 
particular ideas may be known by a variety of names—education, persuasion, 
advertising, propaganda, indoctrination, even brainwashing.  The term applied to 
describe disseminative communication inherently implies a degree of political 
commentary.  What is perceived to be the intent of the communicator?  Do we or do 
we not agree with that perceived intention?  Among the various types of 
disseminative communication, this study looks closely at the concept of propaganda 
because of its frequent linkage with popular conceptions of international broadcasting 
throughout the history of mass media.  The world’s earliest transnational broadcasting 
infrastructures were constructed and funded to meet wartime political ends, thus the 
very act of speaking into an official microphone to be heard across the planet was 
largely considered throughout the 20th century to be an act of propaganda.  Yet is this 
the intention of those who go to work each day to do just that?  In order to demarcate 
a cross-culturally agreeable set of parameters that may be fruitfully applied across 
contexts, it is necessary to investigate how the concept of propaganda has evolved 
over time in Western and Eastern cultures. 
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The term propaganda, as it is used today in modern American society, carries 
a sinister connotation of mindful deception for the purpose of political exploitation.  
However, it was not always so.  The concept of propaganda, i  fact, evolved in the 
decidedly mainstream religious climate of early 17th Century Rome, when the 
reigning Pope, Gregory XV, convened a conference of cardin ls charged with leading 
a counter-offensive to the Protestant Reformation.  Themission of this “Sacra 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide” (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) 
was “to re-conquer by spiritual arms, by prayer and good works, by preaching and 
catechising, the countries… lost to the Church in the debacl  of the 16th century and 
to organize into an efficient corps the numerous missionary enterprises for the 
diffusion of the gospel in pagan lands” (Guilday, 1921, p. 480). 
The “Propaganda,” to which this congregation came to be referred 
colloquially, quickly became one of the most powerful arms of the Catholic Church.  
The young “propagandists,” as alumni of the Propaganda college were called, 
developed great affection for the congregation and called it their “great mother.”  
Thus, the concept of propaganda “found its birth in a wave of tremendous emotion 
and devoted energy” (Jackall, 1995, p. 1). 
Connotations of Propaganda 
The literal Latin definition of propaganda is “to propagate” or “to sow,” but 
the early association of such propagation with the spread of the Catholic faith and 
overt opposition to Protestantism caused the concept to lose its neutrality and carry a 
pejorative meaning, at least for those in largely Protestant cultures.  (It is interesting 
to note that propaganda simply means “advertising” in modern Spanish.)  Over time, 
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the American notion of propaganda came to carry an unmistakably negative 
connotation, as defined for instance in Brande’s 1842 Dictionary of Science, 
Literature, and Arts as “a term of reproach to secret associations for the spread of 
opinions and principles which are viewed by most governments with horror and 
aversion.”  By the 20th century, “propaganda” was known in the English language as 
a communicative tactic of dictators such as Hitler and Lenin, characters indeed 
viewed by citizens of the Allied nations with “horror and aversion,” thus establishing 
the modern American notion of propaganda as a dangerous vehicle of mass 
manipulation. 
However, this usage of the term is far from universal.  The People’s Republic 
of China, for instance, openly boasts as a major part of its government a powerful 
Department of Propaganda (宣传部, XuanChuanBu) with influential branches at all 
levels of society.  This department is officially described by the Chinese government 
as “a movement of the liberated people to educate and reform themselves by 
democratic methods of learning, serving as the political foundation for our general 
cultural and educational work” (Kuo, 1950, p. 2).  For Chinese, propaganda 
(xuanchuan) is usually described as a neutral term, and the phenomenon of 
propaganda is considered to be a natural part of life, “an absolute necessity and a 
powerful tool for governing” (Yang, 1994, p. 18).  Although modern Chinese, coming 
into greater contact with Western communication theory, are more often translating 
xuanchuan as “publicity” rather than “propaganda,” it is widely agreed that this shift 
in terminology is more an act of communication accommodation than a substantive 
change in ideological sensibilities. 
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Definitions of propaganda around the world tend to center on the purpose, 
technique, or outcome of the communication in question.   Definitions can range from 
the very brief and general, such as “organized persuasion” (DeVito, 1986, p. 239), to 
long and specific, such as “the world of large organizations or groups to win over the 
public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions 
packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound upporting 
reasons” (Sproule, 1994, p. 8).  Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) provide a fruitful 
definition of propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 6). 
To begin, then, to be called propaganda, communication must by definition be 
deliberate, intentional, crafted willfully to convey a message.  (Whether or not that 
message is received as intended is a different matter.)  This considered mindfulness 
implies systematic care with regard to the creation of the message(s), whether on the 
individual, organizational, or even national level.  In terms of purpose, propaganda is 
often “associated with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or 
maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist” (Jowett & 
O’Donnell, 1999, p. 3). 
The Development of Western Broadcasting 
Although it would be convenient to lump the East and the West into neat 
categories, of course the political, social, and cultura  realities defy such a 
generalization.  Yet for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to at least draw 
some basic parameters that allow us to engage in cross-cultural analysis.  Thus, this 
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study will focus on two general groupings: Chinese (comprising the PRC, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong), and Western (meaning, for the sake of this study, the U.S. and 
Britain).  Although significant differences are recognized b tween the U.S. and the 
U.K., for the purposes of this research they are taken together for their shared general 
history of liberal democracy, individual rights, market capit lism, and a free sphere of 
public discourse.  In later studies, more fine-tuned differences should be examined 
between media produced in Washington or London, for instance, or between politico-
social differences in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but for the purposes 
of this research, some generalizations across West and E st are made to investigate 
whether there are distinct differences in Eastern and Western approaches to media.   
Western media systems are often regarded as being the world’s leading 
exemplars of the liberal values of free expression, personal freedom, individual rights, 
and open debate (Sopiee, 1997).  Not only has this freedom—be it personal, political, 
religious, economic, or philosophical—been forged at the cor of post-Enlightenment 
Western thought, but this trend was intensified with the formation of the United 
States, as freedoms yearned for in Europe were codified into American legal and 
social practice (Hiebert & Gibbons, 2000). 
Evidence abounds, however, that the ancient Greeks, particul ly Alexander 
the Great, were experts at using the means of public discourse to achieve official 
purposes, not to mention that the communication strategies of mperial Rome, the 
Crusades, the British and Soviet Empires, Napoleonic France, and of course Hitler’s 
Third Reich further testify that Westerners are no strangers to making and 
maintaining power and fortune by careful use of public communication (Jowett & 
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O’Donnell, 1999).   America, as a classic modern society founded on post-
Enlightenment Protestant values, has been more tolerant of propaganda as a 
commercial than a governmental force.  Most modern American work on the subject 
(such as Black, 2001; Cunningham, 2001; Baker & Martinson, 2001) casts 
propaganda in negative terms, fueled by a postmodern, almost despairing Ellulian 
belief in the dark inevitability of propaganda as a symptom of our fragmenting global 
society. 
British International Broadcasting 
Although early technological advances in the use of broadcast technology 
took off mostly quickly in the United States, it was leading figures in Great Britain 
who first realized the potential of using the airwaves as a means of consciously 
purveying culture and information.  Throughout World War I, the British government 
had resisted the plea of wireless manufacturers to promote the sales of their receivers 
by allowing for the transmission of regular programming, but by the end of the war in 
1918, it was impossible to resist the tide of popular interes in the medium.  In 1922, 
the British Broadcasting Company was granted a license by the British Post Office 
and began broadcasting in the U.K. with funding from three sources: the original 
stock, the royalties on wireless sets sold by manufactrers, and a share of revenue 
from broadcast receiving licenses which the Post Office coll cted from the listening 
public (Crisell, 1997). 
The first person to be appointed general manager of the new network was a 
34-year-old engineer named John C. Reith, an austere Scot of Calvinist upbringing 
with no prior experience in broadcasting.  He had previously served as an army 
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officer and a manager of an engineering works in Glasgow, and it was said, “He ruled 
with a rod of iron from the first day of his appointment as general manager” (Wood, 
1992, p. 32). 
Reith believed passionately that it was God’s will that e was in charge of 
British broadcasting, and that it was his destiny.  He also believed that 
monopoly in the case of broadcasting was a virtue, and it gave him the duty to 
choose and broadcast the kind of programme he thought was good for the 
British public—rather than the kind of programmes the general public might 
have chosen for themselves.  …  The wearing of evening dress by the station 
announcers, although it had always been general practice, now became 
compulsory; this was one of Reith’s first changes as director general.  (Wood, 
1992, p. 35) 
Along with Reith, the BBC was placed under the control of a board of 
governors, “persons of judgment and independence,” and the terms of the Royal 
Charter under which the BBC was created made it clear that “broadcasting was seen 
from the outset as an instrument for serving the interes s of the government” (Wood, 
1992, p. 33). 
Although part of the BBC’s establishment was to help stimulate the sales of 
wireless receivers, the network was not founded solely to make a commercial profit—
indeed, the governmental licensing fee arrangement had been crafted to cushion the 
company against such a need.  Rather, Reith and his contemporaries envisioned the 
use of broadcasting as a public service to “teach and train”he listening audience in 
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music, literature, film, drama, and the arts.  Initially, no news was permitted to be 
broadcast on the airwaves, but remained within the purview of British press barons. 
In 1927, the British Broadcasting Company became the British Broadcasting 
Corporation under Royal Charter to “inform, educate, and entertain; to report the 
proceedings of parliament; to provide a political balance; and in a national emergency 
to broadcast government messages” (Crisell, 1997, p. 22).  The BBC was neither to 
editorialize nor to carry any advertising, and it was specifically mandated from the 
outset to strive to maintain a position of editorial independence.  By the same year, 
Reith had convinced parliament of the great potential of the BBC to communicate 
with Britain’s far-flung empire, and shortwave transmitters were erected to broadcast 
the BBC’s signal around the world.  Regular service through ut the British Empire 
was established by 1932 with the sound of Big Ben and “London calli g” as the 
signature trademark that identified all broadcasts of the empir  service—which went 
out in English, of course. 
By 1935, under pressure from the radio propaganda of Hitler’s Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy, the BBC began to realize that an Empire Service was no longer 
enough, and in 1937 the House of Commons voted to begin countering totalitarian 
propaganda by “the widespread dissemination of news and informati n,” (Wood, 
1992, p. 40).  Overseas broadcasts in languages other than English were assembled 
and commenced under threat of war in 1938.  At this time, the Empire Service was 
restructured to be cut off from funding by the domestic license fee and instead funded 




During this sensitive early period in international broadcasting, the British 
took pains to separate notions of information and propaganda.  Although most other 
countries in the world called their information departments “ministries of 
propaganda,” in Britain it was called the Ministry of Information.  Throughout World 
War II, the BBC had complete monopoly over news broadcasting, and because by 
1939 Britain was well involved in the war, the Ministry of In ormation was 
responsible for funneling all news through a variety of censors at the Foreign Office 
and within the MOI itself.  Thus, before any piece of news reached the BBC’s 
studios, it had been subject to much screening and vetting.  I  was said at the time that 
BBC news “was intended to act like a bromide instead of a thought stimulator—some 
described it as chloroforming the people” (Wood, 1992, p. 54).  However, “the British 
public were educated to associate Britain with truth and the enemy with propaganda, 
concealing the origins of the word with faith and truth” (Wood, 1992, p. 61). 
However, during World War II, the British government under Churchill 
stepped fully into the mainstream of propaganda warfare.  One of the best-kept 
secrets of the time was the secret subsidy agreement between the British government 
and Reuters press, signed in 1938, under which Reuters agreed to transmit fabricated 
news from the British government in exchange for payments.  The first sum of  
64,000 was received by Reuters in 1940 for “propaganda services” (Wood, 1992, p. 
55).  Despite its early active (and lucrative) role in the peddling of government 
propaganda, Reuters has been able throughout the years to project and maintain an 
image of honesty and neutrality. 
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During the Cold War, international broadcasting by the Allied powers 
expanded as a result of two main developments—the Soviet attainment of nuclear 
weaponry, and the successful launching of broadcast satellites that significantly 
enhanced the reach of broadcasts around the world.  In 1965, Britain’s external 
broadcasting efforts came to be known as the BBC World Service, which expanded 
through the 1960s, suffered cuts after the 1973 oil crisis, and the  expanded over 60% 
from a listening audience of 75 million in 1980 to over 120 million in 1990 (Wood, 
1992, p. 4). 
Today, the BBC World Service goes out twenty-four hours a day in English 
plus 40 other languages to a confirmed weekly audience of over 130 million in over 
90 countries, providing approximately half of its time in news and half in music, 
drama, and sports.  In terms of content, “until recently the government determined the 
languages in which the BBC broadcast and the length of its tran missions, but the 
Corporation has always kept editorial control” (Criswell, 1997, p. 23).  Studies show 
the BBC to be the most well-known and respected internaional broadcaster in the 
world, and most believe “the key to its success lies in its image as an independent 
voice in the world, not the voice of the British government” (Wood, 1992, p. 4). 
U.S. International Broadcasting 
The term propaganda entered modern American usage in 1918 (Jowett & 
O’Donnell, 1989), soon after World War I, and some of the earliest studies of this 
modern mass phenomenon were carried out on the communicatio s of Adolf Hitler.  
It is no wonder that, given the dominant transmission view of communication 
predominant in U.S. academic circles at the time (Carey, 1989), early propaganda 
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research would take on a decidedly linear “effects” approach (Lasswell, 1948), in a 
climate of general apprehension over the manipulative uses toward which mass 
communication could be employed.  Funding for propaganda rese rch throughout the 
20th century was provided mostly by official governmental organizations, and despite 
early public education efforts (such as the 1937 “How to Detect Propaganda” 
campaign), the U.S. government clearly jumped into the propaganda parade itself 
with such early efforts as the WWI Committee on Public Information (CPI).  This 
committee, under the leadership of politician George Creel, worked to convey the 
message of WWI as an idealistic war fought to ensure the worldwide triumph of 
democracy through all the classic modes of propaganda: press rel a es, interviews 
with CPI spokesmen, cartoons based on the Creel Committee’s ‘Bulletin for 
Cartoonists,’ advertisements, war posters, CPI flyers stuffed in workers’ pay 
envelopes, the academic “National School Service” curricula, war films, public 
‘Four-minute-men’ talks, war expositions, and “Americanization” committees aimed 
at new immigrants, particularly those from non-British backgrounds (Sproule, 1989). 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s as commercial radio flourished in the U.S., 
other Western powers were discovering the uses of short-wave technology for 
sending information over long distances to people in other countries.  Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union, and Germany all began in 1927 to erect short-wave towers for the 
specific purpose of broadcasting information (as opposed to entertai ment), and by 
1929 the Soviet Union’s Radio Moscow had commenced broadcasting external 
programs in French, English, and German.  After Hitler’s rise to power in the 1930s, 
shortwave towers began broadcasting the voice of Nazi Germany to all parts of the 
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world, and in the mid 1930s, Italy became the first nation to begin broadcasting in 
Arabic.  Although short-wave technology had been pioneered and developed in 
America for commercial purposes, by 1938 it had become established throughout 
Europe as essential in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
The U.S. was thus a relative latecomer to the world of external broadcasting.  
Covering the early days of World War II in Europe as an American observer was 
CBS’ Edward R. Murrow in London, with William Shirer in Berlin.  Noting the 
development of radio broadcasting in Europe as an instrument of political 
propaganda, Murrow commented: 
Everyone broadcasts in any language save their own…  New and more 
powerful transmitters are being constructed in order that nation may hurl 
invective to nation…  Radio crosses boundaries and there is no one to inspect 
its baggage.  Propaganda is a legacy of war, and since lying is an attribute of 
war it is quite natural that the word should play an important part in this war 
that is going on in the air today.  There does not exist, in my opinion, such a 
thing as a broadcasting station without propaganda on the rig ts of monarchy 
or the status quo.  We can make propaganda of more tangible things such as 
cigarettes or automobiles.  Individuals may suffer from smoking too many 
cigarettes or from buying too many automobiles, but these troubles are hardly 
to be classed with the suffering from the acceptance of an ideal, or a political 
objective.  (Wood, 1992, p. 51) 
Under this view, throughout the golden age of American broadcasting in the 
1930s, political propaganda was consciously kept at arm’s length.  With the 
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December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the U.S. State Department 
decided that a strong American voice was needed on the international airwaves, and 
the Voice of America began broadcasting seventy-nine days later.  In the midst of 
such a decidedly charged international environment, the United States made its entry 
onto the world stage with a classic opening statement by broadcaster William Harlan 
Hale that continues to echo in the halls at VOA today:  “We bring you Voices from 
America.  Today, and daily from now on, we shall speak to you about America and 
about the war.  The news may be good for us.  The news may be bad.  But we shall 
tell you the truth” (Heil, 2003, p. 32). 
The Office of War Information (OWI) was propelled into action by the tide of 
wartime fervor, and by 1942 had begun broadcasting to Europe, the Middle East, 
South America, and East Asia.  Entering a high-stakes propaganda war with both 
Japan and Germany, the American side enlisted the aid of public relations firms and 
of Hollywood, signing up celebrities by the dozen. 
Extraordinarily talented journalists, war refugees, dramatists, poets, 
philosophers, theater producers, radio announcers, musicians, artists, linguists, 
and bureaucrats suddenly were thrust together overnight in crowded makeshift 
offices and studios in New York.  They and their early successors had before 
them a fundamental goal: to win the war.  (Heil, 2003, p. 33)  
The main question at VOA, both then and now, was how to best serve the 
interests of the United States—through purveying policy or by serving up straight 
news?  Because America was the last major power to broadcast internationally and 
because of deeply mixed American sentiments about the role of international 
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broadcasting, an ambivalent sense of restlessness was formed at the core of 
America’s voice on the global airwaves.  American propaganda had emerged, for 
sure, but for the sake of the ideological safety of the American people, it was decided 
that VOA and other government-funded external broadcasters could only be heard 
overseas. 
Post-WWII, the Truman administration authorized the U.S.’s first non-
wartime propaganda effort with the 1950 “Campaign of Truth,” which led into 
Eisenhower’s 1953 Jackson Commission, charged with overseeing the U.S.’s 
communication efforts abroad.  Significantly, operating u der the liberal American 
notion that the U.S. government should be restricted from directly utilizing mass 
media to propagandize its own people, but still needing to use mass communication to 
further foreign policy goals abroad (especially with the gradual intensification of the 
Cold War), the Jackson Commission was faced with a difficult tension.  There was 
conflict between the mandate to simply convey objective “ ruth” to an overseas 
audience, and the more pragmatic view supported by the work of communication 
scholars about how to make communications “effective.”  This dialectical tension was 
resolved, for all intents and purposes, by the creation of separate venues within the 
U.S.’s International Broadcasting Bureau, the Voice of America (which was 
mandated to be more “dignified” in presenting straight news) and the more aggressive 
services of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Free Asia (Parry-Giles, 
1993).  Thus, surprising to many Americans, communication resea ch throughout the 




Within a media context, although there are indeed some gov rnmentally 
imposed strictures on what may or may not be broadcast to  mass audience, 
particularly within government-funded outlets like VOA, Western values nevertheless 
manifest themselves in a variety of ways throughout the entire media system, 
sometimes overtly and often quite subtly.  Gans (1979) has suggested that U.S. 
journalists share a set of enduring social values, hard to categorize as either “liberal” 
or “conservative,” which guide their production of news.  He names the following: 
altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, ethnocentrism, 
individualism, moderatism, social order, and national leadership.  These values are 
encoded time and again into narratives that simply “make sense” in the West, stories 
that portray in myriad ways how not only individualism leads to achievement, but 
how the emphasis on individual rights above collectiv r ghts is simply “the 
American way.”  Collectives and their institutions areoften portrayed as the enemies 
of individuals, thus they need to be fought and overcome (Larson & Bailey, 1998). 
The Development of Chinese Broadcasting 
Classic Western conceptions of propaganda, based in a Western liberal 
democratic (Protestant-based) approach to the public sphere, ar  decidedly negative.  
However, in China, with its ancient Confucian roots and moern political system 
based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, no such negative implications exist, 
except where imported from the West. 
Pre-revolutionary Chinese Media 
The annals of Chinese media date as far back as recorded history itself, with 
early evidence of Chinese writing on shells and pottery having been dated back to 
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about 5000 BC.  Although Chinese are considered the first to have pioneered the 
communication technologies of paper and woodblock printing, it seems that the 
printed word as a form of mass communication was slow to develop in China, 
perhaps because of low literacy rates resulting from the complexity of learning 
Chinese characters within China’s largely agrarian feudal society. 
Early Chinese publications catered to the intellectual and merchant elite, and 
beginning in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), competing publishers printed court-
related news gazettes from hand-carved blocks for sale to members of the literate 
aristocracy who might concern themselves with the busines  of the imperial city 
(Bishop, 1989).  From earliest recorded Chinese history, an emperor’s scrutiny of the 
printed word and his control of ideas and authors was considered an inalienable part 
of the imperial mandate. 
In the latter half of the 1770’s, while the newly freed United States was 
experiencing the dawn of political liberalism under the leadership of George 
Washington, in China the Qianlong Emperor was overseeing the examination of 
Chinese books, selecting which to imperially mandate for inclusion in master 
collections while slating others for destruction.  After making an unspecified error in 
judgment, an unfortunate author of this period was executed and 21 members of his 
family enslaved, followed by the execution of the provincial governor who had 
supported the publication (Fairbank, 1990).  Having developed over 3,500 years since 
the early Shang dynasty, the potentialities of authoritarian state control over the 
printed word became strict and absolute in China. 
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As the sovereignty of the emperor eroded under influence from foreign traders 
and colonialists during the 19th century, Western liberalism found its way into China 
along the eastern coast.  Far from inciting calls for westernization and modernization, 
however, colonial influence in China such as the Opium War and China’s compulsion 
by western powers to sign unequal treaties ultimately sirred public winds among 
literate segments of the population calling for Chinese reistance against foreign 
interference.  Reform was advocated during the 19th century by bourgeois 
intellectuals who had witnessed the intensity of foreign aggression and were 
dismayed by the inability of China’s corrupt government to cope with it.  By the 
1890s, China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war awakened many Chinese to the plight 
of their nation and catalyzed calls for reform into a political movement with the 
support of the masses (Chang, 1989).  This movement spawned numrous 
publications around the turn of the century that spread revolutionary ideas and 
galvanized young intellectuals into action. 
In 1911, fifteen Chinese provinces declared independence from Qing dynasty 
rule, beginning the end of imperial governance in China.  Around the same time, Sun 
Yat-sen, pioneer of the Chinese democratic revolution, return d to China from abroad 
and was soon sworn in as president of the new provisional ce tral government of the 
Republic of China.  The brief Nationalist period thus ushered in was marked by 
serious domestic political turmoil that continued to leave China vulnerable to foreign 
aggression. 
On May 4, 1919, students provoked by the unfavorable treaty signed by China 
at the Paris Peace Conference demonstrated in the streets for their government to 
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build a stronger nation able to stand up to foreign power.  This groundswell among 
students, dubbed the May Fourth Movement, led to the publication of more and more 
progressive publications that integrated principles of Marxism-Leninism with the 
labor movement in China to promote a new grassroots revolution nationwide.  The 
year 1919 also found young Communist Mao Zedong in Beijing, where  
established the Civilians’ News Agency, issuing 150 news bulletins every day to 
major cities around China to expose the crimes of local warlords (Chang, 1989). 
The ruling Nationalist government under the leadership of the Kuomintang 
suffered tremendously from the death of Sun Yat-sen and Jpan’s launching of all-out 
aggression against China.  Plagued by internal strife and continual losses to the 
Japanese on the battlefield, Nationalist authority continued to erode while the 
Communists were able to consolidate their power and draw strength from people of 
all strata of Chinese society to participate in the War of Resistance (Chang, 1989).  
Sun Yat-sen’s successor Chiang Kai-shek found his government ov rextended 
between fighting a double war with Japan abroad and with the Communists 
domestically.  Meanwhile, Communist leadership made swift use of all available 
means of mass communication to disseminate the Marxist viewpoint and organize 
masses of peasants and workers into open struggle. 
Revolutionary newsletters and magazines flourished during the la e 1910s and 
1920s, advocating the cause of socialism among labor, peasant, women, and youth 
readerships.  In 1931, the Communist Party, engaged in rural-based guerrilla warfare 
with the ruling Nationalist government, established the Red China News Agency, the 
predecessor of today’s Xinhua News Agency.  This agency not only sent reports to 
 64 
 
the outside world but also used the army radio to collect outside news, to be edited 
and distributed to Party leaders.  This practice of news organizations providing 
intelligence for high-level Party leaders continues today (Zhao, 1998).  By 1939, the 
Xinhua News Agency had become a wire service, providing translation, editing, news 
releases, and reception of news stories from major news agencies at home and abroad.  
The agency disseminated the Party’s policies on the united front and provided 
significant support for anti-Japanese forces, playing the role of a national newspaper 
and eventually moving into broadcasting (Chang, 1989).  Xinhua also l unched an 
English service, the beginning of its overseas programming.  BBC officials of the 
time even claimed that they could receive Xinhua signals from the Communist base at 
Yan’an more clearly than Nationalist broadcasts from the capital city Nanjing, a 
condition surely foreboding of the ultimate victory of the Communists over the 
Nationalists for the voice of mainland China. 
Communist Revolution 
With the flight of the Nationalist Party to Taiwan d the founding of the 
Communist People’s Republic of China in 1949, a major task of the new regime was 
to take stock of national conditions, chart a course toward socialist construction, and 
propagate its agenda nationwide among China’s millions of poor, illiterate peasants 
and workers.  One of Chairman Mao Zedong’s earliest directives toward this end was 
that, “We should go to the masses and learn from them, synthesize their experience 
into better, articulated principles of methods, then do propaganda among the masses, 
and call upon them to put these principles and methods into practice so as to solve 
their problems and help them achieve liberation and happiness” (Mao, 1943, p. 16).  
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The Chinese media system was thus devised as a “two-way red lens”—a dual 
surveillance system through which the government could keep tabs on nationwide 
conditions and prevailing public opinion, as well as allow the masses to receive its 
own actions and directives. 
Toward this aim, oral media such as radio and film were brought into wider 
use than ever before with the public issuance of state-mnufactured radios and 
eventually television sets, which were well suited to the needs of rural populations 
who were largely illiterate, cut off from urban areas, nd lacking in the analytical 
skills of more educated audiences.  These “media of agitation” were used to impart 
vivid images of national symbols, disseminating facts, and focusing public attention 
on the tasks of construction at hand.  Also brought into play were the print media of 
newspapers, journals, and books, which were more adapted to literate urban 
populations, complementing the work of audio-visual media by providing events with 
an ideological or cultural context (Liu, 1971).  Although Communist resources for the 
development of the vast communications network needed nationwide were limited, 
the government did develop a great many techniques to increase the effectiveness of 
the network by reaching more people with each particular message, devices such as 
collective newspaper reading, wired radio speaker systems, radio monitoring teams, 
and mobile film projection units (Houn, 1961).  Thus, as people congregated to hear 
and discuss messages sent down from Beijing, popular sentiment could be monitored 
and crystallized by local Party cadres, to be sent back to Beijing via channels of 
leadership.  The Communist regime made this dual surveillance function a major 
national priority, with inestimable effects on the population. 
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A major focus of these broad communication initiatives was to help China’s 
masses make sense of their new roles in society.  China had only newly adopted 
Communism after millennia of feudalism and a very brief experiment with 
Nationalism, and in this context the Communist Party se  very ambitious goals of 
increasing literacy, educating the masses, collectivizing agriculture, propelling 
industrialization, erecting a massive defense complex, promoting women’s liberation, 
and creating an entirely new national identity, among many other broad objectives to 
be achieved within the short period of a few decades.  In order to accomplish these 
extraordinary goals quickly, the government took on a highly authoritarian position in 
directing people toward their appropriate roles in the new society, using the nation’s 
growing communications complex as a primary means of dissemination. 
Since its inception, the central principle underlying the Communist Party’s 
domination over the Chinese media is its stated “Party princi le” (党性原则, 
dangxing yuanze), of which there are three components: 1) the news media must 
accept the Party’s guiding ideology as its own, 2) the media must propagate the 
Party’s programs, policies, and directives, and 3) the media must accept the Party’s 
leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational principles and press policies (Zhao, 
1998).  Thus, the Party guards closely its prerogative to closely survey media content.  
This media monitoring is usually performed by special teams of veteran Party 
ideological workers.  For editors as well as journalists, fear of postpublication 
retribution is omnipresent.  Punishment may range from being forced to write self-
criticisms to demotion to unemployment and social ostracism.  Under constant 
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pressure to avoid political “mistakes,” many professionals mu t learn to play it safe 
(Zhao, 1998, p. 21). 
For the past half a century, journalists in China have thus grown up in a 
culture that unquestioningly expects the news media to serve the interests of the 
government.  Traditionally, Chinese reporters have seen their jobs in terms of not 
only reflecting government policy—they would call this “guiding public opinion” 
(Dai, 1999, p. 78)—but also helping to maintain social stabili y and promoting 
economic growth.  “For them, getting to the scene of a flood or plane crash as fast as 
possible is not as important as reporting what is being doneby the government to 
battle the flood or improve the safety of air travel” (Nolan, 1999, p. 35). 
However, decades of governmental manipulation of the media under 
Communist rule and resulting policy disasters such as the Great Leap Forward in the 
1950s and the catastrophic Cultural Revolution of the 1960s-70s left the Chinese 
populace tired, shell-shocked, and ready for reform.  By the time of the death of 
Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, political winds were blowing even from within the 
Party to create a new mandate that would lead to the gradual opening of Chinese 
society as well as its media system. 
December 1978 marked a crucial turning point in Chinese history with the 
Party Central Committee’s decision to correct the “leftist” errors of the past.  The 
pragmatic new central leader Deng Xiaoping made strong use of th mass media to 
give coverage to his regime’s policies of invigorating the domestic economy and 
opening China to the outside world.  A nationwide discussion commenced in the 
press about the importance of “seeking truth from facts,” arguing that practice was the 
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only basis for testing truth and that “to get rich is glorious.”  Freer critical reporting 
slowly began to appear in the press in the 1980s, along with an increasing emphasis 
on economic news. 
Despite China’s obvious policy of opening gradually to the outside world, the 
Chinese leadership has taken pains to make sure that all reforms are perceived as 
uniquely Chinese, compelling Chinese journalists to operate within a twofold 
mandate: to utilize the western concept of satisfying public tastes while adhering 
strictly to the principles of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought.  Thus, a severe 
dialectic has been created between pragmatism and ideology within which Chinese 
journalists continue to perform a high-stakes balancing act to this day. 
Until very recently, the development of China’s modern media system has 
been significantly hampered by governmental regulation and fixe revenue.  Until 
just the last few years, the Chinese press has rejected adv rtising, remained 
completely subsidized by the state, published relatively small numbers of overall 
titles (only 186 as late as 1978), produced papers small in size (typically four pages), 
and relied heavily on subscriptions at public expense for ofice reading, distributed 
exclusively through the postal service (Zhao, 2000).  This cash-strapped scenario has 
left the overburdened state in the difficult position of having to support growing 
numbers of employees and retirees with declining sources of revenue.  Given no 
choice but to boost income, the state has thus been actively pushing its press outlets to 
the market by severing direct subsidies and providing financial incentives, including 
tax breaks, performance-based salary supplements, and operati nal freedoms 
previously unheard of in order to make media profitable (Zhao, 2000).  Recently, the 
 69 
 
Chinese government has begun systematically shutting down government and Party 
newspapers entirely, a move aimed at alleviating the financial burdens on farmers and 
grassroots units caused by compulsory subscriptions (Xinhua, 2004). 
Modern Chinese Media 
Today’s Chinese media market rests on the principle of “regulated 
marketization,” under which the Chinese licensing system ensur s the Party’s control 
over the fundamental structure of the press.  No newspaper c n be set up 
independently, and all are assigned an official rank and must be registered under a 
recognized institutional publisher or sponsor (Zhao, 2000).  Papers ft  1996 have 
thus become the products of “bureaucratic capitalism,” a characteristic of today’s 
Chinese capitalism whereby political power and official influence are used as means 
for commercial gain by individuals or bureaucratic units through capitalist or quasi-
capitalist economic activities (Meisner, 1996, p. 301). 
The state, therefore, has allowed for mass appeal papers, subsidized by 
advertising revenue and sold mostly on the streets below cost.  These new 
publications emphasize breaking events, the consumer angle, story format, relevance 
to urban life, entertainment, sports, and other “soft” content, and are coming to be 
quite aggressive in marketing, packaging, distribution, and self-promotion.  They 
satisfy consumer tastes and sell well, ushering in what some have called the Chinese 
equivalent of the American “penny press revolution” (Zhao, 2000, p. 11).  The 
resulting phenomenon of consumer choice is indeed new in China, since for the past 
several decades, the custom was for work units or Party cells to purchase publications 
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and make them available to workers and their families.  This practice still goes on in 
China, but less and less (Nolan, 1999). 
The Chinese government’s recent “media rationalization campaign,” was 
launched in 1996 in an attempt to achieve optimal integration between propaganda 
effectiveness and economic efficiency.  Under this plan, the bureaucratic press was to 
be consolidated, the number of professional papers reduced, and newspapers with 
small circulation numbers or records of breaking Party publication rules targeted for 
closure.  Today’s Chinese State Press and Publications Administration has thus been 
granted strong authority to rigorously implement three central controlling 
mechanisms for publications: licensing, annual review, and the certification of 
editors-in-chief (State Press & Publications Administration, 1997). 
While making every effort to retain its ideological high round, the 
Communist Party “no longer believes in low-budget propaganda and the self-evident 
nature of its truth.  It wants to capitalize its press to ensure wider circulation, higher 
production values, faster delivery, and better packaging of content” (Zhao, 2000, p. 
17).  Thus, the new role model of the day is no longer Mao Zedong but Rupert 
Murdoch, who now serves as the Party’s media business partner. Chinese authorities 
today have come to see Western-style media conglomeration as a means to enhance 
press control, strengthen Party institutions, and induce profitable outlets to cross-
subsidize unprofitable venues viewed as socially and culturally important (Zhao, 
2000).  For many in the Party elite, “economic reform is simply an opportunity for 
self-enrichment and for the continuation of social privilege.  Although the Party’s 
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slogans have changed from ‘fight selfishness’ to ‘getting r ch is glorious,’ it’s 
essentially the same elite that has remained dominant” (Liu & Link, 1998, p. 22). 
What appears to be happening in the Chinese media can be seen as a 
microcosm of what is happening in Chinese society at large.  Economic liberalization 
means increased freedom for people in terms of movement, entertainment, standards 
of living, and job opportunities; however the Communist Party leadership has 
determined that this should not lead to strident calls for political freedom.  The 
government has seemed willing to indulge commercial tastes to allow for certain 
degrees of consumer satisfaction as long as forbidden political topics are not broached 
and the power of the Party remains entrenched.   Thus, market liberalization on one 
hand accompanied by political censorship on the other does seem to make terrifyingly 
real the possibility of the Chinese government’s conscious effort to turn its citizenry 
into “a nation of tabloid-dazed couch potatoes” (Schell, 1995, p. 43). 
Chinese Views of Propaganda 
Confucius wrote in the Analects that principles of “good” rhetoric in the hands 
of a benevolent state are indispensable toward teaching people to live meaningful 
lives.  From the earliest days of mass newspaper publishing in China under the Qing 
dynasty, a multivocal press has been considered a sign of failure of the state (Wagner, 
2001).  Today, the Chinese government boasts a powerful cabinet-level Department 
of Propaganda (宣传部, XuanChuanBu) which continues to operate with wide social 
legitimacy in fostering a unified, modern society under th  principles of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”  Under the Communist-style principle of “guiding 
public opinion” (领导與论, lingdao yulun) (Dai, 1999), the Chinese government 
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continues to monopolize the dominant mainstream media, such as the Xinhua News 
Agency and China Central Television, as “mouthpieces” of the state (Chang, 1989).  
Although the dynamics of the proper use of state authority continue to be hotly 
debated among intellectuals and media personnel (Lee, 2000), the basic mandate of 
the state to utilize media to engage in thought work (思想工作, sixiang gongzuo) and 
as the vanguard of reform (改革尖兵, gaige jianbin) continues to maintain high 
social legitimacy in China (Chan, 2002). 
Current popular television programs, such as the news commentary Focal 
Point (焦点访谈, Jiaodian Fangtan) and the magazine-style feature program, 
Oriental Horizon  (东方时空, Dongfang Shikong), stand out as excellent examples of 
the current dialectic tension in the Chinese media today between “the Party line and 
the bottom line” (Zhao, 1998, book title), or the need to produce propaganda that can 
foster Party-sanctioned pro-social behavior, but to make it appealing and popular.  
The moral education of the people has been viewed historically as a function of good 
government in China.  Through the ages, models have played an important role in this 
educational process, constantly making people aware of norms f correct behavior 
and acceptable conduct.  Correct ideas (orthodoxy) were believed to follow 
automatically from this proper behavior (orthopraxy) (Landsberger, 2001). 
The Chinese state continues remains engaged in the form that prop ganda 
(宣传, xuanchuan) takes in a sincere belief in its efficacy in raising the cultural levels 
of the people (Chang, 1997).  Even Mao, although pronouncing the role of all media 
as “cogs and wheels in the revolutionary machine” (Mao, 1942, p. 86), often 
criticized the mass media for failing to engage the imagination of the people because 
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of its “vague and confused talk” (含糊其辞, hanhu qici) or “pages of empty 
verbiage” (空話连篇, konghua lianpian).  Popular Premier Zhu Rongji further 
clarified the modern official Chinese conception of the proper role of media by 
recently presenting a piece of calligraphy to the public extolling the virtues of 
media’s role as “public supervision, people’s mouthpiece, government’s mirror, 
vanguard of reform (與论监督，群众喉舌，政府借鉴，改革尖兵, yulun jiandu, 
qunzhong houshe, zhengfu jiejian, gaige jianbin)” (Chan, 2002). 
The problem for China’s propagandists in the reform era, it seems, has been to 
strike a balance between discourses of collectivism and individualism, with the 
former being called upon to mold the moral subject, and the la t r to address the 
economic subject, the active consumer (McLaren, 1998).   This tension between such 
opposites results in a synthesis of the two, which itself becomes a new position.  This 
dialectic, or ongoing tension, within the Chinese television system, between control 
and propaganda and arms-length cultural management, has allowed the gradual 
introduction of Western cultural influences into a once closed, economically 
deteriorating China.  This change is not to suggest, however, that the Chinese 
government has opened the door completely to Western influences.  In fact, the 
government has strategically promoted specific economic benefits to the television 
industry that complement but do not usurp the traditional cultural make-up or political 
direction of the Communist party leaders (Weber, 2002).  For example, although 
Focal Point’s programming, in classic 60 Minutes style, highlights instances of local 
corruption and selfish profiteering, it is careful to do so without directly confronting 
the central government or undermining the principles of market socialism (Chan, 
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2002).  Journalists for Oriental Horizon, likewise, alternate in a careful dance 
between serving as advocates for public policy, voices of victims, and social 
commentators (Xu, 2000).  Journalists in China constantly live in a state of chronic 
cognitive dissonance, says He (2000), under which they are required to meet the 
needs of two masters: the State and their advertisers. 
Comparing East and West 
As discussed, in the America of the 1920s when radio was first becoming a 
mass medium, and then in the 1940s and 1950s with the advent of t levision, the 
“massification” of these channels of communication was largely driven by 
commercial enterprises such as Westinghouse, which “discovered that an audience, a 
market, existed for news and entertainment broadcast over the airwaves” (Hiebert & 
Gibbons, 2000, p. 16).  As entrepreneurs discovered the potential of m ss media 
markets and capitalized on the technologies that could buil  them into large 
businesses, they established what is now taken as a common sense principle in the 
West, that media are a business rather than a public serv e, or a tool for revolution in 
the way that state-issued broadcasting devices were distributed in China.  Thus, as in 
capitalist, free-market economies in which consumers are considered to serve as the 
driving force of the economy, in free-market media, as well, audiences are presumed 
to have a place of primary importance in choosing to consume and interact critically 
with media.  At the core of the Western value system li s a bottom-up notion of 
democracy as opposed to the top-down conception of autocracy that still dominates 
other systems.  Thus, rather than simply being passive recipients of externally created 
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messages, audiences are viewed in the West as powerful actors in the media 
marketplace (Clark, 1990). 
At the heart of this focus on the audience is the fundamental power of the 
individual mind to construct its own meaning from a message rec ived.  Under this 
model, audiences are viewed as being able to maintain and develop their own real 
competence to interact critically with media.  According to Thoman (1995), this 
power gives the average citizen the ability to choose and select, challenge and 
question, and to be conscious about what is going on in theworld and even within 
government and media organizations.   Such audience orientation certainly carries 
over into the agendas of Western media producers, for they must then respond to 
audiences by making their programs attractive, appealing, interesting, and convincing 
to discriminating consumers.  As discussed previously, however, the Chinese 
government’s conception of media’s role as agitator, educator, and setter of official 
standards diminishes emphasis on audience orientation and sets collective rights 
above individual rights.  One purpose of this project is toexamine the degree to 
which these historical and cultural realities affect Chinese and Western media 
producers’ conception of their roles today.  Because today’s turn-of-the-millennium 
media climate is witnessing unprecedented strides toward commercialization of the 
means of mass communication worldwide, it is high time to understand more about 




Modern Directions in Propaganda 
To effectively interpret the work of today’s media producers, it becomes 
necessary to actually step into this dialectic world, putting aside Cold War notions of 
what propaganda means and seeing up-close the very dynamic process of satisfying 
the demands of traditional culture, modern market, sensitive politics, and personal 
professional standards.  Trying to determine what counts as propaganda is not the 
point.  Viewing propaganda from the perspective of intent rather than product opens 
up a new door on a world that has been deeply affected by forces ancient and modern, 
Western and Eastern, collective and individual. 
This research is intended to provide better tools for understanding the very 
human hearts that produce the voices that find their way around the world via global 
airwaves.  Today still too little is known about the inter ational broadcast media from 
a professional point of view, viewing their current role in the marketplace of ideas, 
not only from the vantage point of consumers, but from the high-wire-balancing-act 
perspective of those who actually produce the messages themelv s.  Because old 
Cold War conceptions of the reasons for international broadcasting are increasingly 
being called into question, the funding sources and distribution channels of the global 
media of the future will depend entirely on what results are being sought.  This study 







Chapter 4:  The Study 
 
A Hybrid Approach  
The purpose of this study is to provide tools to systematically examine 
producer intent for cross-cultural comparative purposes, thu  strengths of both 
qualitative and quantitative methodology are applied in order to bring together the 
benefits of systematically examining data for patterns as well as searching for 
understanding of what these patterns mean in context.  Therefore, the approach to 
gathering and analyzing data in this study consists of the use of multiple methods to 
study a single problem, namely understanding the complex strategic values 
underpinning a journalist’s decision-making. 
This study is driven by an interpretive, qualitative methodol gy in that the 
goal of the research is to “study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 1).  The approach taken is what Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998) call a “bricolage,” or “a pieced-together, close-knit set of practices that 
provide solutions to a problem in a concrete situation” (p. 1).  The main method used 
in this study is interviewing, which is supplemented by freelisting and selection tasks 
that provide numeric data that help to systematically illuminate patterns in strategic 
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emphases between journalists based on different demographic f ctors.  The interview, 
freelisting, and selection task data are analyzed and interpre d together, in that 
themes emerging from the journalists’ interviews are checked for validity with their 
respective degrees of emphasis in the freelisting and selection tasks, and the 
freelisting and selection task data is interpreted for meaning based on the journalists’ 
discourse.  The overall category scheme used in the study was built through a 
grounded process of working with journalists to define the widest range of strategic 
presentational considerations that drive journalistic decisions on choice of topic, 
content, and style.  This dissertation represents the culmination of several projects 
using grounded methods to build conceptual categories from the discourse of working 
journalists and is the first large-scale pilot of this category scheme with a relatively 
large number of journalists in multiple countries. 
Because of the hybrid approach adopted in this study, numeric data are 
contextualized constantly with text from interviews, and i terview transcripts are 
examined repeatedly for meaning.  Although some degree of generalizability is 
sought through applying positivist concerns for reliability, contr lling for certain 
variables, and working with a somewhat larger sample than m y be typical of deeply 
interpretive research, the fundamental focus in this study is to meaningfully apply and 
contextualize the new strategic value scheme and to explr  differences in meaning 
that appear across cultures.  It is hoped that the combination of strengths from both 
qualitative and quantitative research traditions can enhance the potential for this mode 
of research to be explored further both interpretively and statistically in future studies.   
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Reflecting on the Self as a Research Instrument 
Physicists studying forces operating in the natural world work under the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which asserts that the more precisely the position 
(of an atomic particle) is determined, the less precisely th  momentum is known.   In 
other words, the more we as researchers know about where something is, the less we 
know about where it may go.  At least in physics, this enigma arises because one 
cannot observe a particle without disturbing it, because in the process of observation, 
one would need to 'touch' it with something, such as a photon or some other particle, 
which would transfer energy to the observed particle and effect its momentum 
(Hawking, 1988).   
In social science, we are likewise limited in our study of human behavior and 
attitudes, because we too are “particles” floating around in the human soup along with 
those we are observing.  Just as they are in motion, we too are in motion.  Just as they 
are influenced by unpredictable external and internal factors, s  are we.  If we study 
humans through interacting with them, we no doubt impact them through our mere 
presence.  If we choose not to interact but rather study their behaviors or products in 
isolation, we nevertheless interpret these through our own mental constructs.  Either 
way, we, as researchers, are the instruments with which human research is conducted 
and through which meaning from it is drawn.  If we are thento be useful instruments, 
we need to take into account our own “position” as well as our own “movement” and, 
like physicists, acknowledge the extent to which uncertainty is simply an inherent 
rule of the game. 
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In the process of exploring and rendering a heavily context-bound decision-
making environment, a researcher must make countless judgments that boil issues 
down sufficiently to present them comprehensibly to an audience.  Because this 
positions the researcher as a crucial agent of making meaning, it is wise to approach 
this position of power as transparently as possible.  Qualitative research compels the 
researcher to enter the text as one more voice which, along with those of informants, 
plays an active (rather than a supposed “neutral”) role in the construction of meaning.  
Michelle Fine calls this process “working the hyphens,” or standing purposely in the 
vague place where Self and Other come together to define interpretations: 
By working the hyphens, I mean to suggest that researchers probe how we are 
in relation with the contexts we study and with our informants…. Working the 
hyphens means creating occasions for researchers and informa ts to discuss 
what is, and is not ‘happening between,’ within the negotiated relations of 
whose story is being told, why, to whom, with what interprtation, and whose 
story is being shadowed, why, for whom, and with what consequence. (Fine, 
1998, p. 135) 
Qualitative research thus finds the researcher very present in the discussion of 
observations, acknowledging that the interpretations and meaning made from the 
findings can be considered a study of the mind of the resea ch r as well as a study of 
the observations themselves.  Thus, particularly in cross-cultural research, 
considerable exploration and discussion with informants in both cultures is needed of 
how relationships are formed and managed.  Especially within a foreign setting, a 
researcher must carefully delve into how one’s own cultural constructs define the 
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readings of given situations, explicating both to the researcher as well as to readers of 
the study what happens at the “hyphens” between Self and Other (Fine, 1998).   Only 
through such a process can a researcher avoid the notorious “g d trick,” (Haraway, 
1988), pretending to paint the Other from nowhere, and engage instead in a more 
substantial collaborative negotiation of making meaning.  Thus, rather than feigning 
distant neutrality in describing this study and my own place in it, I must take the time 
to characterize the position from which I approached this line of research. 
As a human engaging in empirical inquiry into the motives of other humans, I 
am necessarily “touching” my participants in the very process of observing them and 
presenting their views for the consideration of others.  My presence in the equation is 
thus a given and needs to be approached with care.  The critical piece necessitated by 
such a complex position is verstehen, or empathic understanding (Schweizer, 1998, p. 
57).  Only with this ability to empathetically connect with participants may I as a 
researcher hope to understand the insider’s perspective to sufficiently identify with 
what it is like to make decisions within a certain context and interpret this process for 
those outside the system.  Although my decision to work as a participant at the Voice 
of America through the duration of this project did to some extent color my lens 
through seeing VOA at close range, I felt that becoming an “insider” to the world of 
international broadcasting was an important step in order to better understand the 
realities of day-to-day life as an international broadcaster. 
Confessions of an Involved Researcher 
A few years ago when I was in the middle of my doctoral coursework, I 
received a phone call from a Chinese journalist that I met in passing at a conference.  
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He had overheard me speaking Chinese and wanted to invite me to work as a 
researcher for the Mandarin Chinese Service of the Voice of America.  At the time, I 
was inundated with graduate coursework and not very interested in what I at the time 
perceived to be a propagandistic government agency, so I declined the offer, but after 
a few more calls from VOA inviting me to work for the organization, even part time 
or temporarily, I finally agreed to go in for an interview and to take a Chinese-English 
translation test.  After some careful consideration, I realized that working at VOA 
would provide me with an excellent vantage point from which to not only learn more 
about international broadcasting, but also about the working style of the many 
experienced foreign journalists I would encounter there. 
After passing my tests and interviews and receiving a security learance at 
VOA, I was assigned as a researcher to work closely with a Chinese reporter who had 
been employed previously at the BBC World Service.  She and a few other VOA 
colleagues who had worked at the BBC in the past encouraged me to visit London 
and meet some of the Chinese journalists there, an invitation I accepted.  Thus, my 
exposure to both the BBC and VOA began from within these organizations’ Chinese 
Services.  Through Chinese colleagues I had access to the respective agencies, and I 
spent much of my leisure time with them in Washington, London, and Beijing.  At 
VOA, I was formally employed as a contractor for the Mandarin Chinese Service and 
made friends with many colleagues there.  At the BBC World Service, I spent a 
month in Bush House as a visiting scholar, housed in the BBC’s private hostel (at the 
recommendation of the Chinese Service) and was provided with a small “office” 
(actually an editing studio not currently in use) by the secretary of one of the British 
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World Service Commissioners.  In China, however, I did research on my own without 
any organizational affiliation.  Interview participants, all international broadcasters 
employed by China Central Television, China Radio Internatio l, or the Xinhua 
News Agency, were identified on my own through various academic and personal 
connections, and we met for interviews either in restaurants or on the campus where I 
was staying. 
In contrast, the interactions I had with the American and British journalists at 
VOA and the BBC were much more formal and less personal.  P rticipants came 
forward after receiving written email solicitations I had sent to the English feature 
editors at each agency.  Within the interview context, the time I spent with the 
Chinese and Western journalists was virtually the same, both in terms of timing and 
content.  However, because I am American and China is a foreign culture to me, I felt 
that spending more time working and learning among Chinese journalists was 
warranted for the purposes of this study.  Having been exposed t  American 
journalism throughout my life, both personally and professionally, I feel familiar with 
the values and practices that undergird American-style journalism.  But to craft a 
framework for understanding the values and motivations of journalists around the 
world, I felt it was necessary to spend time among journalists raised within a very 
different media environment to broaden my perspective and increase the chances that 
my analysis would be more universal than my own Western biases might otherwise 




Sociologists Glaser and Strauss first articulated the grounded theory approach 
to research in 1967, proposing that theories should be “‘grounded’ in data from the 
field, especially in the “actions, interactions, and social processes of people” 
(Creswell, 1998, p. 56).  Under the view that theory should propose a plausible 
relationship among concepts and sets of concepts (Strauss & Corbin, 1994), grounded 
theory requires that the plausibility be situated in the lived experience of actors 
themselves.  This approach can be especially valuable when doing exploratory work 
in an unfamiliar culture as a useful strategy to overcome tendency to overgeneralize 
Western (often linear, dichotomous) understandings of the world.  The grounded 
theorist’s emphasis on discovery of theory from data (Dey, 1999) leaves the research 
process open to the possibilities befitting a new or not fully theorized area of study. 
Because early media research tended to focus on effects and messages rather 
than on those producing them, particularly in other cultures, researchers today still 
have a sparse vocabulary to work from in specifying the factors underlying media 
producers’ decision-making processes for comparative purposes.  Work done on 
newsworthiness values implies that there is something inhere t in messages 
themselves that is worthy or not to be selected for broadcast, leaving little to work 
with in terms of understanding the strategic orientation of journalists within various 
contexts.  A major purpose of the current research is to develop and test a strategic 
category system to study media producers’ values in ways th t are grounded in their 
own experience of day-to-day work.  To accomplish this purpose, the analysis must 
be rooted in terms provided by journalists themselves. 
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In describing the grounded theory approach, Strauss and Corbin (1990)
suggest developing categories of information through coding material, linking related 
concepts, eventually building a “story” that connects the categories, and finally 
building a discursive set of theoretical propositions grounded in the data itself.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998) characterize grounded theory as “a way of thinking about 
and conceptualizing data” (p. 163) and state that “grounded theory’s actual use in 
practice has varied with the specifics of the area under study, the purpose and focus of 
the research, the contingencies faced during the project, and perhaps also the 
temperament and particular gifts or weaknesses of the resea cher” (p. 164).  They 
recommend the grounded theory approach to researchers who are interested in 
patterns of action and interaction between and among social actors. 
The grounded aspects of this particular study stretch back to 2001, when I 
began doing grounded research with journalism students and eventually with working 
journalists as a part of my graduate coursework to begin to elucidate themes in how 
reporters in different contexts sought to make their work “effective” in reaching 
media consumers in ways they desired.  Rounds of iterativ  work were performed to 
develop and re-develop coding categories that most succinctly characterize the 
various concerns expressed by journalists.  After dozens of rounds of pilot testing 
were completed through these pre-dissertation trials, the actual dissertation work 
commenced to apply these categories more systematically with journalists at VOA, 
the BBC, and the Chinese official media.  This most recent iteration of the project has 
not employed grounded methods in the same way that the pre-dissertation work did in 
developing the category scheme, but the overall research paadigm still involves 
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grounding the meaning made from the data as closely as possible in the discourse of 
working journalists. 
Coding Category Scheme 
To begin to understand the many values and forces at work in journalists’ 
minds as they engage in decision-making, I began preparing for this project several 
years ago with pilot studies among both American and Chinese reporters, first among 
student journalists at the University of Maryland, and then among professional 
reporters in Washington DC and Beijing (Swartz, 2001; Swartz, 2002).  To begin 
working out the comprehensive range of values that may be present in a reporter’s 
decision-making process, I asked these journalists to broadly brainstorm, both 
individually and in groups, and list as many words as possible that positively 
described the values underlying their decisions, words that they felt explained in 
detail what it is that makes a particular story idea or presentational style “good” or 
“effective,” at least in their eyes.  The journalists gave me dozens of words (such as 
thought-provoking, exciting, relevant, heart-warming, or even convenient for the 
producer).  I then wrote these words on small pieces of paper and organized them into 
exhaustive and mutually-exclusive categories.  Upon organizing the dozens of words, 
I found that the resulting category scheme could be worked into an alphabetical 
listing, which I decided to develop as a mnemonic device for scholars or practitioners 
who may use the coding scheme in the future. 
The categories that emerged from the values listed by journalists in my early 
pilot studies fell into ten general categories: aesthetics, breadth, convenience, depth, 
emotionality, freshness, germaneness, helpfulness, incisiveness, a d justice.  (These 
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categories are described, in both journalistic and culinary terms, in Table 4.1.)  
Aesthetics refers simply to what looks or sounds good, or how to create a good  
narrative through fitting together words, scenes, and sounds to make a coherent piece 
(i.e., packaging or presentation).  Breadth means drawing on universal values or 
interests to try to attract the broadest audience possible (i.e., appealing to the masses).  
Convenience refers to how readily producers can gather necessary footage or sound, 
working within constraints such as time, staffing, or equipment (i.e., “fast food”).  
Table 4.1.   
Description of Communication Value Scheme. 
Category Journalistic Description Culinary Description 
Aesthetics 
What looks or sounds good; what are the elements 
of a “good narrative;” how words, scenes, and 




How to engage the broadest possible audience; 
appealing to universally shared values, tastes, or 
interests. 
Something everyone likes. 
Convenience 
How easy it will be for the producers to gather 
necessary footage or sound; how to work within 
constraints such as time, staffing, or equipment. 
Ingredients on hand or 
readily available. 
Depth 
How to make a program thought-provoking or 
analytical; gaining in-depth or “expert” 
information; avoiding sensationalism. 
“Haute cuisine;” something 
complex for the 
discriminating palate. 
Emotionality 
How to make a program personal, heartwarming, 
exciting, or fun; appealing to people’s feelings to 
attract attention or touch them in a certain way. 
Tasty or evocative:                   
spicy, sweet, salty, etc. 
Freshness 
How to make a program unique or clever; 
innovating in such a way that material is new, 
different, and creative. 
Fresh ingredients, something 
“right out of the garden.”  
Germaneness 
How to make a program relevant to current 
circumstances; addressing what is going on at a 
given time. 
Appropriate for the occasion, 
such as seasonal or holiday-
specific food. 
Helpfulness 
How to make a program educational or useful to 
viewers; providing a needed service; changing the 
world for the better. 
Healthy, organic food that 
promotes wellness for 
individuals and/or the planet. 
Incisiveness 
How to analyze and add something needed; 
providing missing elements; serving a “watchdog” 
role. 
Performing a vital function 
not otherwise provided, such 
as vitamin supplements. 
Justice 
How to make a program fair, balanced, or 
objective. 
Creating a well-balanced diet 
without undue emphasis on 




Depth is about making a piece that is thought-provoking or analytic , gaining in-
depth or expert information, and avoiding sensationalism (i.e., something complex for 
the discriminating palate).  Emotionality describes making a program personal, 
heartwarming, exciting, or fun, to appeal to people’s feelings to attract attention or 
touch them in a certain way (i.e., “comfort food,” or something spicy or sweet).   
Freshness is making a program unique or clever; innovating so that material is new, 
different, and creative (i.e., something “straight out f the garden”).  Germaneness 
has to do with making a program relevant to current circumstances, addressing what 
is going on at a given time (i.e., seasonal or holiday food).  Helpfulness means 
striving to make a program educational or useful to viewers, to provide a needed 
service, or to change the world for the better (i.e., something nutritious).  Incisiveness 
provides the ability to analyze a situation and add something at is needed, serving a 
“watchdog” role or supplying elements that are otherwise missing (i.e., nutritional 
supplements).  Justice describes making a program fair, balanced, accurate, objective, 
or impartial (i.e., a well-balanced diet). 
Of course, these ten categories have some degree of overlap, and it would be 
unusual for a journalist to be motivated by one sole category, to the exclusion of 
others.  As noted, strategic decision-making in journalism is a multi-layered process 
in much the same way as cooking.  If I am preparing a Christmas dinner for my 
family, I will probably focus largely on germane elements that evoke the holiday 
spirit, seeking heartwarming ingredients and spices that are traditional and satisfying 
to my guests.  Of course, I want to also serve a nutritious, fresh, and balanced meal, 
yet on an occasion such as Christmas, I might choose t  plurge, erring on the side of 
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more emotionally evocative recipes.  However, if I am preparing a summer salad for a 
picnic, I may choose to focus most of my efforts on freshness in order to use some of 
the vegetables currently coming out of my garden.  And to make the salad palatable to 
everyone at the picnic, I may seek breadth, choosing a fairly universally-accepted 
salad dressing.  In other words, decisions made in preparing food (physical or mental) 
for the consumption of others are highly influenced by contextual factors. 
No one category is used exclusively by any journalist at any p rticular time.  
Media production is a highly creative, multi-faceted process that adapts dynamically 
to meet evolving needs.  Yet, there are circumstantial and preferential patterns to be 
found between individuals, media organizations, and even national cultures.  Just as 
culture shapes our diet, cultural influences also affect our c mmunicative choices.  
All media producers want their work to be palatable in some way to their audience.  
Thus, with the range of options provided by the ten-pronged category scheme, a 
common conceptual vocabulary can be used to discuss and more clea ly understand 
the choices journalists make, both as producers and consumers of mediated messages.  
After all, the creation and maintenance of culture is an iterative process, situated in 
the highly contextual world of communicative decision-making.  Developing and 
refining categories through which to discuss our choices can provide a number of 
useful ingredients to the conceptual “cookbook.” 
Because this value scheme is to be used in other cultures, it is necessary to 
provide translations of the terms that are as close in meaning to their English 
counterparts as possible.  Thus,  for this study Chinese translations of the category 
value terms were performed, checked, and confirmed by native Chinese-speaking 
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staff at the Mandarin Service at VOA who have both professional training in 
translation as well as journalism.   The Chinese connotations of these words were 
then explored with the thirty Chinese participants in this study and found to hold as 
equivalent meanings to the English terminology as possible.  The Chinese terms are: 
aesthetics (审美, shenmei), to “judge beauty,” valuing beautiful stylistic elements; 
breadth (广泛, guangfan), meaning wide-ranging and holding broad appeal; 
convenience (方便, fangbian), meaning convenient and readily available; d pth 
(深度, shendu), “degree of depth,” going beyond the surface to address more complex 
issues; emotionality (情感, qinggan), meaning to convey human interest and evoke an 
emotional reaction; freshness (新鲜, xinxian), meaning literally fresh (as in food), 
new, and original; germaneness (相关, xiangguan), or interrelated to the interests of 
the consumer; helpfulness (有益, youyi), “has benefits,” providing useful tips for 
living; incisiveness (透彻, touche), or penetrating, thorough, and bold; and justice 
(公正, gongzheng), meaning fair and just, presenting all sides of a story.  If this 
scheme were to be applied in other cultures, similar work uld need to be done to 
translate the category scheme carefully by involving native speakers who are 
preferably both journalists and skilled translators.  Having discussions about the 
meaning of the value categories between people from different backgrounds can in 




Connecting Interpretive and Systematic Approaches 
Although the concept of culture is most often linked with national origin, 
culture can be better characterized as a communication pattern than as a feature of 
certain geographic or political boundaries.  Thompson (1990) defines culture as 
the pattern of meaning embodied in symbolic forms, including actions, 
utterances, and meaningful objects of various kinds, by virtue of which 
individuals communicate with one another and share their experience, 
conceptions, and beliefs.  (p. 132) 
In other words, culture is intrinsically linked with a host f factors in making 
us who we are, thus the dimensions of this analysis must focus on more than one 
source of identity.  In this study, data were grouped in different ways, not just by 
national culture, for the purpose of considering a broad range of issues that could 
account for variance in the responses.   
This study seeks to find patterns in the articulated strategies of international 
journalists from different national cultures, but also to address whether national 
culture is the most salient source of differences and similarities between and among 
these journalists.  Thus, to prevent focusing too heavily on national culture and 
overlooking other salient sources of difference such as age, gender, organization, or 
level of training, a more systematic approach is used to analyze relationships within 
the data as objectively as possible.  Discovering patterns h ough this systematic 
analysis provides for additional insights not addressed in the qualitative analysis. 
Qualitative analysis the provides necessary context for understanding the results 
gained from the systematic analysis.  Like two lenses u d together, this dual 
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approach provides a parallax perspective to see depth not observable with either lens 
alone. 
To achieve this twofold goal, this study uses three methods—interv ew, 
freelisting, and a selection task.  Through interviewing, rapport is built, concepts and 
context are described, and values are made salient in the journalists’ minds through 
the course of discussing the circumstances and values guiding their work.  Through 
freelisting, the participants have the opportunity to articulate their values in list form, 
brainstorming words and ideas that may provide more clarity on what they consider 
to be the goals they strive for in their work.  Finally, through the selection task, 
participants are asked to rank and order their values from a list of established choices, 
drawing clear preferences out of a wide range of possibilities.  Taken together, this 
triangulation of three approaches provides breadth and depthinto understanding the 
journalists’ value structure.   
Samples 
Participants were from the Voice of America (VOA) in Washington, DC, the 
British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) World Service in London, and Chinese 
journalists with official international media outlets in Beijing (China Central 
Television, China Radio International, and the Xinhua News Agency).  As I began to 
work out the parameters of the study, I knew I was interest d in examining the 
influence of culture on media decision-making, but after spending some time within 
various media outlets in the U.S. and China, I realized that isolating pure cultural 
elements would not be possible within the variety of organizational influences 
affecting reporters in such differently-structured media systems as those found in the 
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U.S. and China.  The main focus of this study is on the cultural influences of Chinese 
and Western values in mass communication, rather than on the structural and 
organizational elements of actual agencies in the different countries.  To this end, it 
was necessary to find agencies employing both Western and Chi ese journalists 
within the same organizational value structure.  In this way, it would be possible to 
“control for” organization sufficiently to identify the influence of national culture on 
the individual.  The interrelation of national culture and organizational culture is a 
topic for a different study. 
VOA and the BBC are two of the world’s premier broadcast institutions, 
employing relatively large numbers of well-seasoned journalists from many different 
national cultures, including Chinese and Afghans, Nigerians and Koreans, Russians 
and Indonesians.  These broadcasters live in the same cities (Washington and 
London), work within the same organizational mandates, and work their way up 
similar bureaucratic structures as their American and British counterparts.  (It can be 
argued that the Americans and British at the VOA and the BBC are still privileged 
nonetheless, but at least attempts are made to treat them equally in principle in terms 
of job descriptions, benefits, status within the organization, etc.)  Many of these 
international broadcasters have lived in the West for yea s, and their adult lifestyles 
and experiences have largely paralleled their American and British counterparts in 
terms of education, entertainment, and daily economic life. The main difference 
between these journalists is their native culture, which makes their discourse about 
their work a good place for examining the influence of cultura  background while 
providing some control for organizational influences. 
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I approached the entire features teams of the Chinese and English divisions of 
VOA and the BBC World Service, soliciting about ten people from each unit for 
interviews, striving for an equal gender balance.  I chose t focus on feature reporters 
because their latitude in story selection is much wider than that of their “hard news” 
colleagues, whose decisions are guided more by the availability of news stories on the 
international wire services.  Feature producers and editors have a wide set of options 
before them, so I was interested in the values and strategic considerations that drive 
the stories they cover and how they choose to cover them. 
To examine the degree to which the Chinese feature reporters at VOA and the 
BBC think like their American or British colleagues or like other Chinese reporters 
from their homeland, I also went to Beijing to interview ten more journalists 
employed by China’s premier international broadcast organizations: China Central 
Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and the Xinhua News Agency.  
Unlike my experiences at VOA and the BBC, where I enjoyed blanket approval to 
conduct research, in China I had to rely on personal conta ts and snowball sampling 
for interviews.  As a result, this sample of Chinese journalists who were willing to let 
me interview them may be more internationally-minded than other reporters in China, 
yet I was careful to reserve at least half of my sample for those who spoke no English 
so as to include Chinese reporters who have had less direct exposure to the West. 
In total, I interviewed 50 reporters:  10 Chinese at VOA, 10 Americans at 





Table 4.2.   
Demographics of Participant Samples. 







































official Chinese international media.  At VOA and the BBC, some of the Chinese 
reporters had American or British citizenship, or permanent residency status in the 
United States or United Kingdom, yet all those I interviewed had grown up and been 
educated in the People’s Republic of China or Taiwan.  Table 2 describes the average 
ages, gender mix, and educational and journalistic training backgrounds of those I 
interviewed.  Although the Chinese sample in Beijing was self-selecting 
(international journalists who were willing to be interviewed on their own time), the 
VOA and BBC samples turned out to be quite representative of the larger teams from 
which they were drawn in terms of age, gender mix, and educational background. 
Of the 30 journalists in the Chinese sample, all but the hree Taiwanese 
participants (two at VOA and one at the BBC) grew up in Mainland China.  The ten 
currently employed by the Chinese official media still reside there, and all live in 
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Beijing.  Although the Taiwanese press has grown into a much more liberal system in 
recent decades than its peer system in the Mainland, the ecision was made to keep 
Taiwanese respondents in the sample because they were a r presentative, integral part 
of their teams at VOA and the BBC.  Although a 27-to-3 ratio does not provide 
enough data to look for generalizable differences between Mai land and Taiwanese 
reporters, pattern differences were nonetheless considered uring data analysis. 
Procedures 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the native langu ge (English or 
Chinese) of the 50 feature reporters who came forward for the study.  Interviews 
averaged about 45 minutes in length (see Appendixes A and B for interview 
protocols), which provided enough time to cover all of the protocol questions but was 
also all the time that most of the journalists I intervi wed could spare.  The interviews 
focused around the reporters’ story choices, their overall journalistic values, their role 
models and preferred media, their understanding of the composition and interests of 
their international audiences, their notions about propaganda, and the nature of 
modern international broadcasting.  Toward the end of each interview, journalists 
were asked to consider using the food metaphor to characterize their journalistic 
approach by answering the question, “If your work were a food or a dish, what would 
it be?”  This primed the journalist to think in culinary terms about the strategies 
underlying their reporting, although no specific concepts or terms were suggested 
with which to frame their answers.   
For the freelisting exercise, at the end of each interview, I gave each journalist 




down as many words as you can think of that would make you happy if they were 
used to describe your work.”  I organized notes while the journalist wrote as many  
words as he or she could think of to list.  Most participants took about two to three 
minutes to complete the task, and then I collected their paper without comment.   
With these values salient in their minds, I asked each journalist to complete a 
forced-choice selection task.  I presented each person with ten envelopes, on which 
were written the labels: Aesthetic/Beautiful, Broad/Comprehensive, Convenient/Easy 
to produce, Deep/Analytical, Emotional/Moving, Fresh/Original, Germane/Rel vant, 
Table 4.3.   
Selection Task Categories with Descriptions. 
Values presented in round 1 Elaborated descriptions presented in round 2 
Aesthetic/Beautiful 
A program with rich sound and smooth 
production elements. 
Broad/Comprehensive 
A program that could speak to the experience of 
almost everyone. 
Convenient/Easy to produce 
A program that can be produced relatively 
quickly and easily. 
Deep/Complex 
A program that will make the audience think. 
 
Emotional/Moving 
A program that will touch the audience’s hearts. 
 
Fresh/Original 
A program about something that has hardly hit 
the press yet. 
Germane/Relevant 
A program related to events at this point in time. 
 
Helpful/Beneficial 




A program that skillfully exercises the media’s 
“watchdog” role. 
Just/Balanced 






Helpful/Beneficial, Incisive/Probing, and Just/Balanced.  Each journalist was asked to 
choose the top three that they personally thought weremost important in their work to 
and rank them in order of importance.  Opening the envelope that the journalist had 
selected as number one in importance, I then pulled out ten slips of paper on which 
were written out longer descriptions of each of the ten value categories; these slips of 
paper were identical in each of the ten envelopes.  The journalist again was asked to 
choose his or her top three and rank them in order of importance.  These ten 
descriptive sentences had been pilot tested previously with ten international 
journalists at VOA who did not take part in the project.  Journalists in that pilot test 
were asked to match slips of paper with the two-word value cat gories and the 
elaborated descriptions, and the reliability rate between th  categories and their longer 
explanation was 100%.   
After the conclusion of each interview, I examined the journalist’s selections 
and ranked them by a simple scoring system: three points f r each first choice, two 
points for each second choice, and one point for each third choice.  Thus, the range of 
possible scores between the two trials was zero to six:  zero if a journalist had never 
selected a certain category and six if they had selected a particular category as their 
first choice in both rounds (thus 3+3).  Summing these totals among the categories 
made it possible to examine patterns of emphasis across the five samples. 
Follow-up Focus Groups 
After all the systematic data was analyzed and plotted, I made presentations at 
both the BBC and VOA, inviting all the journalists who had been involved in the 
study to hear how their answers compared to those at other agencies and to answer 
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some follow-up questions about observable patterns in the daa. At the BBC 15 out 
of the 20 journalists interviewed there came to the presentatio , and at VOA 12 out of 
the 20 were in attendance.  (I was unable to do the same kind of presentation in China 
because the journalists who had participated in the study worked at three different 
agencies and were more sensitive about keeping their involvement in the study 
confidential.) 
At both the BBC and VOA, I described the purpose and research questions of 
the study and then presented charts representing the systematic data provided by of 
the samples, divided by national culture, gender, age, training, and organization.  I 
discussed some of my own impressions and questions about the data, inviting the 
journalists to comment on why they felt that the patterns emerged as they had, and 
what the differences and similarities between samples mean to them.  I let the 
conversation flow fairly freely in these meetings, with journalists sharing their 
opinions and engaging each other about the nature of their work.  With their 
permission, I recorded these conversations and included them with the interview data 








Chapter 5:  Freelisting 
 
The Inductive Sandwich 
One goal of this research is to provide tools for analyzing mass 
communicators’ production values across cultures.  Few tools have yet been 
developed for researchers to analyze the underlying strategic considerations 
governing how messages are crafted, so this study fills this gap by providing a 
reasonably grounded way to understand the criteria by which journalists make the 
choices they do in preparing their work for public consumption.  This study makes 
use of three main layers through which to understand the inent of participating 
journalists, an approach I call the inductive sandwich. 
The meat of this study is provided by the interview data.  This segment of the 
research provides the most valuable information:  the context and strategic value 
considerations of international journalists.  To approach the large volume of 
qualitative data collected in this study in an organized and meaningful way, the 
results of the two systematic tasks are first examined for the strategic values that 




The goal of the freelisting task was to understand the strategic considerations 
most salient in journalists’ minds.  To this end, they were asked to describe the kinds 
of consumer response that give them the most satisfaction.  The freelisting task 
explores what, at the end of the day, makes journalists feel best about their work:  
What do they themselves consider to be a successful outcome?  What descriptors are 
most meaningful to them?  Using this approach, journalists can imagine any outcome 
they like and write as many words as they want, in any way they want, in their native 
language.  The freelisting exercise provides the bottom layer of the inductive 
sandwich, the base on which the rest of the data analysis can be built. 
The forced-choice scenario focuses on the assumption that journalists operate 
under constraints by presenting them with a forced-choice scenario in which they 
must focus on certain values over others.  In their day-to-day work, journalists must 
continually decide and rank-order priorities.  This task reflects this reality by focusing 
on which values come to the fore when journalists must choose between a host of 
positive possibilities. 
To examine journalists’ value choices in a forced-choice scenario, they were 
presented with the ten values of the category scheme from which they were asked to 
choose, and then rank, their top three values in choosing how to craft work for their 
audience.  They did this task twice, first by using words, and then by using sentences.  
The journalists’ top three choices in both trials were then weighted by the rank 
assigned, summed together into a total score, and represented in a chart to illustrate 
the different emphases placed on each value among the five different sample 
groupings: gender, age, training, organization, and national origin.  These data then 
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become the top layer of our inductive sandwich, the piece that holds the sandwich 
together. 
The metaphor of the inductive sandwich is used to emphasize three separate 
yet related layers of analysis that complement each other by providing different 
approaches to understanding the journalists’ strategic values.  Although asking 
participants to supplement their interview material with freelisting and the selection 
task is not time-consuming (together the tasks took approximately five to ten 
minutes), a greater depth of understanding is gained into their underlying values by 
using this combined approach.  The two levels of basic systematic analysis provide 
better understanding of the data’s “meat” and are sufficiently portable to be used in 
different real-world journalistic scenarios. 
Freelisting 
At the conclusion of each 30-45 minute interview after journalists had just 
finished talking about their work and their individual values were still likely to be 
salient in their minds, participants were asked to perform a short freelisting task.  
They were each presented with an unlined blank piece of paper; across the top of the 
paper was written, “Please write down as many words as you can think of that would 
make you happy if they were used to describe your work.”  I instructed participants 
(in English or Chinese, as appropriate) to take as long as they needed to write down 
as many descriptive words as they could think of in whatever language was most 
comfortable for them.  When each journalist said that he or she was finished and 
could think of no more words to write, I collected the paper without comment. 
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The freelisted word lists ranged from as few as three words to as many as 
twenty, with a mean number of 8.3 words over the 49 participants who completed the 
exercise.  (One participant out of the 50 was unable to complete the task because of 
time constraints.)  Although almost all of the participants produced lists of words or  
phrases, two participants wrote sentences and one wrote a paragraph, from which I 
extracted the relevant descriptive words to analyze the text as a list.  Each journalist 
was encouraged to write words in his or her native language, eith r Chinese or 
English.  Chinese words were translated to English for the purpose of analysis by 
Chinese graduate students studying Communication at the University of Maryland.  
Table 5.1.   
Sample Freelisted Responses by Category. 
Aesthetics 
Beautiful presentation, well-written, natural, not pretentious, to 
the point, well-organized, clear, flexible, rich, smooth, simple, 
graceful, fluent, concise, great use of sound, well-told, vivid 
Breadth 
Comprehensive, inclusive, global, sensitive to all perspectives 
 
Depth 
Deep, thorough, in-depth, knowledgeable, intelligent, well-
thought-out, profound, authoritative, well-researched, analytic , 
historical, complex 
Emotionality 
Entertaining, stimulating, enjoyable, touching, lively, animated, 
friendly, moving, fun, amusing, energizing, shocking, inspiring, 
hilarious, warm, surprising, exciting 
Freshness 
Unique, quick, original, refreshing, creative, different, exclusive, 
up-to-date, new 
Germaneness 
Relevant, reflects our voices/thoughts, timely, appropriate 
 
Helpfulness 
Educational, informative, useful, life-changing, barrier-breaking, 
taught me a lot, helpful 
Incisiveness 
Incisive perspective, independent observation, higher 
perspective, bold, provocative, powerful, illuminating, 
insightful, mind-opening, revealing, unafraid, brave 
Justice 
Fair, accurate, reliable, just, balanced, objective, realtrue, 




Table 5.1 shows a representative sampling of freelisted responses within each of the 
ten categories. 
Although Chinese journalists were all encouraged to list words in their native 
language, over half of them (57%, or 17 out of 30) chose to wri e at least some of 
their list in English (70% of respondents at the BBC did so, 50% at VOA, and 50% in 
China).  When I asked them about why they used English, a few told me that it was to 
make my analysis easier, but over half told me that they found it easier to call certain 
words and concepts to mind in English, particularly related to their journalistic work.  
For most of those who had used some English in their responses (59%, or 10 out of 
17), their use of English was likely due to the fact thatey received collegiate or 
graduate education in the West, thus they have grown accustomed t  articulating 
thoughts and values in English, particularly when asked to do so by a Westerner.  
Similarly, within interviews, Chinese participants switched almost unconsciously to 
speaking English from time to time, although I usually tried to bring them back to 
Chinese so that all participants would be encouraged to articul te themselves in their 
native language and thus be more prone to call on native cultural constructs when 
discussing their work.   
Once freelisting data were translated, checked for accuracy, and prepared for 
examination, iterative waves of analysis were performed to look for patterns in the 
responses.  Each set of coding and analysis was examined by dividing participants 
into categories across five factors:  1) national background (Chinese vs. Western),    
2) gender (female vs. male), 3) age (under 39 vs. over 40), 4) journalistic training 
(those who had received at least one course of formal journalism training in college or 
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graduate school vs. those who had been trained entirely on the job), and 5) 
organization (VOA, BBC, or Chinese media). 
Judging Value by External and Internal Standards 
The first analysis categorized responses by the type of information the 
response provided about the journalist’s own beliefs about wha constitutes good 
journalism.  This analysis showed that responses fell into two general types, 
externalized and internalized.  Externalized responses were general descriptors 
indicating that others liked the journalistic product, such as “great,” “interesting,” and 
“good job,” generically positive terms that do not reveal a substantive value 
orientation on the part of the journalist.  Internalized responses provided more 
information about what the journalist him- or herself considers to constitute “good” 
journalism—value statements like “thorough,” “unique,” “objective,” or “bold.” 
Of the five factors (i.e., background, gender, age, training, a d organization), 
only journalism training resulted in a notable difference in the level to which 
participants listed externalized versus internalized values.  Journalists who had been 
through formal journalism education, either in college or graduate school, tended to 
list a higher percentage of internalized responses.  Of the 18 participants who had 
majored in journalism, the percentage of externalized responses was 26%, and for the 
five journalists who had received some journalism education but not as a major, the 
percentage of externalized responses was 19%.   The 26 journalists who had learned 
journalism entirely on the job, however, had a rate of 42% of externalized responses, 
indicating a greater tendency to rely on external standards to evaluate their job 
performance.  Journalists with no formal journalism education may have had fewer 
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chances to consider a larger set of values regarding what cons itutes good journalism 
to use for evaluating their own work.  This study provides evidence that journalists, 
both Eastern and Western, who have been exposed to formal j urnalistic training in a 
university setting may be better able to articulate substantive factors they feel 
comprise high-quality journalism. 
This finding about differences in externalized versus internalized values is 
particularly notable when considering the influence of journalism education 
compared to the other four factors of gender, age, national origin, and organization.  
Gender produced the smallest gap in externalized versus internalized values, only one 
percentage point difference (34% externalized for females, 33% for males).  The 
organizational comparison showed VOA and the BBC to be only two percentage 
points different (37% externalized for BBC and 35% for VOA).  The Chinese media 
sample, which showed 21% externalized, likely represents the high level of 
journalism training found in that group (70%) in combination with their relatively 
young average age (33), which means that the time since many of them have been 
discussing these issues in the classroom is fairly recent.  National origin accounted for 
only four percentage points of difference (35% externalized for Chinese across the 
board, 31% for Westerners).  Age accounted for more variance than gender, national 
origin, or organization, with six percentage points of difference (36% externalized for 
those over 40, 30% for those under 39).  These smaller variances make the rates of 
26% externalized for those who had been through formal journalism education as 
opposed to 42% for those who had learned their trade entirely on the job especially 




The second analysis of the freelisting looked more closely among the 
internalized responses provided by participants for patterns across national 
background, gender, age, organization, and journalistic training.  For this analysis 
externalized responses (i.e., general concepts such as “good” or “interesting”) were 
excluded, and internalized responses were coded according to the ten value  
categories: aesthetics, breadth, convenience, depth, emotionality, freshness, 
germaneness, helpfulness, incisiveness, and justice.  A representative sampling of 
words and phrases from the participants’ responses are listed by category in Table 5.2 
to provide a sense of how the coding scheme was applied. 
Note that the convenience category is absent from the freelisted responses.  
This outcome is not surprising because this task asked partici nts to list the ideal 
characteristics that would bring them the most satisfacon if used to describe their 
work.  Convenience is certainly an aspect of day-to-day journalism that must be 
included as a code within the scheme for the purposes of analyzing interview and 
selection task data, however journalists are not likely to voluntarily list convenience 
when given the open-ended opportunity to freelist ideal charateristics to describe 
their work.   
Freelisting by Age 
Among the five demographic factors analyzed, age produced the least amount 
of difference between participants in terms of their freelisted values.  Five points was 
used as a threshold for significance in this study because of th  qualitative judgment 
that this level of difference was also reflective of a basic threshold of significance 
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within the interview data.  In this case, only three values have a spread of five or 
more percentage points: depth, emotionality, and justice.  Depth and justice had the 
widest difference, which may be a result of shifts in hiring practices within these 
official news agencies over time: the majority of those in the younger age group who 
freelisted depth and justice values were Chinese.  Within the Chinese language 
services at VOA and the BBC, a significant shift took place shortly after 1989 to 
employ more trained Chinese journalists instead of language tr nslators.  Prior to the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Chinese services of both VOA and the BBC 
were mainly charged with translating news reports written by the agencies’ English 
Table 5.2.   
Freelisted Responses by Age. 
Age 
40 and over 
(n=28) 
39 and under 
(n=21) 
Aesthetics 11% 14% 
Breadth 2% 4% 
Depth 16% 28% 
Emotionality 20% 14% 
Freshness 10% 8% 
Germaneness 5% 4% 
Helpfulness 10% 7% 
Incisiveness 9% 7% 




divisions into Chinese and airing them.  However, after the push in Chinese-language 
international broadcasting brought about by Tiananmen, alo g with a resulting 
increased diaspora of Chinese journalists to Western countries, agencies such as VOA 
and the BBC made a point of attracting more trained Chinese reporters to expand 
their capacity to produce original Chinese reports. 
These younger Chinese reporters now staffing VOA and the BBC not only 
brought with them a higher degree of training in journalism but also a passion and 
sense of idealism about what journalism is and the role it can play in society.  Many 
of the journalists I interviewed said that the post-Tiananmen generation brought a 
significant cultural change to the Chinese divisions of these Western news agencies, 
intensifying a sense of responsibility to do reporting that is objective, well-
researched, and balanced.  One Chinese VOA reporter currently s rving as an editor 
explained: 
We grew up in a very bigoted cultural environment (during the Cultural 
Revolution), that is, at that time there was only onenotion; other notions must 
be wrong. That is the education we received. So people would be going to 
extremes.  However, after the Tiananmen Square incident, this extreme notion 
was broken. I know more than one notions can be corret in this world.  There 
are other correct notions, and many wrong ones.  So I should cherish more 
being objective, being truthful, and being complete.  Now that I am out of that 
environment, at every second, I am, consciously or unconsciously, reminding 
myself of being objective and being complete.  Because I grw up in that 
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environment, I know how much damage and impact partiality could bring.  So 
I should not be that way.  (VOA Chinese male editor)  
The only notable difference that appeared in the freelisting task when 
analyzed by age was that emotionality was emphasized more by journalists over 40.  
Among the American VOA sample, especially, a majority of whom were over 40, 
emotional values were included often within their freelisting.  One senior American 
VOA reporter spoke from wisdom and life experience to explain why emotional life 
takes precedence as one ages: 
I think that the ultimate, most important link between peopl  is our emotions 
and how we connect to each other.  Not on the basis of facts, but how we 
relate to each other.  …  It’s important for me to lift people up, too, so that’s 
my goal--to lift people up.  So I want to encourage the emotional link. … I 
think this is what it’s all about.  We all have these things and we all want to be 
loved.  We all want to believe in something.  We all want to have friends.  We 
all want to have some sort of connection.  (VOA American male reporter) 
Freelisting by Gender 
Analysis of the freelisting data by gender resulted in slightly more value 
differences than the analysis by age.  The sample of 49 participants who completed 
the freelisting and selection tasks was almost evenly divided by men and women.  
The four most important freelisted differences, with a spread of five or more 
percentage points, were in the values of aesthetics, emotionality, helpfulness, and
justice.  Men tended to emphasize a sthetics and justice more than the women, 
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reflecting a striving for what looks and sounds like “real journalism.”  One male 
editor at VOA explained, 
I think aesthetics is the most important because if something is not listenable, 
a pleasure to the ear (or the eye, if you’re talking about television), if the 
message isn’t packaged right, people aren’t going to be listening to it….  So I 
think there needs to be good production, good writing, an attractive package.  
(VOA American male editor)   
The justice value appeared particularly often among Chinese males, as 
summarized by this senior male Chinese reporter at the BBC:  “The most important 
Table 5.3.   






Aesthetics 9% 17% 
Breadth 5% 2% 
Depth 16% 18% 
Emotionality 22% 12% 
Freshness 9% 10% 
Germaneness 3% 5% 
Helpfulness 11% 6% 
Incisiveness 9% 7% 




value I choose should be truth.  As a news organization, if you do not tell the truth, if 
you get biased, you know, partial, taking sides and so on, that is the end.”  Thus, in 
emphasizing both aesthetics and justice, male journalists, both Chinese and Western, 
acknowledged certain standards that befit members of a professi nal news 
organization and focused their attention on being accepted wi hin that context.   
Women in the study, on the other hand, more than men, emphasized the 
values of emotionality and helpfulness, focusing their attention more on the effect of 
the news story on the listener than on their role within their organization.  Whereas 
the male participants tended to consider success more a matter of meeting 
professional standards, female respondents tended to describe de iving satisfaction 
from knowing that their work had captivated the interest of the audience.  An 
Englishwoman at the BBC explained, “It’s about being sort of approachable, 
surprising, informative, and fun.  It’s that kind of package that ells you a lot of 
things, but also is just a really entertaining listen.”  Another female reporter at the 
BBC personalized her listeners in this way: 
We used to talk about this (proverbial) Nigerian housewife.  You know, she’s 
packed off her kids and husband to go out and do their different things, and 
then she might sit down and listen to (our program) because it’s entertaining 
and informative.  (BBC English female reporter) 
Little difference was evident between the American, British, and Chinese 
women in the sample.  Although the interviews revealed a wide range in their value 
orientations, one recurring theme that arose was a concern for their work to reach and 
benefit their audience.  One senior Chinese female reporter at VOA told me: 
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I want my report to touch people’s lives, instead of just being a story.  I want 
my reports to be beneficial for people to understand issues, th  urrounding 
environment, and things happening in other countries in ways th t can be 
helpful to their lives.  I want my audience to get real benefits from my 
reporting.  (VOA Chinese female reporter)    
Freelisting by Journalistic Training 
Journalists’ level of training produced more differences in freelisted responses 
than either gender or age.  Journalists who had received some formal journalism 
education were much more likely to emphasize the values of depth, helpfulness, and 
incisiveness than those who were trained exclusively on the job. Those who received 
only on-the-job training were more likely emphasize the values of emotionality and 
justice. 
As noted earlier, journalists with some formal journalism education were 
more likely than their peers who were trained exclusively on the job to produce 
internalized responses (i.e. value descriptors that reflect an inner sense of what 
constitutes good journalism) when asked to freelist words they would want to 
describe their work.  For this reason, it is not surprising that depth, helpfulness, and 
incisiveness are values reported more often by formally-trained journalists, because 
these values represent the value-added aspects of the field often touted in journalism 
schools.  People who have been through journalism courses a e more likely to seek to 




Most of my programs are analytical.  I’ve been taught not to analyze the good 
aspect or the bad aspect of an issue.  Maybe there is a perspective you have 
not been aware of.  Now I let you know it.  Maybe we can look into the issue 
from this perspective.  This is the first point.  Second, ideally, I hope I can do 
a program reflecting opinions or ideas from multiple perspectives rather than 
the voices from a single perspective.  (BBC Chinese mal reporter) 
Formally-trained journalists in this study conveyed a sense that their job is not 
something that just anyone can do—that they have a seriou  pr fessional 
responsibility to provide a window to the world that they are uniquely positioned to 
Table 5.4.   








Aesthetics 14% 10% 
Breadth 3% 4% 
Depth 19% 14% 
Emotionality 12% 24% 
Freshness 10% 8% 
Germaneness 5% 4% 
Helpfulness 8% 2% 
Incisiveness 11% 5% 




provide.  The functions of providing depth, helpfulness, and incisiveness were often 
discussed as filling a needed role in society, as described by a Chinese female editor 
at CCTV:  “I think journalism is not entertainment.  One of its important roles is to 
make the audience think.  They don’t need to agree with you. But your stories should 
motivate them to think.” 
Those reporters who had received formal journalism training reflected more 
confidence than their on-the-job-trained counterparts in heir own news judgment and 
their self-perceived ability to ascertain issues that mayhave been neglected but need 
to be brought to public attention.  As one Chinese reporter at he BBC describes: 
When you produce the news, you have to consider a lot.  Ithink most people 
will be interested in analyzing different people’s attitudes towards the same 
thing, especially the sympathetic opinion, because you can see yourself, or 
others’ opinion.  No matter whether it is big, small or disputable, maybe 
something neglected by others, if it is important I feelit is worthy to be 
reported.  (BBC Chinese male reporter) 
In contrast, the tendency for journalists trained exclusively on the job to 
emphasize emotionality may reflect more of an inclination to consider any feedback 
as positive feedback.  Reporters trained on the job had to teach themselves the tricks 
of the trade based on the responses they received from editors, peers, and audience 
members.  Making stories palatable enough to be consumed and remembered is, for 
many journalists, a sufficient mark of success.  I was told by several journalists that 
their most satisfying moments come when an audience member tells them that a 
particular story “made them cry” or even “made them angry,” anything sufficiently 
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notable to evoke a response.  A Chinese journalist at the BBC spoke in culinary terms 
about the kinds of work she tries to produce: 
Maybe something spicy and light…It’s not something completely risk-free but 
interesting enough to attract their attention, a bit on the spicy side, so they get 
a lovely shock, but then hopefully it wouldn’t upset their stomach completely. 
You can still think, “That’s interesting, I’d like to experiment a little bit 
more.”  (BBC Chinese female journalist) 
Although the Chinese journalists who had received journalistic training were 
split almost in half in terms of having received their training in the West or in the 
East, all of the trained Chinese journalists I interviewed, including those who had 
received state-sponsored training exclusively in China, had significant exposure to 
Western notions of journalism.  The oldest member of the Chinese sample, a senior 
editor at the Xinhua News Agency, described an interesting anecdote from her 
journalism education during the revolutionary era: 
When I was a master’s student in journalism, my American professor was the 
first to teach journalism after the founding of the Peopl’s Republic of China.  
His name was James Aronson.  There was heated discussion regarding 
whether to hire him in our graduate school and the Academy of Social 
Sciences in China.  Some people argued that we shouldn’t let a capitalist 
professor teach our proletarian journalists.  But my advisor contended that we 
would have to open ourselves to the outside world and make China known to 
the world.  In that case, we need to learn their journalistic skills and style.  He 
maintained that we can learn a lot from the capitalist journalistic skills.  
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Finally he won and James came.  I learned no journalistic principles before he 
came.  (Laughs…)  I did not even know the ABCs of journalism when I took 
the national entrance exam to graduate school. I was ignorant of the five Ws.  
But we knew that we should be honest and our reporting truthful, which was 
similar to what Aronson taught.  His four principles greatly impressed me.  
They were being resourceful, skeptical, fair, and accurate.  He taught all our 
journalism classes.  Nobody else taught us.  So, I knew nothing about Chinese 
journalism theory.  (Xinhua Chinese female editor) 
Every one of the Chinese journalists who spoke to me about their training 
were uniformly critical of China’s state-sponsored journalism education and 
expressed a preference for Western theories of reporting.  O e CCTV reporter 
described how he supplemented his training with a book from overseas:  (In the 
process, he provided an interesting commentary on how intellectual property is often 
treated in China at present.) 
My most valuable source of training, for me personally, was a book given by a 
colleague.  Probably you may find it interesting as this book was written by an 
American on how to write news stories.  Newswriting.  It gave me a 
particularly deep impression.  I’d say that it laid the foundation for my 
journalistic principles, such as justice, fairness, telling the story of each side, 
giving the other side their rights to speak, and so on.  I got this book six 
months after I entered the TV station from a colleague, a fabulous reporter.  
He stole this book from the library. (Laughs…)  He liked it too much.  But I 
didn’t steal it from him.  I just photocopied the book.   
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(CCTV Chinese male reporter) 
Because the trained Chinese journalists I interviewed overwhelmingly 
reported having been exposed to Western journalism principles and expressed 
admiration for them, it is possible to compare the training that they received with that 
of their Western counterparts.  Thus, a qualitative distinction can be made between 
those (in both West and East) who have been trained in jour alism at all, rather than 
making separate distinctions based on the location or natu e of the training.  Future 
studies can enrich this point by exploring differences in the practice of journalism 
education in different regions of the world. 
From the data obtained in this study, it appears that journalism training does 
make journalists more sensitive to the value-added aspects of journalism such as 
depth, helpfulness, and incisiveness, that help to establish journalistic credentials and 
foster a sense of the professional role of journalism in society. 
Freelisting by National Origin 
The greatest source of strategic value differences in the freelisting data was 
national origin.  When journalists’ responses were compared based on national 
culture, notable differences of five percentage points or greate  appeared between all 
of the value categories except for breadth:  aesthetics, depth, emotionality, freshness, 
germaneness, helpfulness, incisiveness, and justice.  The Chinese journalists reported 
more emphasis on the values of aesthetics, depth, freshness, germaneness, and 
justice, whereas Western journalists focused more on motionality, helpfulness, and 
incisiveness.  The most dramatic differences between Eastern and Western reporters 
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centered on emotionality and justice, with Western journalists placing more emphasis 
on emotionality and Chinese journalists placing much more emphasis on justice. 
In their interviews, the Chinese journalists in the study emphasized balance 
and objectivity, even at the cost of emotional impact.  I was told several times in 
China about a Chinese idiom, which translates as, “Don’t broadcast it; don’t stir the 
pot.”  One Chinese reporter explains the idiom as follows: 
Buyao bao, buyao chao (不要报，不要炒) means don’t sensationalize it. We 
should be objective.  It doesn’t necessarily mean that you shouldn’t cover a 
certain event, but it stresses the importance of objective reporting.  You 
Table 5.5.   






Aesthetics 15% 9% 
Breadth 3% 3% 
Depth 20% 12% 
Emotionality 7% 34% 
Freshness 12% 6% 
Germaneness 7% 2% 
Helpfulness 6% 11% 
Incisiveness 4% 13% 




should not focus on the sensational.  If you cover a sm ll thing every day, then 
it’ll become a big issue.  (CCTV Chinese female reporter) 
Chao (炒) in Chinese refers to stir-frying: mixing ingredients and heating 
them quickly over an open fire.  After China’s tumultuous 20th century that brought 
about cataclysmic change, most of the Chinese reporters I spoke with in the early part 
of the 21st century placed a great emphasis on stability and sticking to the facts.  
Because the China media are in a period of establishing their professional credentials 
in the world, I was told, the emphasis at present is on building a reputation based on 
accurate and respectable reporting and on the aesthetics of a carefully-crafted 
professional style.  Many Chinese journalists I spoke with equated emotionality with 
editorializing, or attempting to access the audience’s judgment through their feelings.  
A journalist at the Xinhua News Agency explained: 
You cannot teach or editorialize.  Just give people information, they’ll make 
decisions.  Balance is important.  I think most of your readers will make sound 
decisions if you give them balanced narratives.  They’ll make the right 
decision.  But if you are biased, one-sided, you are leading them to 
conclusions.  This is not good.  That’s my observation of objective.  Also you 
want to make sure what you are reporting is true, not false.  This is included in 
what I mean by objective.  (Xinhua Chinese male reporter) 
When asked in follow-up focus group interviews why they had not 
particularly emphasized justice, British and American reporters responded that it was 
“patently obvious” that news reports need to be accurate and objective.  “It just goes 
without saying that news needs to be factual,” a female BBC reporter commented.  
 121 
 
“It’s like saying that there needs to be water in the ocan.”  An American VOA 
reporter explained that talking about being factual is stating the obvious and that, 
“Likewise, we don’t need to talk much about good spelling.  Of course we need to 
have good spelling.”  The larger question among the Western broadcasters that I 
heard most frequently was how to make reports interesting in order to get them 
consumed.  Both the BBC and VOA are organizations that have been charged for 
decades with the difficult task of broadcasting to vastly disparate people around the 
world with little or no feedback, so journalists in these organizations are likely to be 
constantly searching for ways to engage foreign audiences. 
Describing his work in culinary terms, one BBC reporter told me about his 
recipe for success: to add spice and plenty of variety in order to make his pieces as 
emotionally evocative as possible. 
My work would be like (the Spanish dish), paella.  Because basically, you’ve 
got a rice base, which are the words, and you have all these other exotic things 
thrown in, and colors and flavors.  I mean, paella just springs to mind because 
of the saffron, and the peppers, and the chicken, and prawns, nd all kinds of 
shit.  And that’s essentially what it is, a mixed dish.  You have to be 
interesting.  I mean, you can make bone dull, dead, boring, ghastly features, or 
they should be in some way spicy and interesting or really unique.   
(BBC British male reporter) 
One way that the Western reporters I spoke with said they go about making 
their work interesting and unique is through incisive investigative reporting.  
Although the mandates of VOA and the BBC World Service are somewhat different 
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than their domestic commercial counterparts, the reportrs I spoke with at both 
agencies expressed a genuine sense of responsibility to dig deep for special, probing 
stories to bring to their audiences abroad.  A senior American editor at VOA 
described his desire to help international listeners understand the heart of important 
issues in the U.S.: 
In order to understand something, you need to get to the heart of it, and the 
heart is a complex place.  When you’re listening to a piece that’s talking about 
an important topic, you want something that cuts to the heart of the matter and 
makes it clear and understandable.  And in order to do that, I think it needs to 
be incisive and probing to get to what the essential truths are.   
(VOA American male editor) 
Chinese reporters, on the other hand, despite their propensity to cite freshness 
as an important value, rarely said they strove for incisiveness.  A clear line existed for 
them between permitted and unpermitted probing for information.  A Chinese 
journalist for CCTV told me about the furthest he ever w nt in his investigative 
reporting: 
I found a big company in China that did nothing about it when tir enclosure 
wall started leaning to one side.  It was like the Leaning Tower of Pisa.  Many 
people were afraid that it would fall down and hurt people.  I reported on this 
because I thought this company didn’t care about human life and health.  I 
asked many people for their opinions about what to do about the wall and they 
all suggested tearing it down. Because of this small story, I became concerned 
about justice for the first time.  (CCTV Chinese male reporter) 
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Although this report probed into information that was potentially damaging 
for the company concerned, such a story is far from rocking the system in China and 
causing the kind of instability that may be troubling for the current leadership.  A 
young male editor at CCTV spoke about how Chinese culture and politics come 
together to prevent incisive reporting from going too far: 
Chinese tradition tells us to follow commands of our leaders and the senior 
members of the society, such as our parents.  Chinese culture requires us to 
respect the old and love the young.  Respecting the old means th t you should 
obey your parents and not do things to make them unhappy.  In terms of work, 
particularly media policy, our communist government states that the media 
belongs to the state.  This is China.  So, this policy portrays the government as 
a senior member of the society and we must be obedient to them.  We must 
follow the rules.  So, I think both our culture and communism play a role in it.  
As an individual member of society, I know we should obey our parents and 
seniors.  As an employee, we should obey our leaders.  
(CCTV Chinese male editor) 
Despite China’s economic reforms and media globalization, he communist 
framework still exerts a heavy degree of influence on journalistic decision-making.  
Yet the changes in China resulted in some surprising value interpretations.  For 
instance, because the Chinese media system developed under a communist 
framework as “a movement of the liberated people to educate and reform themselves 
by democratic methods of learning” (Kuo, 1950, p. 2), it was surprising to find 
helpfulness rank so low among today’s Chinese journalists.  One explanation for this 
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result is that to be helpful, a journalist must have an opinion on what would be 
beneficial to listeners; most of the Chinese reporters I interviewed were reluctant to 
express their own opinions through their reporting.  A Chinese journalist at VOA 
explained: 
I am a reporter, not a judge.  So I cannot judge the matter.  W  should remove 
any judgment and strive for balance, which is the basis of news from my point 
of view.  This is what I always emphasizing, being complete and being 
impartial.  (VOA Chinese female reporter) 
Chinese journalists may view the best way to be helpful as withholding 
judgment and striving for neutral coverage.  The message I heard repeatedly was: 
package stories well (aesthetics), do careful research (depth), find fresh topics 
(freshness), make them relevant to the audience (g rmaneness), but above all don’t 
take sides (justice). 
Freelisting by Organization 
Interpreting the data by organization is easier after examining the effect of 
national culture on journalists’ responses within the fre listing task.  The Chinese 
tendency toward emphasizing justice remains apparent, as is the Western focus on 
emotionality, particularly at the BBC.  Freshness also emerged as a relatively 
important value among those interviewed in China compared to their Western 
counterparts. 
The Chinese reporters I spoke with expressed a great sense of re ponsibility 
for the effect of their reporting, and took pride presenting he facts without 
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commentary.  Although this emphasis on justice may in part be related to the current 
historical moment in which Chinese journalists find themslves, an organizational  
component is evident, as well.  For example, a young report r at CCTV talked about 
overt attempts within her organization to encourage more circumspect reporting: 
CCTV often holds trainings for us, to make our coverage more effective...  
The biggest principle is truthful reporting.  Sometimes we have meetings.  For 
instance, I don’t know if you know it, we had a very brave policewoman a 
while ago.  Her name is Ren Changxia.  CCTV held a stationwide meeting in 
Table 5.6.  









Aesthetics 14% 8% 17% 
Breadth 2% 5% 2% 
Depth 20% 14% 17% 
Emotionality 15% 25% 5% 
Freshness 9% 2% 16% 
Germaneness 4% 4% 5% 
Helpfulness 7% 10% 5% 
Incisiveness 10% 8% 4% 




commemoration of her.  It encouraged truthful coverage of her, instead of 
exaggeration.  (CCTV Chinese female reporter) 
Although what constitutes truth and exaggeration is unclear in the context of a 
stationwide meeting in commemoration of a brave policewoman, still attempts were 
made to discourage journalists from lionizing public personalities beyond the limits 
of common credibility.  A Chinese radio journalist for China Radio International told 
me that his organization’s primary stated value is that, “You must be truthful. The 
primary principle of journalism is factual.  Put it simply, it has no exaggeration and 
hiding, just true reporting.  People have their own judgments. It’s not your job to 
teach them.” 
Along with this increased emphasis on gaining credibility as a mark of 
professionalism on the world stage, the Chinese reporters I interviewed also divulged 
an increasing sense of competition with other news agencies to find fresh news and 
get it out quickly.  A reporter at China Radio International told me about the pressure 
he felt to report the news about 9/11 as quickly as possible: 
The xin (新) in xinwen (新闻, news) means that nobody else knows about it.  
You send out this ‘fresh’ information to your audience as soon as you can.  
Also, we should send out the information in a fast and simple way.  For 
example, when 9/11 took place, I was watching it on TV and couldn’t believe 
it.  But I knew it was not a movie, but a true event.  So I sent out the news 
right away in the most simple and direct way possible.    
(CRI Chinese male reporter) 
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Both the English and Chinese languages have “new” as the root of the word 
for “news.”  However, the journalists interviewed for this study were mostly feature 
reporters, so pressures to report breaking news quickly are significantly less for them 
than for their hard news colleagues.  Yet as Chinese news gain prominence 
worldwide, competitive pressures are likely raise the stake  on market share, driving 
freshness increasingly to the fore. 
In Summary 
An analysis of journalists’ freelisted values reveals strategic considerations of 
journalists in a pressure-free context.  From these lists of words, this coding scheme 
helped to discern a notable patterns between the participans b sed on demographic 
factors.  Using these tools derived from the journalists’ discourse, the voluminous 
interview data can be understood in a more meaningful way, grounded and 
contextualized in the values of journalists themselves. 
Before proceeding with the interview data, the journalists’ presentational 
values are first examined in a forced-choice scenario that supplements the more ideal 
freelisting data with the important values that emerge under a context of constraints.  
Moving from ideal to constrained choices sheds light on the types of limitations that 








Chapter 6:  Selection Task 
 
Forced-Choice Scenario 
Constant time pressures, rigid editorial policies, tight resource allocation, and 
a complex host of shifting market demands make a journalist’s job a perpetual game 
of arranging and rank-ordering priorities to meet the demands of the hour.  Because 
journalists work under such constraints, it is necessary in the research process to 
cause participants to think carefully about which presentatio l values mean the most 
to them in an environment of limitations.  Although such strategic decisions are 
necessarily context-bound, it is helpful to our analysis to ask journalists to select and 
rank their top priorities in a neutral context to discover if there is patterning in their 
selection by the five demographic factors—gender, age, training, organization, and 
national origin. 
Journalists’ value choices were examined in a forced-choice context: 
journalists were presented after their interview and freelisting task with a set of ten 
envelopes (in random order) labeled with the words Ae thetic/Beautiful, 
Broad/Comprehensive, Convenient/Easy to produce, Deep/Analytical, 
Emotional/Moving, Fresh/Original, Germane/Relevant, Helpful/Beneficial, 
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Incisive/Probing, and Just/Balanced.  Each journalist was asked to select the three 
envelopes that represented the presentational values that they felt were most  
important to their work and to rank these top three in order of importance.  I then took 
the envelope the journalist had selected as number one and ope ed it to reveal ten 
slips of paper on which were written out longer descriptions of each of the ten value 
categories—these slips of paper were identical in each of the ten envelopes.  The 
sentences read as follows:  “A program with rich sound and smooth production 
elements” (aesthetics), “a program that could speak to the experience of almost 
Table 6.1.   
Value Categories and Descriptions Used in Selection Task. 
Values presented in round 1 Elaborated descriptions presented in round 2 
Aesthetic/Beautiful 
A program with rich sound and smooth 
production elements. 
Broad/Comprehensive 
A program that could speak to the experience of 
almost everyone. 
Convenient/Easy to produce 
A program that can be produced relatively 
quickly and easily. 
Deep/Complex 
A program that will make the audience think. 
 
Emotional/Moving 
A program that will touch the audience’s hearts. 
 
Fresh/Original 
A program about something that has hardly hit 
the press yet. 
Germane/Relevant 
A program related to events at this point in time. 
 
Helpful/Beneficial 




A program that skillfully exercises the media’s 
“watchdog” role. 
Just/Balanced 






everyone” (breadth), “a program that can be produced relatively quickly and easily” 
(convenience), “a program that will make the audience think” (depth), “a program 
that will touch the audience’s hearts” (emotionality), “a program about something that 
has hardly hit the press yet” (freshness), “a program related to events at this point in 
time” (germaneness), “a program that will benefit the lives of those who listen” 
(helpfulness), “a program that skillfully exercises the media’s ‘watchdog’ role” 
(incisiveness), and “a program that fairly reflects a balance of pers ctives” (justice).  
As discussed in chapter four, these ten descriptive sentences were pilot tested 
previously with ten international journalists at VOA who did not take part in the 
project and reliability between the category words and their more elaborated 
descriptions was 100%.   
In the present study, after the ten slips of paper from the top-ranked envelope 
were laid out in random order, each journalist was again asked to choose his or her 
top three and rank them in order of importance.  This two-layer approach, asking 
journalists to make their selections first based on the one-word descriptions and 
subsequently based on the longer phrases provided a deeper level of validation for the 
journalists’ true values of emphasis.  Each of the journalists’ set of selections were 
ranked by a simple scoring system: three points for eachfirst choice, two points for 
each second choice, and one point for each third choice.  Th refore, the range of 
possible scores for each value across the two trials ws zero-to-six: zero if a journalist 
had never selected a certain category, and six if they had selected a particular 
category as their first choice twice (i.e., 3+3).  Summing these totals among the 
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categories made it possible to plot the scores graphically and examine patterns of 
emphasis across the five samples. 
Raw scores were derived by adding the total points for each of the value 
categories down the lines of each demographic sample (malvs. female, 40/over vs. 
39/under, formal journalism education vs. on-the-job training, Chinese vs. Western 
national origin, and VOA vs. BBC vs. Chinese media).  The scores were then 
normalized to 100 total selection points to account for differences in the sample sizes 
by calculating a basic percentage of the total score for ach value selected within the 
sample out of 100 possible points.  This way, the scores were comparable across 
samples, regardless of differences in the number of partici nts in each group.  The 
numbers listed in the following tables reflect the normalized scores within each 
sample.  Value categories with a greater than five-point spread between samples are 
discussed at length.  Five points was used as a threshold for significance in this study 
because of the qualitative judgment that this level of difference was also reflective of 
a basic threshold of significance within the interview data. 
Selection Task by Age 
In the selection task, age turned out to be a relatively insignificant source of 
differences between the samples—all of the value categories experienced less than a 
five-point difference between those over 40 and those under 39, except for the case of 
emotionality, which had a 7-point spread.  As in the case of the freelisting, 
emotionality turned out to be more emphasized among those over 40.  The data 
indicate that this trend may be due to the fact that, by the time journalists reach the 
age of 40, they have heard a lot of reporting—years of breaking news, facts, statistics, 
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quotes from famous people, and in-depth reports from around the world.  From the 
data, it appears that senior reporters feel they have already “earned their wings” and 
proven themselves as serious journalists, thus their need to demonstrate their 
professional competence is somewhat reduced.  Experienced journalists understand 
the value of cutting through the overwhelming cacophony of each d y’s sober news 
Table 6.2.   
Normalized Selection Task Scores by Age. 
Category 40 and over 
n = 29 
39 and under 
n = 20 
Aesthetics 6 2 
Breadth 7 3 
Convenience 1 2 
Depth 16 14 
Emotionality 10 3 
Freshness   14 18 
Germaneness 10 14 
Helpfulness   9 10 
Incisiveness 7 11 















with more emotionally evocative stories that touch the heart.  An older journalist at 
the BBC who responds to listener mail explained why emotive stories are important: 
I think that it’s interesting that we tend to get fewer r quests for the major 
series on the really serious topics.  For example, whn we’ve done topics like 
the United Nations and analysis of that, we tend not to ge  requests for that, 
whereas we would get requests for an unusual item, an unusual interview, or a 
piece from a drama.  It’s probably because people absorb the information once 
they’ve heard it.  I’m sure they liked it, but they don’t want to hear it again.  
Whereas something that made them laugh or made them cry they do want to 
hear again.  (BBC British female reporter) 
The older reporters I spoke with, both in China, at VOA, and at the BBC, 
were much more likely to refer to their job as “storytelling” than the younger 
reporters, and to articulate a desire to make an emotional c nection with listeners, as 
articulated by the oldest member of our sample, a senior feature reporter at VOA: 
I think writing is an emotional experience.  I think listening is an emotional 
experience.  And I think that that’s one of the things that makes radio different 
from print, in that it has life, it has emotion.  I don’t mean pathos, but it has 
flesh and blood, almost.  And I think that it does make an impact.   
(VOA American male reporter) 
Following emotionality, the other most significant differences were found 
between the older and younger samples in the categories of a thetics, breadth, 
freshness, germaneness, incisiveness, and justice, which each received a spread of 4 
points.  A senior Chinese reporter at the BBC World Servic elaborates on all of these 
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values at once, likening a journalist’s storytelling to great artwork that sets itself apart 
from the crowd with its universal ability to convey originalty and meaning: 
There must be fresh and original elements in your programs.  You cannot 
copy the dated stories reported in previous programs.  If you did so, your 
programs, no matter radio or TV, would be boring and meaningless.  We must 
make our programs fresh and original.  Listening to a program shouldn’t be 
like eating a piece of dry bread.  Freshness and originality are very important 
for radio programs. You must make your programs beautiful artwork.  
Producing a program is like writing a novel, a story, or making a piece of art. 
You must make relevant programs to which people say “yes.”  In order to 
produce good programs, you must be balanced and tell both sides of every 
story.   You must provide your audiences with information for them to judge.  
(BBC Chinese female reporter) 
Because the proclivity of the older journalists was to concentrate on the 
emotional impact of their work in both the freelisting and selection tasks, as well as in 
the interviews, this is a robust finding.  In the way grandparents pass along their 
wisdom to the next generation by telling stories and relishing the gasps and wide eyes 
of their audience, there seems to be a tendency as journalists age for them to conceive 
of their work more as storytelling and to enjoy the emotionally evocative aspects of 
the journalistic enterprise. 
Selection Task by Training 
Table 6.3 shows that the selection task data reveals that the level of 
journalistic training did not produce a large effect in the forced-choice scenario.  The 
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two value dimensions that reflect a spread of five points are aesthetics and 
incisiveness, with the journalists who had been trained entirely on the job favoring 
aesthetics and the journalists with some degree of formal journalism education 
favoring incisiveness.  This result is not surprising, in that journalists who have had to 
learn their job completely within a professional broadcast organization are more 
likely to be caught up in trying to make their pieces look r sound professional 
Table 6.3.   







Aesthetics 2 7 
Breadth 4 6 
Convenience 2 1 
Depth 17 13 
Emotionality 7 6 
Freshness   17 18 
Germaneness 10 13 
Helpfulness   10 8 
Incisiveness 11 6 















enough to meet the standards of their colleagues and editors.  Because they did not 
have an opportunity to experiment with writing or editing for broadcast in college, 
they must catch up to their peers and focus more attention on the nuts and bolts of 
news production.  Because the a sthetics dimension focuses on packaging elements 
such as flow, organization, concision, and tone, which often differ between 
journalistic and academic writing, such issues should become important for 
journalists who are trained exclusively on the job, thus setting a pattern into these 
reporters’ expectations and standards for their work, evenaft r they are fully trained 
and have been in the organization for years. 
Most of the reporters I spoke with described their entry i to their organization 
as a “do or die” experience with very little in the way of formal classroom instruction.  
A British journalist summed up her experiences, which were echoed by many others 
in the study, when she described her training at the BBC World Service: 
They are very good about taking in people who know nothing and teaching 
them a whole load of stuff.  So all the producers there r ally bent over 
backwards to make sure that new people like me who arrive knowing next to 
nothing really learn things while we’re there.  So the sort of on-the-job 
training there was very informal; it was all very much, you know, “Do you 
want to have a go at doing this?”  “These are the things you’ll need.”  “Go 
away, do it, we’ll talk about it and work it out and put it together and give you 
feedback and that sort of thing.”  It was all giving you opportunities to see if 
you kind of flew or didn’t.  They don’t have massive resources, and so they 
really try their best to make the most out of everybody who’s there.   
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(BBC British female reporter) 
In this context, time and resource pressures may lead to journalists turning out 
acceptable work as quickly as possible without much discussion of the roles and 
functions of reporting in society.  Journalists with some level of formal classroom 
instruction in journalism prior to entering the organization, however, seem to be 
expected to have a much more developed sense of their responsibility and the unique 
role they play, which translated in this study into an emphasis on incisiveness. 
Formal journalism education in the classroom usually carries with it exposure 
to journalistic codes of ethics and the examination of case studies regarding the role 
of journalism in society.  This level of guided critique directs students’ attention to 
the value of investigative journalism and stimulates their interest in doing their own 
responsible reporting.  A Chinese reporter at VOA with a Master’s degree in 
journalism from a U.S. university says that he feels his training had two purposes: 
One is to teach students the skills to report news, such as teaching them how 
to interview people, how to write news, how to edit, and to help them build 
good judgment to decide what should be the news and what should not.  The 
other purpose is to teach students good ethics.  Beyond knowing how to 
report, we also need to know what is a reporter’s responsibility.  Reporters 
should have integrity and know how to assure their own neutrality.  Generally 
speaking, this is the purpose of journalism school.   
(VOA Chinese male reporter) 
Although, in the freelisting exercise depth, emotionality, helpfulness, 
incisiveness, and justice all carried larger differences between those who had been 
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trained in the classroom versus on the job, in the selection task, there was little 
difference in these dimensions.  The five-point differences in aesthetics and 
incisiveness do reveal, however, that journalists who have been formally trained may 
be more likely to dig more deeply into stories, whereas tho e trained on the job may 
have to concentrate more on stylistic elements that give their work broadcast quality.  
However, because these effects are slight, not too much emp asis should be placed on 
these potential differences. 
Selection Task by Gender 
A variation by gender was evident between the ideal-value freelisting task and 
the forced-choice selection task.  Whereas females were more inclined to cite values 
of emotionality and helpfulness in the freelisting, these values were more often 
selected by males in the selection task, although not to a notably large degree.  In the 
selection task, women tended more toward values of germaneness and incisiveness, to 
a degree of seven and six points over men, respectively.  The value of justice was 
selected more often by males in both the freelisting and the selection task, and 
reported more often in the interviews, producing a robust finding. 
The women in the study spoke frequently about trying to stay updated on 
current affairs and finding ways to make events relevant in the lives of their listeners.  
A frequent concept that emerged from the women’s discourse wa  connection, as in 
digging out information on interesting and important topics and interpreting them to 
help make a connection with audiences abroad. 
A senior American reporter and program host at VOA discus ed that, to her, 
being germane meant that: 
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What I try to do is to make a human connection, both in my style as the host 
and also in making sure that our choice of stories that we cover is what’s 
really going on.  I assume that a lot of the major sties that happen in this 
country are covered in English-language newspapers all over the world, so 
just because we don’t cover them doesn’t mean they don’tknow about it.  
Table 6.4.   





Aesthetics 4 6 
Breadth 5 5 
Convenience 1 >1 
Depth 15 15 
Emotionality 9 6 
Freshness   19 16 
Germaneness 8 15 
Helpfulness   10 7 
Incisiveness 6 11 















That’s why I feel that it’s important that we cover them, because I’m in a 
position to do it without too much bias.  At least I try.   
(VOA American female reporter). 
In other words, because this reporter feels that her audience already has 
gained a sense through other channels of “what’s going on,” she needs to offer a 
unique and (she hopes) unbiased perspective on widely-known current events.  
Because germaneness i  an intersubjective social construction—an agreement about 
what’s hot now—a reporter who strives to be g rmane will value keeping abreast of 
what people believe to be the most important things going on in the world around 
them.  This approach necessitates a degree of incisiveness, as well, to allow a reporter 
to dig out deeper details on an agreed-upon “scoop” and interpret what it may mean 
for people’s lives in some meaningful way. 
Because different political systems prohibit journalists from digging out 
details in various ways, incisiveness is necessarily bound up in context.  A Chinese 
reporter working for the international arm of the Xinhua News Agency agrees with 
her American and British counterparts about germaneness and incisiveness, 
explaining how germaneness helps to connect readers to the world of events.  
However, she also comments on how her own goal toward incisive reporting is 
frustrated in the current political context in which she operates: 
Everybody wants to know what is going on and what is related to our life. 
This is the mindset of the majority of readers.  Some events are quite distant 
from our lives, but people want to know what exactly happened and what part 
is connected to their lives.  The second part is social responsibility, which is 
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vital for reporters. They are responsible to identify social problems and press 
the government to change them.  As far as this is concerned, I don’t think our 
reporters have done enough, because of the resistant forces involved.  
(Xinhua Chinese female reporter) 
A British reporter at the BBC echoed this sentiment tha was repeated among 
female reporters about why germaneness i  so important: “I suppose it’s about 
finding some basic humanity which teaches you something or makes you amazed at 
the amazingness of people, or moves you in sharing that bit of humanity across the 
distance, that kind of thing” (BBC British female reporter).  This finding is consistent 
with Deborah Tannen’s (1991) analysis that women tend to more often use 
communication as rapport-talk to foster a sense of connection and intimacy, whereas 
men are more prone to communicate in report-talk for the purpose of conveying 
information and establishing respect.  If strategies in mediated communication, even 
across national boundaries, can be considered an extension of our interpersonal 
tendencies, this would help explain the female emphasis on germaneness as a means 
toward building rapport with listeners.  More work would need to be done to further 
explore this linkage between gendered interpersonal and broacast style. 
Although this kind of reaching across boundaries and finding common 
elements between people could fall under breadth, in the selection task, female 
participants were three times more likely to choose “a program related to events at 
this point in time” (germaneness) over “a program that could speak to the experience 
of almost everyone” (breadth).  This result may be because, in the selection task,
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journalists were faced with prioritizing based on the real-world constraints of their 
job.  Another BBC reporter explained: 
I mean, I’m a journalist, I have to make programs that are relevant.  I have to 
write an announcement at the top of the program that says, “This program is 
about this because…”  The audience has to know why they’re listening to it.  
If they don’t know why they’re listening to it within about 90 seconds, why 
should they?  (BBC British female journalist) 
As for the tendency of males in this study to cite justice as a preeminent value 
in both the freelisting and the selection task, the significant contribution of Chinese 
males in the sample toward this value is noteworthy—all but one (15 out of 16) of the 
Chinese men who participated selected justice at least once in the selection task, and 
13 of the 16 selected it twice—once during the first round that consisted of words, 
and once during the second round that consisted of sentences.  A strong indication 
came through in the interview data that justice and balance meant striving for 
objectivity and neutrality, as described by this senior Chinese journalist at the BBC: 
Right or wrong?  Positive or negative?  It is not you but your audiences and 
readers who decide what is right, what is wrong, what is positive, and what is 
negative.  If possible, we should present different perspectives of looking at 
the world. Then your audiences make their own choices. It is very important 
for them to make the choices.  (BBC Chinese male report r) 
Of the nine Western men in the study, only three of them chose justice in the 




Selection Task by National Origin 
In the selection task, as with the freelisting, national origin was clearly the 
largest source of differences between the samples.  A thetics, breadth, emotionality, 
helpfulness, and justice all resulted in large differences between the Chinese and 
Western reporters.  The only dimension that did not als show a difference in the 
freelisting task was breadth, which was more important in the selection task, 
particularly among the American and British reporters.  Because the selection task 
related more to pragmatic values operating on a day-to-day basis, thi  emphasis on 
breadth among Western reporters in the selection task is likely a consequence of the 
broad and difficult mandate of the English services of VOA and the BBC to 
communicate with vastly disparate audiences in cultures around the world.  A British 
editor at the BBC reflected the difficulty I heard express d by English-speaking 
reporters at both the BBC and VOA over trying to craft programs that can appeal to 
audiences in extremely different circumstances.  ThisBBC editor commented: 
It’s very, very hard, but I do know that we have sort of half our audience in 
Africa, and at the same time, we have a growing audience in America.  And 
then in Australia, China, Singapore, and different places – so it’s bloody hard 
to make it work for Africa and make it work for the U.S.   I try and look at 
things that would work for both, as a way to simplify it in my mind, I suppose.  
When I look at things, I think, “What would that sound like in Africa?  Or 
what would that sound like in the U.S?”  There’s been no audience research 
done in my area, which drives me completely bonkers.   
(BBC British female editor) 
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Trying to make programs have sufficient breadth to appeal to widely diverse 
audiences in different circumstances requires internaio l journalists to use all the 
tools available to them, which helps to explain the emphases on aesthetics and 
emotionality also reflected in the Western sample.  The journalists I poke with 
acknowledged that nothing succeeds in transcending national b undaries as much as 
the universal languages of music, art, and human experience.  A r porter at the BBC 
Table 6.5.   






Aesthetics 2 8 
Breadth 3 8 
Convenience 1 >1 
Depth 13 17 
Emotionality 4 12 
Freshness 17 19 
Germaneness 11 13 
Helpfulness 11 6 
Incisiveness 10 7 
















explains the degree to which the values of breadth, aesthetics, and emotionality are 
tied together: 
Different sectors of the audience like different things, and we try to please 
them all.  There is no doubt that big names are very much appreciated across 
the globe.  We have a fair smattering of various celebriti s, and particularly 
we cover film a lot.  We do live performances on this show every week, on the 
grounds that our listeners don’t get a chance to consume firsthand culture in 
the way that we do.  So I try to make sure in every show t at there’s 
something, a cultural experience.  So we have live music or poetry or live 
stand-up or whatever.  And that gets tremendous response.  Beyond that, it’s 
stories and features that touch a nerve.  It’s often human stories.  It’s often 
personal success against the odds.  And it’s stories that bleed into a social or 
political theme that means a lot to people.  (BBC British female reporter) 
In the Chinese selection task data, there is an emphasis on helpfulness that was 
not found in the freelisting.  Those who selected h lpfulness were most likely to be at 
VOA, because 80% of Chinese journalists interviewed at VOA selected this value, as 
opposed to 40% of those at the BBC and 20% in China.  Examining the interview 
data, the reporters at VOA tended toward a certain definition of helpfulness, namely 
helping Chinese listeners to have access to information that would otherwise be 
denied them by the Chinese government’s censorship policies.  One young journalist 
at VOA explained: 
Many stories we report here cannot be obtained back in China, or very few of 
them could reach the audience there.  For instance, we cover dissidents in 
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China, stories about Chinese immigrants, and things happening in China.  But 
probably some of them cannot be allowed to be reported by the Chinese 
government; so we should make them news stories, say, demonstrations in 
HK, protests in Tibet, or relations between Mainland China and Taiwan.  
Chinese media will not release much information on those t pics, but we will.  
We are very special in this way to help Chinese know what has happened.  
(VOA Chinese male reporter) 
A Chinese journalist at the BBC echoed the same view: 
My audiences benefit from my work.  At least they canfind out more about 
things otherwise kept as secrets from them.  A free flow of information is very 
important. In China, you will be in trouble and thrown into jail if your 
opinions are too sensitive.  As we all know, human beings have the right to 
know the information they want to know.  Therefore, I believe our job is to 
provide them the information.  (BBC Chinese female reporter) 
Because of perceptions like these, it is not surprising that the overwhelming 
tendency for Chinese journalists in this study was to cite justice as a preeminent 
factor in their news decision-making.  The pattern was striking:  26 of the 30 
participating Chinese journalists selected justice at least once when presented with the 
selection task, making it the largest spread in any of the ten factors in the systematic 
data-gathering exercises.   
At first consideration, it may seem that the Chinese journalists at VOA and the 
BBC may be somehow qualitatively different from their peers still working in China.  
After all, these journalists have left their home country and become employed by 
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media organizations overseas that are perceived as a threat by the Chinese 
government.  Chinese who voluntarily seek work at such foreign agencies may be 
more likely to espouse an admiration for justice, objectivity, and freedom of the press.  
However, when compared with their counterparts at VOA and the BBC, the 
journalists interviewed in China who are currently employed by official Chinese 
media organizations turned out to be just as likely to emphasize justice in their 
responses as their peers.  Among Chinese journalists at VOA, the ranked value of 
justice selections was 25% of total possible selection points, among Chinese at the 
BBC it was 32%, and in China the percentage was 28%, right in between VOA and 
the BBC.  Given that this value was expressed similarly by Chinese journalists across 
the board in both the freelisting exercise and the interviews, combined with the 
significant weight it received from all three subsets of participants, the Chinese 
propensity to cite justice as a value is a robust and significant finding.  However, to 
further explicate, the interview data show that there may be interesting differences 
between how “justice” is construed in China and the West. 
Justice East and West 
As discussed earlier, the Chinese journalists in the study ten ed to equate 
justice with completely neutral objectivity, balancing perspectives reflected in a 
program to the point that the journalist’s agenda is completely invisible.  A Chinese 
reporter at the BBC explained: 
Balance is the most important principle in news production.  I believe every 
coin has two sides. Every story has different sides.  I believe this idea is true 
because of my background.  How should we report news?  We should report 
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news in a balanced way.  If you look at the world only from ne perspective, 
you cannot present a full picture.  Although you argue your viewpoint is right, 
many people will disagree with you.  Therefore, we should try to report a 
story from various perspectives, in a balanced way.   
(BBC Chinese male reporter) 
The reporter’s comment that he feels “this idea is true because of my 
background” raises the question of whether or not there may be a degree to which this 
inclination toward neutrality is inherent in Chinese thinking.  A Chinese reporter at 
VOA interestingly rooted this tendency in traditional Chinese Confucian ethics, in the 
philosophy of the zhongyong (中庸), translated loosely as the golden mean, or the 
balance between opposites.  He explained, “Chinese like zhongyong, which in its 
essence has some commonality with journalism because in th news we need to be 
just, we need to be neutral and balanced.  We need to listen to both sides and combine 
them together” (VOA Chinese male reporter).  Further research should examine 
whether there is indeed evidence of a classically Chinese “yin/yang” striving toward 
balancing of perspectives and ideologies in journalism, which could perhaps indicate 
a resurgence of ancient Confucian and/or Daoist ethics in Chi a’s approach to the 21st 
century. 
One reason the Chinese data on justice are so interesting is because of the 
contrast in the definition of justice between the Chinese reporters and their Western 
counterparts.  Whereas Chinese journalists had a strong tendency to equate justice 
with refraining from favoring one side of a debate or the other in their coverage, the 
American and British journalists had less of a problem with allowing their own 
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opinions of right and wrong to enter more clearly into their reporting.  For the British 
journalists at the BBC, justice was a matter of social justice, of striving toward globa  
diversity in making sure that all voices, even those of the disenfranchised, are heard 
and valued.  The American reporters, on the other hand, while also articulating a 
desire to value and benefit all people, were more likely to equate these values with the 
core principles of America as they perceive them—freedom, democracy, and 
American-style governance.  Although the BBC reporters invoked a sense of 
universal ethics removed from any one country, the VOA report rs were more likely 
to identify the United States, with its own diverse society, as a representation of 
diversity and justice. 
At the BBC, I heard from British reporters a genuine striving for social justice 
around the world.  One reporter gave a vivid illustration of the sense of responsibility 
he feels to use his position of power as an internationl broadcaster to air the voices 
of the otherwise voiceless: 
I have this intense privilege of getting on the commuter train in the morning, 
coming into London, and making things that more than 40 million people 
around the world will hear.   To me, that feels like a positi n of astonishing 
power and responsibility, so I use that power and responsibility… and this is 
going to sound pompous… to let ordinary people speak.  There was a guy in 
the Madagascan rain forest who used to live in the rain forest, then along 
came the foreign timber companies and said, “We can make you lots of 
money,” and they chopped down his rain forest. “You can’t live there any 
more, so we’re chopping it down.”  So he was moved out and he festered in 
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some village; it’s not the way of life he normally had.  So the foreign NGO’s 
came along and said, “The logging is bad.  We’ll stop the logging and make 
your forest a national park.”  He says, “Great.”  Then the logging stops and 
the NGOs say, “But you can’t go back and live in there; it’s a national park.”  
And they put a fence around it.  So the Madagascan guy, when he actually 
went to America and visited Yosemite or the Grand Canyon, the thing that 
stunned him about it was that nobody lived there.  To a Madagasc n, forests 
only live if people live there.  Without people, the forest dies, that is what 
their culture says.  They sustainably use it for honey, for animals; they’re 
nomadic.  The point is, nobody hears that guy unless he’s in my program.  So 
that’s the kind of high-faluting crusade zeal we feel. 
(BBC British male reporter) 
This desire to give voice to disenfranchised sectors of society was not 
uncommon among the BBC reporters I interviewed, such as tis journalist who 
described what it takes to make him feel effective: 
What makes me feel effective is when I’ve given… it sounds terribly 
pretentious, but when I’ve given the voiceless a voice.  There are real people 
who are being squashed by circumstance.  You can say half the world drinks 
dirty water, but go and spend time with those people and get iarrhea and see 
their children die and it becomes a bit more important.  You cannot, in this 
kind of job, build a wall or a moat or look the other way if you’re going to be 
inclusive and do your job.  (BBC British male reporter) 
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According to this reporter, then, “doing your job” means being inclusive.  
This same sense of universal mission was expressed by others a  the BBC as well.  
Balance was articulated as not so much about being completely neutral and having no 
opinion, but about making sure that all views are expressed within a larger sense of 
fairness and respect.  Another journalist at the BBC mused: 
It’s the whole argument about being on the side of the angels, isn’t it?   You 
know, do you say that apartheid is right, or do you get someb dy on to 
support apartheid, or do you get someone from the British National Party 
expressing their racist views?  Do you get somebody on from the Mujahadin 
to say that jihad against the West is necessary?  That 9/11 was the best thing?  
I think there are times when that point of view must be expressed.  But 
immediately it needs to be balanced.  You couldn’t get someb dy on the radio 
saying that 9/11 was the best thing that ever happened, in isolation.  I mean, 
that just sounds wrong.  It’s not rocket science, but I mean, I have actually 
done an interview with somebody saying 9/11 was the best thing at ever 
happened, but that was in the context of a package that I had put together, so it 
was immediately balanced.  But it’s not bad in itself to have that expression.  
It’s important to seek out alternative perspectives.    
(BBC British female reporter) 
The American reporters I spoke with at VOA also equated justice with certain 
values, such as human rights, democracy, equality, diversity, and civil involvement in 
the functions of governance.  Yet they were much less likely to look to other 
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countries for anecdotes and illustrations of these princi les.  As one VOA journalist 
put it, 
The average American is not a person who is well-traveled or particularly 
well-acquainted with the rest of the world.  We are an insular culture; we are 
self-contented and self-sufficient.  I think there is a part of us, also, that likes 
to explore, but we have such a big country and we tend to busy ourselves 
exploring our own beautiful landscape.  (VOA American male reporter)   
Thus, most of the VOA journalists I spoke with drew on the United States 
itself rather than other countries as their source of inspiration for stories that illustrate 
universal issues.  A VOA editor told me: 
We look for stories, not that are just sort of mainstream pablum, but stories 
that talk about American culture and the American body politic and the 
American ethos in all of its complexities, in ways that illuminate the reality 
here.  And that can be a story that involves individuals grappling with… you 
know, a Walmart wants to come into a town, and sort of bullies its way into a 
place where people have protected their natural woodland or something for 
decades and decades, and now a developer comes in and that green space is 
threatened.  How do people in some Midwestern town deal with that?  What 
avenues do they take?  What are the passions that are roused?  And what is 
the end game in this?  Telling a story like that would be very interesting.  We 
look for stories about some of the institutions, you know, public schools, state 
and local governments, as well as the federal government.  But, you know, 
state and local governments are where democracy hits the ground – you know, 
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sort of where the rubber meets the road.  We look at how t ey deal with 
problems.  (VOA American male reporter) 
The reason for this focus on America, I was told by repoters at VOA, is 
because listeners around the world genuinely want to know what life is like in the US.  
For example, a senior reporter noted: 
My limited experience abroad indicates to me that people are actually 
hungry—craving—for stories about life in America.  There’s an intense 
interest about what it’s really like here, and I think our music and our movies 
have fed that.  Maybe it’s jingoistic to think it, but I do think that people 
almost dream about America as a place, maybe not so much in today’s 
climate, but there was a time when the world wondered whether we really 
were cowboys or whether we really were movie stars, or what are we really 
about?  There are things that we take for granted—school boards, historic 
commissions—things like that, that are just amazing, almost jaw-dropping to 
some people.  They think, “Wow, do you really do that?,” and “How do they 
allow you to do that?,” and that kind of thing.  (VOA American male reporter) 
Thus, the way that justice is defined by broadcasters in different countries and 
contexts is far from uniform; cultural values interact with organizational values in 
ways that are too complex for this one study to fully nravel.  The position of a nation 
on its developmental trajectory is an important issue, ch as China’s current historic 
transformation from authoritarian to modern society, Britain’s status as a long-time 
global imperial power, and the US’s current self-proclaimed position as a world 
superpower.  This study provides evidence that these historical positions do affect 
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what justice means to broadcasters working for different media outlets, hu  sorting 
the selection task data by organization produced some unexpectd alliances. 
Selection Task by Organization 
Rather than being spread unevenly between the three organizatio s, the data 
lined up on each factor in such a way that two organizations closely paralleled each 
other in contrast to the third.  In the case of aesthetics, breadth, incisiveness, and
justice, the Chinese sample stood apart from VOA and the BBC, yet in the case of 
depth, freshness, germaneness, and helpfulness, the VOA and Chinese samples were 
similar and stood apart from the BBC.  
The broad mandate of VOA and the BBC to effectively communicate with the 
farthest reaches of the globe translates into an emphasis on the need for b eadth, and 
thus story-packaging elements such as word usage, flow, concision, and the rich use 
of sound that fall under aesthetics need to receive a great deal of attention as well.  A 
senior journalist at VOA explained the importance of using words that will be 
understandable around the world: 
We broadcast to people of all backgrounds—the intelligentsia, poor people, 
educated people, people who are just learning English in our case, or if things 
are translated, they may not have any education at all.  We had a person here 
who used to sarcastically say, “You’re always writing for the Bedouins.”  I 
don’t know why the person said Bedouins, I don’t know what it is about the 
Bedouins, but we used to walk around here kidding each other, “Would the 
Bedouins understand this?”  You can’t make assumptions that omeone in 
North Africa or South Asia has any of the cultural exp riences that we do, so 
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you have to overdo the explanation sometimes to the pointthat you wouldn’t 
in an American script.  You wouldn’t say, for example, S attle—a large city 
in the American northwest—to an American audience, but that little bit of 
context at least helps to place things, and we try to weave that in.  
(VOA American male reporter) 
In terms of incisiveness and justice, the values which Chinese emphasized 
more than the U.S. and British journalists overall, the high score values in China are 
Table 6.6.   
Normalized Selection Task Scores by Organization. 
Category VOA 
n = 20 
BBC 
n = 19 
CHINA 
n = 10 
Aesthetics 7 5 0 
Breadth 7 5 1 
Convenience 1 0 3 
Depth 13 18 13 
Emotionality 10 6 3 
Freshness   15 22 15 
Germaneness 8 15 9 
Helpfulness   13 3 12 
Incisiveness 8 7 15 

















likely attributable to the fact that there are no Westerners in this sample to wash out 
the effect.  At the BBC and VOA, the overall scores are comprised of a combination 
of both Chinese and Western journalists within those organizations.  To explicate this 
Chinese emphasis on justice and incisiveness further, there are two possible 
explanations: a cultural explanation or a developmental xplanation.  The cultural 
explanation would posit that these values are inherent in Chinese culture, as 
exemplified by the Confucian concept of zhongyong (中庸), culturally impelling 
people to value a balance of perspectives on a topic rather than favoring any one side. 
The developmental explanation, on the other hand, would raise the possibility that 
China’s current historical moment, moving from an authoritarian to a more open 
system, causes journalists who have previously felt constrai ed by political 
circumstances to seek to stretch their wings to bring more of a balanced view to their 
programs.  The cultural explanation, then, would assume that the justice values of 
objectivity, balance, and neutrality are and have always been abundant in Chinese 
society, whereas the developmental explanation would assume that these values have 
been scarce in China but are now on the increase.  The only way to properly address 
this question was to discuss the issue further with Chinese journalists. 
In follow-up interviews with Chinese journalists at VOA and the BBC, the 
resounding answer was to favor the developmental explanation.  I posed the question 
of whether justice in reporting is a common theme in Chinese journalistic circles, and 
was told emphatically by a Chinese reporter at the BBC (while others nodded in 
agreement), “No, that’s why we have to value it so much.”  As I spoke with over 25 
Chinese journalists at VOA, the BBC, and in China (many of whom I had previously 
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interviewed, and many I had not previously spoken with) about why justice emerged 
as such a consistently valued factor, I was told repeatdly hat this emphasis is 
because Chinese reporters have been denied the privilege of doing their own honest, 
investigative reporting for so long that at this point in history, the longing to do this 
kind of work has reached epic proportions, “like a tiger wanting to rush out of a 
cage,” as a Chinese reporter at CCTV noted.  As China becomes a global power, I 
was told, its journalists want the freedom to engage in world-class reporting.  Not a 
single follow-up interviewee indicated otherwise on this question, although many 
Chinese journalists I spoke with thought that the cultural zhongyong explanation was 
also interesting and worthy of further exploration. 
The three values that reporters at the BBC selected more often than their 
peers: depth, freshness, and germaneness, may be attributable to the BBC tendency to 
position themselves as an international organization working for the people of the 
world, in contrast to the tendency of journalists at VOA and in the Chinese media to 
describe themselves as working for their governments.  Although reporters at VOA 
and those working for the official Chinese media referred often to their mandate to 
express the voice of their nations abroad, the BBC report rs I interviewed never once 
made mention of feeling the need to present the perspective of th  British 
government.  At VOA, I was told by both Chinese and American reporters that the 
airing of editorials produced by the U.S. government is a regular reminder of “who 
they are working for.”  A senior American journalist explained: 
I think there’s some stuff that VOA puts out that…. Is it propaganda?  The 
editorials – they’re our commercials.  In that sense, th y’re propaganda, but I 
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think of them more as commercials.  Like, “This is a message from our 
sponsor, the United States government.”  (VOA American female reporter) 
Similarly, in China I was told repeatedly that because Xinhua, CCTV, and 
CRI are government-funded agencies, their ultimate responsibility is to uphold the 
image of their sponsor, the Chinese government.  A reporter at he Xinhua News 
Agency said: 
Our media is the mouthpiece of the Party, the government and the people, 
which guides most of our news media.  First of all, you have to think of what 
benefits the Party, the government, and the people.  That’s a standard. You 
need to rethink the unbeneficial parts.  For example, if there was a murder, 
you should focus on the positive side and avoid damaging the overnment’s 
image.  You ought to avoid too much negative reporting.    
(Xinhua Chinese male reporter) 
If news agencies are focused on presenting a positive image of th  
governments they work for, it is not surprising that values such as depth, freshness, 
and germaneness would suffer.  For instance, a reporter at CRI complained about his 
organization in comparison with the Japanese media: 
Chinese news usually starts with covering the meetings of national leaders, 
which I don’t like.  I don’t think the audience is interest d in this, either.   I 
was greatly impressed when I went abroad.  I haven’t been to foreign 
countries other than Japan, but I have been there many times.  In Japanese 
news, for instance, when a typhoon is coming, they’ll report this news first, 
such as casualties, devastated places and people, what the government should 
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do, etc.  Why can’t we report it as the Japanese do?  I think we should do it 
too.  The most important thing is not who our leaders met today.  Definitely, 
political issues are important too.  But what the ordinary people care about is 
what happens in their daily life.   
(CRI Chinese male reporter) 
Many VOA reporters, both Chinese and American, expressed a imil r 
sentiment and complained that they felt their agency’s mandate was becoming 
increasingly focused on covering government leaders.  An American female reporter 
commented that, “The big difference between VOA and CNN is that when the 
President of the United States sneezes, we report on it, whereas CNN might not.”  If 
reporters sense that they are constrained, both in terms of story choice and coverage, 
their pursuit of deep analysis of issues (depth), finding new topics and angles 
(freshness), and making their programs relevant to their audience (germaneness) may 
become less important than meeting editorial expectations. 
Although the values of depth, freshness, and germaneness came out higher at 
the BBC than at either VOA or the Chinese media, helpfulness came out significantly 
lower at the BBC than in Washington or Beijing.  This result may be explainable by 
the fact that many journalists I interviewed at the BBC expressed that there is a bit of 
a modern backlash against the strong ethos created in the organization by founding 
director Sir John Reith that the British Broadcasting Corporation be an educator and 
refiner of the common people, which often came (in the opinion of modern reporters, 
apparently) at the expense of high interest.  Several rporters told me that no one 
wants their programming to sound too “worthy” (a word usually uttered by the BBC 
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reporters I interviewed with a slightly overblown haughty accent and a roll of the 
eyes), as articulated by a British journalist who told me whom she feels she is 
primarily working for: 
We get very supportive emails from people for whom the program is a friend 
and they kind of find out things that amuse them or amaze them or tell them 
something interesting.  So you hope you’re doing it for the list ners.  But 
you’re also slightly looking at the bosses as well, of course.  If they don’t like 
it, that’s an immediate problem.  (laughs)  They’d like things to be as amazing 
as possible nowadays.  So “worthy” is a bit of a bad word.  It means kind of 
very worthwhile, but a bit pedestrian and plodding.  Not surprising or fresh 
enough, I suppose.  Too predictable.  If you can disguise it with charismatic 
speakers and high production elements, then it stops being worthy and 
becomes a great listen.  (BBC British female reporter) 
In other words, the BBC, as conveyed to me by some of its reporters, appears 
to be going out of its way in modern days to be more approchable and less preachy, 
which means that striving for so-called helpfulness is a value that few are willing to 
admit if it comes at the expense of being “a great listen,” as several reporters at the 
BBC noted.  With the political shrinking of the British Empire, the BBC World 
Service seems to be still in the process of earnest soul-searching to reinvent and 
preserve its role as a resounding voice across the globe, which means finding ways to 
stay relevant to listeners through the “amazingness” of the message rather than the 




In the process of selecting presentational values in a forced-choice scenario 
such as this selection task, journalists reveal a great deal about the complex value 
environment in which they work.  As they seek to get their programming consumed 
by audiences worldwide, there is a degree of journalistic decision-making that is 
rooted in a reporter’s gender, age, training, organization, and n tional origin.  The 
most robust findings from both the freelisting and selection task show that older 
reporters have a greater tendency to focus on emotionality and storytelling in their 
reporting, that journalists with formal training tend to emphasize incisiveness, and 
most of all, that Chinese (particularly Chinese males) cite the justice value as most 
integral to their work. 
Because this study utilized a triangulated methodological appro ch between 
freelisting, selection task, and interview data, not only does a clearer idea of the 
patterning emerge between and among journalists of different backgrounds, but the 
findings can also be more richly contextualized with the journalists’ own words.  
Examining the freelisting and selection task data for patterns provides a structure 
from which to approach the mountain of interview data. 
Using the inductive sandwich approach, two solid pieces of “bread” have been 
provided on which to build a consolidated analysis of the journalists’ discourse.  After 
analyzing what differences emerge between journalists of different ages, genders, 
nations, organizations, and levels of training, the next section examines why these 







Chapter 7:  Qualitative Analysis 
 
Exploring Context 
Because the systematic analysis of the freelisting and selection task has 
already provided a degree of organizational structure around the approach to the 
interview data, a number of qualitative aspects of the mat rial can be understood 
more deeply than survey methodology alone could provide.  A number of patterns 
emerge in journalists’ tendencies to emphasize certain presentation values, by gender, 
by age, by training, by organization, and most notably by background c lture.  
Moreover, some sense has been gained of what these values mean in the participants’ 
own words and why certain patterns may emerge as they do.  Yet, to gain the greatest 
degree of benefit from the hours of interviews with these fifty journalists in the U.S., 
Great Britain, and China, the next section turns to the meat of the methodology—a 
deeper qualitative look at the contextual factors that ber on the research questions.  
How do role conceptions of what it means to be an interna ional broadcaster differ 
across cultures?  How does cultural background inform how institutional and market 
contexts are perceived, and in turn, how does this influence the programming choices 
made to conform to these expectations? 
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National culture has been identified thus far as having the largest effect on a 
journalist’s conception of his or her journalistic decision-making.  Although gender, 
age, and training appear to have some effect on journalists’ notions of how to best 
connect with audiences and meet their needs, organization and culture produced the 
largest effects in terms of how broadcasters perceive their role and what impact they 
expect their programming to have on society.  The noteworthy emphasis on justice by 
Chinese journalists, both in China and in the West, deserv further exploration, 
including the political and historical factors that bear on h w propaganda is perceived 
by journalists broadcasting under the funding and institutional auspices of national 
governments seeking to disseminate messages around the world. 
Becoming an International Broadcaster 
The fifty journalists interviewed for this study have a number of things in 
common—the study’s demographic analysis based on self-reported data from the 
journalists revealed all of the participants to be educated, upper-middle class, 
cosmopolitan individuals engaged in the full-time business of broadcasting messages 
in their native language overseas.  They have traveled; th y tune into international 
news.  They are employed by large, state-funded broadcast media organizations that 
have existed since around the time of the Second World War and whose work helps 
constitute their nation’s international voice abroad. 
The group of fifty journalists interviewed for this research is comprised of ten 
Americans at VOA, ten Chinese at VOA, ten British at the BBC, ten Chinese at the 
BBC, and ten Chinese journalists working for the Chinese official media—China 
Central Television, China Radio International, and the Xinhua News Agency.  Of this 
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sample, the Americans broadcasters at VOA, the British Broadcasters at the BBC, 
and the Chinese broadcasters in China all share the fact that they are living in their 
home country, residing in their nation’s capital, working as government employees 
for their own country’s foreign news organization.  The Chinese journalists at VOA 
and the BBC, however, have relocated to a foreign country, become sufficiently 
proficient in a foreign language and culture to become employed in the nation’s 
capital there, and to commence building a life and a family overseas. 
Most of the journalists interviewed said that they wound p working for their 
news organizations through some sort of “accident” or unexpected turn of events—a 
referral from a friend, a job opening in the right city when they needed it.  Very few 
of them (only two of the 50) told me that they had actually hoped to work for their 
organizations someday.  All of the journalists I spoke with expressed that they took 
their job because it had what they needed:  a decent salary, some level of job security, 
and an interesting and varied workload.  For the overseas Chinese working at VOA 
and the BBC in particular, the main benefits the job offered that were attractive to 
them were the ability to work in their own language while living in the U.S. or 
Britain, and (for those who needed it) sponsorship for a vis . 
Almost all the Chinese interviewed had opportunities to listen to their news 
organizations as an outsider during their younger years.  To them, the Chinese official 
media represented the official voice of their government, a d VOA and the BBC 
represented outside voices with news that often could not be btained elsewhere.  
Almost all of the Chinese I spoke with at VOA and the BBC had listened to these 
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agencies’ English broadcasts “to practice their English,” and were either unaware of 
or uninterested in their Chinese-language broadcasts. 
Many Chinese in both Washington and London talked about the history of 
Chinese broadcasting at VOA and the BBC World Service.  Apparently the year that 
the Chinese broadcasts of VOA and the BBC both became particul rly important was 
1989, around the time of the Tiananmen Square incident that culminated on June 4 of 
that year.  The Chinese government’s tight control of the domestic media on the issue 
drove many Chinese to their shortwave radios in search of news about what was 
going on at Tiananmen Square and around the country, thus listenership ratings for 
both VOA and the BBC World Service soared.  This increased demand for foreign 
news in China, combined with an increasing understanding in Washington and 
London of China’s importance as a large developing power, caused both VOA and 
the BBC to expand Chinese-language broadcasts to the point that many new Chinese 
staffers were needed.  Because Western journalists had had to rely to a large extent on 
Chinese journalists to help them keep up with the quick pace of events in 1989, 
professional relationships were developed that for many tured into jobs.  One 
Chinese journalist articulated a common scenario when s described how she came 
to work for the BBC: 
Why did I join the BBC?  It was largely because of the ev nt in 1989.  I 
worked for the media in China before 1989, working with media and TV 
stations during the Students’ Movement.  The BBC even interviewed me.  
Many of my friends worked for the media, too. On the third day after the June 
4th event, we left China. The BBC was recruiting new employees because it 
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was expanding, because a big event took place in China, and because China 
was more and more important to England.  So I joined the BBC at the end of 
1989.  (BBC Chinese female reporter) 
This generation of post-Tiananmen reporters are now largely middle-aged and 
serving in editorial positions within the Chinese branches at VOA and the BBC, with 
the younger generation of reporters under them not having directly experienced the 
dramatic events at Tiananmen Square.  The entrée of so many professional Chinese 
journalists around 1989 did change the work environments within these divisions at 
VOA and the BBC to emphasize professional journalism in Chinese over merely 
translating English broadcasts, as they had in the past, thu  raising the status of the 
Chinese language services within VOA and the BBC considerably. 
The American and British journalists spoke about shifts in hiring and training 
over time as well.  Many of the older journalists at both VOA and the BBC had been 
brought in through extensive training programs that placed themin a number of posts 
throughout their agencies to give them the chance to learn a range of broadcasting 
skills in a hands-on way and also to gain a broader perspective on their organizations.  
A reporter at the BBC proudly told me: 
The training I received was the best on the planet.  Undoubtedly.  It was a 2-
year traineeship.  For the first six weeks, it was absolute start-from-zero, 
teaching you how to at least make radio technically and how to think about 
making original features.  After that six weeks, for the next two years I had 
placements (to some extent of my choice) around the BBC to learn the ropes.  
It was fantastic having the label of trainee, because it gave you the right to 
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fail.  You know, you failed and you could say, “I’m just a tr inee, for Christ’s 
sake,” whatever.  That was an astonishing privilege.  At the end of those two 
years, you weren’t given a job, you had to apply for one, but if someone’s 
applying for a job having just spent two years within the corporation, he’s 
going to get one.  (BBC British male reporter) 
A journalist of similar age at VOA spoke in similar terms about her training, 
which, although not as extensive as the BBC’s traineeship, gave her comparable 
opportunities to try out various skills and gain perspectiv: 
It was a year-long internship, and throughout the year you’d spend about six 
weeks in different parts of the operation.  You’d spend six weeks in features 
production, and there were people on hand to tell you how to wri e a radio 
feature.  You would spend six weeks in newscasting, and they taught you how 
to write news and how to put together a newscast and how to time your 
scripts.  I worked in the production side where I learned how to direct in the 
studio, to direct programs and how to backtime a clock.  I learned through 
most of these what it means when you try to achieve balance, and how your 
choice of words, even the tiniest of words, can be so loaded.  I think they just 
wanted to teach me how to be a good radio person for VOA.  That just means 
accurate, informative.  And I also got voice lessons.  To become a good (by 
their standards) presenter.  You know, personality.  That’s the way it worked 
then.  It’s changed since then.  (VOA American female reporter) 
Apparently the shift at both VOA and the BBC has been to move away from 
providing such extensive training to incoming reporters, thus more of the younger 
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journalists I interviewed at both organizations had more establi hed credentials, either 
in the field of journalism (such as working previously for NPR affiliates) or in 
academia generally (such as having earned an advanced degree).  Thus, it is safe to 
say that both the Western and Chinese reporters I spoke with at VOA and the BBC 
are highly educated, with extensive experience in journalism, gained either inside or 
outside their organizations. 
Who Benefits Most? 
When participants were asked whom they feel they work for, or who benefits 
most from their work, I received a variety of responses.  Some journalists gave more 
than one answer.  The most common response was that the listeners benefit most, by 
gaining information and insights that they might not have access to otherwise.  
Thirty-three of the 50 participating journalists described listeners as the most 
important beneficiaries, a sentiment spread evenly between reporters of all ages, 
genders, and levels of training at VOA, the BBC, and in the C inese media.  The 
strongest articulation of this ideal that I heard was from a British reporter at the BBC: 
I work for the audience; I mean there’s no question.  Benefit is quite a loaded 
term, but I make the program not for myself, my presenter, or my boss.  I 
make my program for my 45 million listeners.  Without sounding too Reithian 
about it, I believe in the ideals of the BBC—to educate, inform, and entertain.  
And we have an extremely loyal and vociferous audience.  W  get emails and 
letters and texts, as well as anecdotally.  I know what a difference our output 
makes, and that’s not just the news output.  (BBC British female reporter)      
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Reporters at VOA and in China, on the other hand, were molikely to say 
that their work benefits their audience by allowing them to know more about what is 
going on in their own countries.  An American reporter at VOA told me that he hopes 
that his work will benefit listeners by allowing them 
just to learn more about the incredible variety of culture, lifestyles, 
discussions, various issues, research… in this country (the U.S.).  And then, I 
guess secondarily, just the fact that Americans can have all these amazing 
different lines of work and different artistic output.  I think, in a sense, it’s a 
message just saying what an open society is like, what leanings there are in 
this country.  (VOA American male reporter) 
Statements such as these reveal two key assumptions. The first is that 
broadcasting is from an open country to an audience in a not-so-open country.  This 
qualitative difference in levels of openness between cou tries is considered to 
automatically generate demand.  The second assumption is hat f a country is well-
known or powerful, people in the world will want to know more about it and tune in.  
Reporters with the Chinese media spoke in similar terms about seeking to benefit 
audiences by giving them a fuller picture of life in China.  An editor at CCTV 
explained: 
We wish to introduce China to an audience that is interest d in China.  I wish 
to serve them, at least in terms of information.  Information such as their 
traveling, day-to-day life, and their opinions of China.  We wish that they 
could get to know China.  I’ve heard that Americans who have not been here 
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still equate China with pandas and think it’s an underdeveloped country.  So, 
we wish to present them a true image of China.  (CCTV Chinese male editor) 
Reporters both at VOA and with the Chinese media expressed that they felt 
they were doing a service to both their country and to those who tune in by supplying 
information about their societies to those on the outside.  When I asked a Chinese 
reporter at VOA why he feels his audience tunes in, he told me, “Because they have 
an interest to know this country.  We all should know America.  This is a very 
important country.”  The frame of mind expressed through suca statement is that 
important countries have a voice by sheer virtue of their importance, and for China to 
be considered an important country, it likewise needs a voice on the world stage.  A 
Chinese journalist at the Xinhua News Agency explained that the paradigm is similar 
to the Olympics, in which individual athletes compete on behalf of their nations, and 
the more “important countries” are expected to bring home a significant number of 
medals.  This way of thinking is tremendously pervasive among Chinese during these 
years leading up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. 
Chinese reporters at VOA were the most likely to express the idea that it is the 
American government’s prerogative to express its views (imply ng that a 
“government” can have views).  The presence of the dailyeditorial (shelun, 社论, in 
Chinese) produced by some unknown government office, which must then be 
translated to other languages and aired, was described by many as  constant reminder 
of the underlying “sponsor” of the agency, the U.S. government.  One Chinese 
reporter at VOA told me: 
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VOA is the only official media for the American government.  Thus, one part 
of its goal is to communicate the American government’s ideas and policies, 
which is understandable.  This is a difference as compared to other news 
networks.  They don’t have a duty to work for the American government.  
Although there are conflicts about whether VOA should work f r the 
government, through negotiation and compromise, VOA needs to broadcast 
editorials everyday.  Furthermore, VOA is dramatically different from the 
Chinese official media.  Chinese official media only follow the tone and rules 
from the Chinese government. VOA is different. Except for the editorials, 
others aspects are the same with the majority of massedia.  VOA still has its 
editorial independence, although it is often challenged.  (VOA Chinese male 
reporter) 
This conception of the Chinese government media as having a rather short 
leash was confirmed by over half of the reporters I spoke with in China at CCTV, 
CRI, and the Xinhua News Agency.  One editor at CCTV, who referred to himself as 
relatively friendly toward the U.S. said that to him, the goal for a news organization 
should be to strive for achieving true objectivity: 
Objectivity means that you have both positive and negative sides.  But I 
cannot do this when it comes to some sensitive issues.  I am not allowed to do 
so.  I have to abide by rules of CCTV and represent China.  With regard to 
such sensitive issues as Taiwan’s human rights, the Falun Gong cult, 
especially some resolutions passed by the United States condemning China, I 
can only position the United States as our antagonistic targe  in my stories.  
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That’s all I can do.  I will not even leave half of the space for the United 
States.  Most likely I would present China’s standing and argue against the 
United States.  Ninety percent of the content will be devoted to China and the 
remaining 10% to the United States.  I cannot put too many criticisms from 
the American side in my stories.  It’s not allowed.  Under such circumstances, 
I cannot consider my audience.  Whether it is effective or not is not my 
concern.  I only speak for the government and weigh what I c n say and what 
I cannot.  Effectiveness is not my concern, because such political issues may 
affect my career.  (CCTV Chinese male editor) 
A peer at the Xinhua News Agency agreed that this goal of objectivity is 
tough to reach: 
Because Xinhua is the biggest news agency in China, they should strive to be 
authoritative and factual.  They seem to seldom mention objectivity, as it is 
hard to be objective in terms of domestic reporting.  I think it’s natural that 
foreigners consider us to be unobjective.  I think news reporting in every 
country is biased.  Is AP really objective?  I don’t think so.  During the war in 
Iraq, their newspapers, their media were guiding the whole c untry.  And their 
reporting was more or less like propaganda.  I think it is understandable that 
China has propaganda.  (Xinhua Chinese female reporter) 
Reporters at the BBC, in contrast with their peers at VOA and the Chinese 
media, did not speak about representing the British government or any other aspect of 
British society.  The BBC World Service’s mandate, I was told repeatedly, was to 
shed light on “the amazing things going on throughout the world.”  Almost all of the 
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British reporters interviewed at the BBC told me that te stated goal of their 
organization was less to showcase life in the U.K. and more to “show the best of 
Britain by being impartial.”  Reporters implied that the modern backlash against 
Great Britain’s imperial history has made today’s BBC repoters sensitive about 
coming off as too condescending or too “Reithian.”  Thus, rathe  than casting itself as 
the voice of one country seeking to be understood, the BBC World Service was 
characterized by its reporters as seeking to capture the voic  of “the world speaking to 
itself.” 
Although three-fifths of all the journalists I interview d reported that they feel 
the biggest beneficiaries of their work are the listeners, another sizable portion of the 
participants told me that they themselves feel that they benefit the most.  A Chinese 
reporter at the BBC explained why: 
From my point of view, I possibly get the most benefit from my own job.  I 
cannot know whether the audience has listened to my program every time, but 
I know I did.  So I can get a lot from the programs.  If I interview one party 
involved in an event and asked him or her why he or she was put into jail by 
the Chinese government, I think it influenced me greatly, even more greatly 
than it did my audiences.  It influenced me greatly because I got the first-hand 
information.  Maybe the tape of the interview was 30 minutes in length.  I had 
to edit and shorten it.  Therefore, I was the only person who knew the whole 
picture. I think I’ve got some valuable details from the intrview and it has 
also broadened my view.  (BBC Chinese male reporter) 
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Interestingly, males and females, those over and under 40, and those with 
different training backgrounds at the various organizations were evenly divided 
among those who said they feel they work for themselves; th  only significant source 
of difference was national origin.  There was an 8-7 split among every demographic 
factor except national origin, which split 10-5, with twice the number of Chinese 
stating that they work for themselves than Westerners.  Nine of the ten Chinese who 
said they benefit most were at VOA or the BBC, which could likely be due to many 
of these journalists being self-proclaimed independent types who are doing whatever 
it takes to thrive in a career abroad.  Another Chinese r porter explained that his 
work, even without listeners tuning in, is still inherently satisfying on its own: 
In fact I work for myself.  I have my dreams when I work.  I sometimes 
discuss the dreams with my colleagues.  I hope I have new achievements 
every day or something different from yesterday.  I don’t want to do the same 
thing every day.  (BBC Chinese male reporter)  
Aside from those who said that they work for listeners or that they work for 
themselves, five journalists also told me that they work f  their organization, three 
told me that they work for their colleagues, and another thr e told me that they work 
for their country.  (Two of those who said they work for their country were at VOA 
and one was in China; none of the reporters at the BBC said that they were working 
for Britain.)  Five journalists, four Americans at VOA and one British at the BBC, 
also told me that they work not for the masses but simply for “that one listener out 
there.”  A senior American reporter at VOA explained: 
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Something that I learned in journalism school and have ner forgotten is that 
you’re always speaking to or writing for one person at a time.  You’re not 
talking to the masses; you’re not talking to a group; you’re not talking to a 
country.  You’re talking to one person, and you try to imagine a conversation 
that you and he or she would have, and make it as personal, as personable as 
possible.  (VOA American male reporter) 
Although this idea of the “one listener” came up several times among the 
Western reporters, the Chinese I interviewed never referred to their audience in any 
other than mass terms.  The very word most often used by my Chinese participants 
for the concept of audience, tingzhong  (听众) (literally “listeners,” since I was 
interviewing mostly radio reporters) signifies a mass—the second character of the 
word is comprised of three combined characters for “person,” ignifying a mass of 
people.  The Chinese reporters I spoke with also always referred to their audience as 
“they” or tamen (他们), necessarily denoting a plurality.  There was no concept for 
the single representative listener as discussed by the Western participants.  However, 
there were frequent references made by Chinese reporters (especially in China) to 
certain segments of the audience, such as “people who are learning English,” 
“audiences interested in China,” or “those who are concerned about economics.”  The 
idea of a reporter imagining herself conversing with one indiv dual representative 
listener was never mentioned by Chinese reporters.  Rather, they considered 
themselves as doing their job by reporting news to mass audiences, even if those 
markets are segmented into publics with varying special interests. 
 176 
 
Propaganda or Public Service? 
An interesting and significant theme that emerged in my conversations with 
journalists at VOA, the BBC, and the Chinese official media was whether or not they 
considered their agencies to be producing propaganda.  This topic is a particularly 
important discussion in this context because of modern shifts in the Chinese notion of 
xuanchuan (宣传), traditionally translated from Chinese to English as propaganda, 
but more recently (perhaps in response to Western derogatoy notions of the word) as 
publicity.  To what extent does the degree of a Chinese reporter’s exposure to 
Western definitions of propaganda affect his or her construction of the mission of a 
government broadcast agency?  How comfortable are individuals in different cultures 
with thinking of themselves as “propagandists?” 
It was clear from what Chinese reporters, even those who have never left 
China, told me that the Western negative view of the term propaganda has entered 
and influenced their notion of the term.  Only one Chinese journalist I spoke with, a 
young TV reporter at CCTV with no formal training in journalism, indicated no 
concession to the Western definition.  She told me, “Xuanchuan is to let the public 
know the true story, truly report facts, and have truthful publicity.  Our work is 
definitely xuanchuan.”  A news editor at the same organization who says that he tries 
to keep up with Western theories of journalism agreed that CCTV produces 
xuanchuan, although he defined the term propaganda (which he used in English) 
more according to the Western definition: 
Yes, CCTV is a propaganda organization.  To me, the word means the 
information-sender intends to achieve its own goal through propaganda’s 
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influence on the public. They want the information recipients to do as they 
wish.  They feed the audience with one-way information, thus doing as they 
want.  When I learned the terms propaganda and xuanchuan, they meant the 
same.  I also looked it up in the Chinese thesaurus, which confirmed my 
understanding.  In Chinese, xuanchuan is neutral, but negative in English.  It 
is neutral in Chinese, for example, we still have the Department of 
Xuanchuan.  But now we already realized its derogatory connotation in 
English.  So, we don’t use the word propaganda any more.  Rather, we say the 
Department of Publicity.  Because in English, propaganda is erogatory, but 
not the same case in Chinese.  (CCTV Chinese male editor) 
Likewise, a senior editor at the Xinhua News Agency echoed th  sentiment 
that because she perceives that her audiences don’t like the t rm, neither does she:  
“Because our audiences are in foreign countries and we deal with foreign media, I 
don’t like the word propaganda at all.  I don’t want our articles and our stories to 
appear to be propaganda.  I’m against propaganda.” 
A reporter from China Radio International went on furthe  to explain what it 
is that he believes Western audiences have against propaganda, although he feels that 
the issue is more of form than of content: 
The term propaganda was initially a positive word, but came to have negative 
meanings attached to it after Hitler.  He maintained that false information 
would become true if it was repeated 10 times.  If you don’t accept my 
argument, I’ll say it again.  Then, perhaps you have some knowledge about it, 
and still don’t agree with me.  I’ll tell you a third time and repeat it again until 
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you agree with me.  So this term is more about how to use it properly.  As an 
official radio station, it’d be inaccurate if I deny that CRI indeed has 
propaganda.  But it is more a medium.  If you send out propaganda 
information to the audience through your radio, television, the Internet, and 
newspapers, nobody would listen to you. You must tell the s ory of China as 
fast and accurately as possible.  Propaganda won’t work.  So, this term has 
more to do with how it’s used.  (CRI Chinese male reporter) 
The issue, I was told several times by journalists in China, is not whether 
Chinese media broadcast propaganda (“Of course they do,” I was told several times), 
but how and for what purpose.  Because the founding model of the Chinese media 
was as an educator and agitator of the masses, propaganda as described even in 
Western terms, as presenting skewed information for a political purpose, is often 
viewed in China as a natural and necessary evil.  “Even the American media are 
propaganda,” I was told frequently by Chinese journalists.  Although there is a belief 
among journalists that outright deceptive bias is an unfortunate element of true 
propaganda, there was a sense conveyed by many reporters that China has as much 
right to produce propaganda as the Western powers do.  The question is more one of 
degrees and effectiveness, as articulated by this senior rep rter at Xinhua: 
Xuanchuan did not have derogatory connotations to me when I started 
working. Because I was a non-journalism major, I equated xuanchuan with 
media and news reporting.  Later on, I learned that this erm has a unique 
meaning, that Westerners regard it as a derogatory term.  Now, I think the 
xuanchuan aspect of Chinese news reporting is less apparent, but has not died 
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out.  I think we are striving towards international standards, such as in terms 
of social news and international news.  I don’t think Rome can be built 
overnight.  But there are changes.  Besides, during my one- ear study abroad, 
I found foreign media are not as objective, balanced and unbiased as we 
thought.  They have their preferences, but are more skillful than we are.  …  Is 
the AP really objective?  I don’t think so.  During the war in Iraq, their 
newspapers, their media were guiding the whole country.  And their reporting 
was more or less like propaganda.  I think it is understandable that China has 
propaganda.  (Xinhua Chinese female reporter) 
One common device I heard from Chinese, both in China and abroad, was to 
distinguish between propaganda and public relations or public dip omacy. Whereas 
propaganda is thought often to involve blatant bias or deception, public 
relations/diplomacy is considered to be a softer and more acceptable term.  An editor 
at CCTV explained: 
Propaganda means you should not doubt our policy.  But public dip omacy is 
to explain a policy in a reasonable way and make it sound very good and 
reasonable.  Propaganda sometimes doesn’t sound reasonable.  Our programs 
are absolutely not propaganda.  Propaganda should be done by departments 
like the news division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Our job is just to 
make the policy sound more reasonable.  CCTV is positioned as, well, the 
Chinese government’s public relations.  It explains China’s st nding on some 
international issues.  (CCTV Chinese female editor) 
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It was this point, the accepted necessity of having a broadcast agency whose 
job it is to explain a government’s stand on certain issue , that overlapped with the 
perceived mandate of journalists at VOA.  Although all of the reporters interviewed at 
VOA, both American and Chinese, told me that they feel quite free in their own 
individual reporting and that ninety to one hundred percent of their story ideas are 
their own, they feel that the presence of the five-minute editorials aired regularly as 
“the opinion of the United States government” falls distinctly into what they consider 
to be propaganda.  The most common sentiment I heard was summed up by a senior 
Chinese reporter who said, “I don’t think VOA’s reports are propaganda, except the 
editorials.  The editorials are the government’s opinion.  Of course they want to 
influence people.”  I was told that the fact that the government should even have an 
opinion that it feels it has a right to broadcast creates n environment in which, even 
if individual stories are produced by reporters without governmnt oversight or 
involvement, there is still a specter of influence that is perceptibly pervasive.  And, I 
was told repeatedly by both Chinese and American reporters a  VOA, this specter has 
been exerting an increasing amount of control over the inn r workings of the 
organization, most notably after 9/11.  From journalists whohad been around VOA 
for decades, I heard disappointment that the agency has actually taken steps backward 
from its landmark 1976 charter that explicitly granted the Voice of America 
independence from government influence over content.  A senior ditor who has been 
at VOA since the mid-1970s told me: 
Within VOA, there’s always been kind of warring cultures, a little bit.  Some 
conflicting notions of what our mission, our purpose is.  The charter that we 
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won from Congress in 1976 is very specific about our programming being 
accurate, objective, and comprehensive.  The Charter had been kicking around 
for 10 years before that, but Watergate and the troubles with the Nixon  over 
Vietnam and the whole Pentagon Papers and all of that… very difficult 
political stories that VOA had tried to report on during the late 60s and early 
70s finally led Congress to grant this protective umbrella over the VOA to say 
whatever administration is in power, whatever Congress, however it’s made 
up, the Voice of America will not be a slave, will not be a microphone for the 
policy people, and it will not be enslaved or intimidated by political pressures.  
(VOA American male editor) 
However, several reporters told me, the post-9/11 VOA has been moving 
increasingly away from this mandate and toward a climate of government-led 
mission-building.  A senior American reporter articulated he frustration I heard from 
several of her colleagues over what they call recent “micromanagement:” 
I’m feeling much more constricted by circumstances lately.  There are certain 
things we just can’t…  We’ll be very careful about how we approach things.  
For example, Abu Ghraib.  The leadership here thought VOA was focusing 
too much on it, which I think was colossally ignorant.  We found out that they 
told, I think, the Web Desk, and Television to stop putting up pictures.  It had 
already run by the time the VOA Director saw that we had done it, but he 
would have killed it.  I heard from my division chief.  Actually, from my boss.  
It came down the ladder.  It’s micromanagement.  A leadership that is um… 
partisan.  (VOA American female reporter) 
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Chinese reporters at VOA, particularly those who had been employed by the 
organization for a significant length of time, echoed the same sentiment, that they 
have been surprised by recent exhortations for the agency to fall in line with current 
administration policy.  A Chinese reporter explained the importance of the 1976 
Charter in what he feels should be the limitations of the government in exercising 
control over VOA’s content: 
I have some concerns about the general management of VOA because it 
seems the government wants to have more control over the Voice of America.  
Once the President came here and said “The Voice of America is not free; it 
should be part of the war on terrorism.”  The President has this will; that is, 
since VOA is a government institution, why not report things based on the 
President’s opinion?  However, we have our Charter, which is a law.  It states 
very clearly that we don’t represent any governmental istitution.  What we 
represent is the American people.  So we need to report government policies, 
but we also need to report whether some people disagree with the policies.  So 
if I go to the Congress and find many Democrats who are dissatisfied with 
Bush’s policies, it is my responsibility to report it, or else Chinese might feel 
that the United States is a dictatorship that must follow what Bush believes.  
Actually the United States is not like that, and it does allow different points of 
view.  (VOA Chinese male reporter) 
American reporters at VOA expressed a similar dilemma, that although they 
personally feel free in their reporting, they realize that the Charter is all that stands 
between the U.S. government and a direct link into theircoverage.  They recognize 
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that, if the administration desires more control over content, they simply have to 
remove certain services from under VOA’s Charter in order to have greater license to 
influence programming decisions.  A VOA reporter (who is no longer with the 
organization) told me that there is a clear chain of command… 
I’d say going from certainly the State Department and below the State 
Department, I’d suspect as far as (VOA Director) David Jackson.  He 
considers our mission to be fighting the war on terror.  I don’t think that’s our 
mission.  I don’t think that has anything to do with our mission.  I think the 
way that they’re trying to execute the mission is completely counter-
productive to the war on terror.  I mean, I think Radio Sawa (the newly-
created Arabic radio service created outside of VOA) is the most glaring 
example of that.  They took VOA’s Arabic content off the air.  You know, 
they took a service that was chartered to be comprehensive and independent 
and objective, and replaced it with pop music with occasion l headlines, little 
snippets of news that is not chartered to adhere to VOA’s standards, that’s not 
required to be comprehensive, independent, objective.  Which means… I 
don’t know what they’re saying, but I imagine Radio Sawa probably isn’t 
reporting a lot on Abu Ghraib.  I’d be very surprised if itwere.  I mean, I 
don’t know.  But I imagine that they probably don’t talk about things going 
badly in Iraq.  (VOA American male reporter) 
Although my questioning did not focus particularly on political ssues, many 
of the VOA reporters I spoke with were eager to talk about larger institutional issues 
such as these that I was told “are affecting morale.”  There was a sense of disconnect 
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between the ideal VOA that journalists want to be working for, of the objective, 
comprehensive, independent VOA that they attempt to convey through their 
reporting, and the decisions “higher up” that are perceived to be eroding the 
independent ethos that was celebrated as a result of the 1976 Charter. 
The fundamental characteristic of the Charter that VOA journalists told me 
they look to is its casting of the agency as a public servic  broadcaster, in essence 
granting employees a position of journalistic tenure so as to maximize their freedom 
to cover issues that they perceive are most interesting and beneficial to their 
audiences.  Metaphorically speaking, this tenure would allow reporters to freely 
search out and share the “food for thought” that they personally find valuable and 
would like to share with others, rather than “force feeding” American policy and 
lifestyle around the world.  A Chinese reporter at VOA summed up his confidence in 
the Charter to accomplish this goal most meaningfully to everyone concerned: 
The first priority is to improve listeners’ lives.  I think this is the most 
important factor, because if we could improve their lives, it will be beneficial 
to Sino-American relations and their future.  So even though I also want to do 
other things, like make a very nice product, the most important thing, and our 
purpose here at VOA is not just making news stories sound good, but making 
stories that are useful to our audience.  Other radio stati ns could talk about 
other stuff, but for us, we have a very clear purpose, that is, we want to reflect 
our life here to a Chinese audience based on our Charter.  And then our 
audience could improve their lives after listening to our programs, politically, 
economically, and culturally.  (VOA Chinese male reporter) 
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At the BBC, in contrast, morale issues that I heard articulated had little or 
nothing to do with being subject to British government influence.  The issues there 
were more centered around the “corporatization” of the agency, related to issues such 
as branding, marketing, and conceptions of the audience.  On  British reporter 
complained: 
I mean, internally it’s becoming… the jargon is beginning to sound a bit like 
propaganda just because there are all these words like “ownership” (said with 
an American accent) and other corporate terms.  It’s awful that one feels one 
has to say them in an American accent, but you know what I mean.  (laughs)  
The jargon begins to feel like propaganda, but it might just be that 
management has carefully chosen the most appropriate terms, and they’re just 
such horrible jargon that you think it’s propaganda.  Words like ownership, 
stakeholders, just pressing all the right buttons…  that listeners are 
stakeholders, like the politicians say voters are stakehold rs.  Why can’t they 
just say voters?  I think it’s this kind of desire to find words that press lots of 
correct buttons.  Which is not in itself propaganda, but it increasingly becomes 
distanced from normal, everyday use of English.  (BBC British female 
reporter) 
Whereas VOA and Chinese media reporters expressed no qualms about 
reflecting the best aspects of their nations in their reporting, journalists at the BBC 
described covering “the best of Britain” in almost blameworthy terms, as if it were a 




Propaganda means somebody is trying to use the media in some way to 
convince other people of an opinion and therefore not giving a whole truth.  
What we do is very different, it has different values, a different approach here 
in the World Service.  Do we do propaganda?  No, I don’t think we do.  We 
do cover lots of… we have sort of a slightly ambiguous mandate about our 
coverage of “the best of Britain.”  And I find that sort f a floaty, ambiguous 
notion.  On one hand, we are told it isn’t really to be done because we show 
the best of Britain by being impartial.  But on the other and, there is 
something which does come up that we do cover British culture, which we do 
to a far disproportionate degree than we would if we were looking really at 
spaceship Earth.  (BBC British female editor) 
The very clear response from the BBC reporters I interviewed, both British 
and Chinese, in discussing propaganda is that there is no need for the BBC World 
Service to propagandize and that, despite its funding coming from the British Foreign 
Office, the government takes no pains to use the agency as a mouthpiece.  A Chinese 
reporter who had been at the BBC for many years summed up the views of her 
colleagues in saying, 
I don’t think the BBC propagandizes.  It is not necessary for it to 
propagandize. The BBC is a news organization.  It has nothing to 
propagandize.  There is no need for it to do so.  It is not affiliated with the 
government, any organization, any factory, or any corporation.  It is not 
necessary for it to propagandize for anything. There is no need for it to 
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promote itself.  It has been well established.  The BBC is a public service.  
(BBC Chinese female reporter) 
A British reporter at the World Service expressed a verysimilar view: 
Propaganda means a one-sided version of a story that you want to make 
somebody else believe is the whole truth.  We don’t produce it in my area at 
all, at all.  No.  I can’t even kind of equate it to what we do, because I don’t 
quite know what we’d be doing propaganda for, really, or who.  (laughs)  I 
mean, we are very aware as program makers that our reputation h ngs entirely 
on the quality of the news that the BBC World Service provides.  And you 
know, one can only say that the access we get to people is because of the 
reputation of the BBC and the World Service for trying to pr vide a reliable 
source of as-impartial-as-possible news.  You know, we’re so lucky that we 
work for an organization that has that kind of international reputation.  (BBC 
British female reporter) 
The most striking evidence I discovered of the varying morale at the different 
agencies came when I asked the journalists what news source  they turn to first for 
their own news.  At the BBC World Service, 19 out of the 20 people I interviewed 
told me that they usually turn to the BBC each day when ty want to find out what is 
going on in the world.  Among the journalists in China, nine out of ten told me that 
they stay tuned to the Chinese official media, with four t of ten mentioning that 
they also tune in to the BBC, and four of the ten (slight y overlapping) saying that 
they also watch American media such as CNN.  At VOA, all of the journalists I spoke 
with said that they tune in to various American media sources—CNN, MSNBC, 
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network television, National Public Radio.  But not a single VOA journalist told me 
that they turn to VOA to get their own news. 
Story Selection 
Journalists were asked to talk extensively about specific stories that they had 
covered, because in contextualizing and explaining their story choices, they revealed 
a great deal about how they operationalize their presentational values in day-to-day 
work.  The most common theme that emerged from all five sets of journalists was the 
mandate they feel, as public servants, to convey a sense of ordinary life in the nations 
they cover.  Rather than focusing on the extreme or the unusual, as is often the case 
with commercial media, these international broadcasters seek out and celebrate the 
ordinary moments that define culture itself.  An editor at VOA explained, 
We’re speaking to people who are listening to us because they’re curious 
about the United States, chances are.  And I want to respect their need for 
useful, realistic information.  If we feed them, you know, the ten weirdest 
stories of the day, you know, the ten weirdest Americans, that’s doing a 
disservice.  So we look for stories, not that are just sort of mainstream pablum, 
but stories that talk about the American culture and the Am rican body politic 
and the American ethos in all of its complexities, in ways that illuminate the 
reality here.  (VOA American male editor) 
In terms of Carey’s (1989) ritual view of communication, this function is 
especially meaningful because it positions both the producer and receiver of a 
message together at a virtual table feasting together on the stuff of human life.  
Stories are chosen for their capacity to meaningfully comment on society, and 
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messages are chosen that resonate with the people who share them because of the 
insight they provide on the human experience.  A VOA report r commented on how 
the importance of this connective social function personally helps him choose the 
stories he covers: 
I did a really great interview with the lady who mops out the men’s rooms in 
the local subway station.  Some people might say, “Who cares about that?”  I 
mean, “Who wants to hear her?”   Well, I fancy it would be interesting to 
audiences because many of us often do menial work ourselves, and so it’s sort 
of nice to hear somebody else and what they’re like, and it can extend a sense 
of a certain solidarity with others in our class.  I feel that it would be great to 
hear like, somebody sweeping out a mosque courtyard somewhere in a minor 
city in Egypt.   I mean, I would love to hear what he had to say.    
(VOA American male reporter) 
The sense I heard from reporters when they shared ordinary story ideas such 
as this one was, “if not me as a public broadcaster, then w o?”  Who will tell the 
stories of everyday life if media become entirely politicized or corporatized?   This 
sentiment was particularly strong at the BBC, where the stories of ordinary people 
outside of Britain are just as important as those within t e U.K..  I was told repeatedly 
that special efforts are taken to find out about what is go ng on that is culturally 
significant in widely diverse areas of the world for the sake of publicizing them 
internationally.  An editor of an arts program at the BBC explained why she feels that 
it is especially important to seek out and cover, for instance, emerging African artists: 
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We work in arts/entertainment/culture here in this area, and I do feel a kind of 
onus on us to treat the things which make sense to people loca ly, which 
challenge assumptions, which aren’t all about our Western eyes.  It’s about 
giving an equality to people who don’t have the marketing behind them that 
Western culture does.  It’s both my own personal passion, and also it is 
something that is coming from the top, because half of our listeners are in 
Africa, and we know that in order to succeed with them, we’ve got to do 
programs in which they feel that their voices are being heard as well.   
(BBC British female reporter) 
Delivering news that is not otherwise available through other media was a 
high priority among all of the journalists I interviewed, but none so strongly as the 
Chinese at VOA and the BBC.  They expressed a sense of mission to share 
information about certain aspects of life in the U.S. and the U.K. that can bear 
meaningfully on current aspects of China’s development.  A VO  reporter told me 
about the underlying reasons for the coverage he pursues on Capitol Hill: 
Laws in this country need to be passed by their vote and then signed by the 
President.  It is a different process than what China has.  So I want to explain 
to my audience what the legal process in the States is like and especially what 
is the legal process related to China. I make my stories lik  this because I 
believe it should be the best for my audience.  (VOA Chinese male reporter) 
The Chinese reporters I spoke with expressed a strong sense that their Chinese 
peers back at home are hungry for details, even common details, about life in the U.S. 
or U.K.  When I asked them where this idea comes from, I was told that they receive 
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many emails and hotline calls from listeners in China.  A young Chinese reporter at 
VOA told me about an interesting story she did in response to a caller’s request: 
They use the hotline to tell us what topics they would like to hear about.  I 
remember one time a caller told me that he wanted to know what an American 
school’s lavatory looks like; whether it is separated btween male and female; 
and whether people could take showers there.  Yes, they want to know what 
an American school’s lavatory looks like and what are the facilities.  So they 
often would offer some interesting suggestions for topics.  (VOA Chinese 
female reporter) 
However, I also heard that not every detail of life in America is necessarily 
interesting to a Chinese audience, so it takes Chinese reporters to know what will and 
what will not arouse attention back in China.  A Chinese VOA editor explained: 
The mission is to introduce American culture, American political institutions, 
and American reality.  This is one mission of VOA.  So I think I should 
introduce some meaningful and interesting things here to our Chinese 
audience, letting them be aware of these.  However, not all the things in the 
United States could arouse their interest.  For example, football here is a very 
popular sport.  If you talk with Chinese about this, they would not have any 
interest because they do not have such a sport at all.  Therefore, even though it 
is something about America, the audience will not necessarily be interested.  
If your listeners do not like the topic, no matter how well you write the story, 
it is still not meaningful.  (VOA Chinese male editor) 
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Similarly, I was told at the BBC that the topics chosen are those that are 
expected to interest audiences in China, particularly unheard angles on issues 
currently unfolding in China, such as political developments in Beijing, revaluation of 
the Chinese exchange rate, elections in Taiwan, or anti-corruption protests in the 
Chinese countryside.  Fewer Chinese at the BBC told me about doing stories on life 
in Britain, but those who did were just as likely to talk bout the dark side of British 
life as the bright side.  For example, one seasoned Chinese reporter told me: 
I myself have interviewed a lot of British people with different jobs—farmers, 
homeless people, etc.  My interviews were to stay withthem and record their 
lives.  Why did I do this?  I just wanted to let Chinese peopl  know more 
about Britain and British people.  The U.K. is really not what they imagine, a 
perfect, developed, and industrial country.  When I was still in China, I 
thought so too, and now, I want to tell the Chinese people they are wrong.  
Later, one of my British friends asked me why I did a program on homeless 
people.  She felt like I wanted to present Chinese audiences with the dark 
sides of British life.  I told her that’s exactly why I did the program.  I said I 
wanted to let Chinese people have an idea of the freedom in BBC’s news 
production.  That is to say, it is safe for us to report the dark sides of British 
society.  BBC broadcasting is full of all kinds of news, sometimes all of which 
are negative.  The BBC does not worry about it at all.  (BBC Chinese female 
reporter) 
This sort of example provides one more instance of the BBC’s prime directive 
being “to show the best of Britain by being impartial,” which sometimes entails 
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covering dark issues just to demonstrate that they can be covered.  One BBC 
journalist working on a pop culture program told me about several instances that she 
felt demonstrated the agency’s attempt to truly engage all audiences by brushing up 
against the limits of free expression.  She told me with a bit of a blush that 
We also did something about… I can’t remember what the reason for doing 
this story was, but it was… oh what do you call those?  Prostitutes who are 
into bondage and whipping.  Perhaps it’s not prostitution that’s involved, it’s 
just a good whip hand and dressing up in the appropriate uniform.  And we 
had one of these women included in the discussion, and she was so good.  I 
must say she was so good.  In the old days, we’d have had someone who’d 
written a book about it or met someone who did that, and now we want the 
person who does it.  So there’s a fine line between us toppling over into poor 
taste, which we tread uneasily.  I think it’s just thegeneral push that we 
should push at the boundaries and be a bit more daring in all directions, 
including that direction.  (BBC British female reporter) 
Among the Chinese official media, perhaps needless to say, no one talked 
about bondage and whipping.  But they did talk about other relatively controversial 
and edgy issues such as AIDS, sexual orientation, corruption, and prostitution.  I was 
told numerous times that China is rapidly becoming a more open society, and that the 
authorities are waking up to the need to respond to audiences by addressing issues of 
genuine and direct concern to all segments of the population.  A senior editor at the 
Xinhua News Agency told me about some of the recent storie  she has been proud of, 
along with her criteria for deciding what issues to pursue: 
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We had stories about AIDS.  For instance, we wrote about discrimination 
against AIDS patients. Also, we wrote about employees of foreign enterprises, 
and labor insurance.  There are also environmental and development issues 
which are also of concern to the international community.  We are concerned 
about common problems encountering the general public, which therefore 
could raise attention.  I’m very realistic.  It has to be of interest for other 
media.  Meanwhile, it should comply to our style.  For instance, we may not 
be able to work on topics like fashion or lifestyles.  Because the audience is 
limited.  Only a group of people or a particular class is concerned about it.  
But issues like environment, ecology, AIDS, and health are common 
concerns.  (Xinhua Chinese female editor) 
Although I was told that there are still many issues that cannot be covered in 
China, particularly stories that might be considered destabilizing for the central 
government, most of the journalists I spoke with told me about how they can be edgy 
with their reporting in other ways.  I was told about the Chinese proverb, “Liu de qing 
shan zai, bu pa mei chai shao (留得青山在不怕沒柴烧),” which loosely translates 
to, “As long as we’re on the green mountain, don’t worry about having no firewood 
to burn.”  In other words, as long as you can stay in the right position, even though 
conditions are not ideal, you can use the position to find what you need.  The idea I 
heard from several reporters in China is that they do what they must to stay in their 
jobs, because as long as they have a platform from which to publish, they can work in 
quiet and gradual ways to create more space for societal reform.  If they get kicked 
off the “green mountain,” there’s no way to engage in the work at all.  Thus, even a 
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shortage of “firewood” (i.e., lack of completely open expression) is to be tolerated in 
the short term, for the sake of long term engagement.  This is a classic pattern in 
Chinese society. 
For example, one CCTV reporter told me that the reason he is willing to put 
up with some level of censorship in his job is because he values the position from 
which his reporting can make a difference in people’s lives, such as in the area of 
public health: 
In China, there are many things that cannot be reported.  Yes, it is true.  Many 
of my colleagues complain that, okay, we report nothing, then we’re finished.  
So they would complain. Our audiences and people outside the journalism 
industry accuse us of lying.  But, I believe it is we that fail to report some 
stories that can be reported.  It will be a better society if we do well in every 
small thing.  If you say that we should topple the Communist government, 
surely the government will kill you first.  Why don’t you devote your efforts 
to many other things that you are able to change?  In otherwords, a journalist 
should not abandon his or her responsibilities simply because of pressure from 
the environment.  I had a very well-known program in Wuhan City.  I didn’t 
feel our law enforcement agencies did a good job.  It seemed that they were 
useless.  Our public hygiene was terrible, which must be of great concern in 
the United States.  So I invited a law enforcement officer to my studio and 
asked our audience to call in and tell him which restaurants f iled hygienic 
standards.  You know, China is a big developing country suffering from 
hepatitis.  Western countries consider hepatitis a disease unique to developing 
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countries that have bad hygiene, which is rare in the United States.  There are 
100,000,000 Chinese hepatitis patients, a heart-wrenching figure.  It looks like 
a small issue of individuals, but when you read the statistics, you definitely 
will regard it a big national issue.  We asked the officer to send his people 
who should be listening to our program as well to check the restaurants 
reported by audiences.  If problem really existed in the restaurants, they must 
be handled promptly.  Then the next day, we would tell our audiences the 
results.  It was such a program.  I did it because I atat a dirty restaurant 
myself.  And this problem is not unique to that restaurant.  I hope journalism 
can affect our lives.  This exposure can better our life, force the restaurant 
industry to improve and conform to the law.  (CCTV Chinese male reporter) 
Eating is considered in China to be the most fundamental of human rights, and 
great emphasis is placed on feeding and being fed.  Thus, perhaps the most innovative 
story idea I encountered in my research was the BBC Chinese Service’s decision to 
capitalize on this most basic of human connections by facilitating dialogue between 
China and Britain around the topic of eating.  Content was produced to be broadcast 
on the air, on the BBC Chinese website, and also through an actual joint festival held 
in western China called “Eat East, Eat West” (吃东吃西, a play on the Chinese word 
for “thing,” dongxi, made up of the characters for east and west).  This programming 
was designed to allow Chinese to gain exposure to the BBC throug  the neutral 
subject of food by providing recipes, cooking tips, and a food quiz offering a trip to 
London.  In this day when controversial programming is expanding, it is interesting 
that food should provide a staple for Chinese media to reach across boundaries. 
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Characterizing the Daily Feed 
One important aspect of this research that has thus far been addressed only 
tangentially is the culinary metaphor of “serving up the daily feed.”  To explore this 
“news as food for thought” symbolism fully, it was helpful to position journalists in a 
metaphorical kitchen, likening their reporting work to thepr paration of food for the 
consumption of others.  Thus, after interviewing each report r for at least half an hour 
about their work so as to make their values more salient in their minds, I asked them 
very bluntly, “If your reporting were a dish, what would it be?”  Although the 
question usually evoked some surprised laughter, all of the journalists I interviewed 
managed to answer creatively and substantively in ways that revealed a great deal 
about the value orientations underlying their journalistic choices.  Even though none 
of the journalists seemed to feel prepared at first to answer the question, all of their 
answers were meaningful and helped to add an extra layer of understanding to our 
characterization of the gatekeeping choices they make in preparing news to serve to 
their audiences. 
The most obvious theme that emerged throughout the international 
broadcasters’ responses was the notion of mixing, a theme that came out most 
strongly among the British at the BBC.  Seven of the ten British reporters at the BBC 
World Service told me that their work would be “a mixture,” “a fusion,” “a selection 
of different things,” or “a big mix.”  Furthermore, each of the seven reporters who 
strove for a mix characterized the mixture of elements i  their reporting as containing 
foreign or exotic elements—an Indian tahli, a Hungarian goulash, Spanish paella, or 
“a big masala mix,” as one told me, because “It would be bits of Britian—chips—and 
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quite a lot of American culture, because that’s what’s universal.  And a bit of curry.  
It would be a masala mix of local stuff that you might no have heard of from 
different places prepared by a mix of people, ideally.”  Another British reporter at the 
BBC emphasized 
It would have to be cultural fusion.  That’s absolutely paramount.  So it would 
have to be sort of Eurasian or Indochinese or something.  It’s the global 
conversation; it’s the meeting of cultures.  And it would have to be delicious.  
The dish probably hasn’t been invented yet.  (BBC British female reporter) 
I was not surprised to hear such internationally-minded responses from the 
BBC World Service.  Their reporters, I was told by several interviewees, tend to have 
an extraordinary level of international interest and experience, and indeed the BBC 
World Service management appears to have gone out of its way, at least in certain 
rounds of hiring, to bring in people who had lived unusual lives in various parts of the 
world.  One reporter told me that, after years of hiring “too many Oxbridge people” 
(i.e. graduates of Oxford and Cambridge Universities) who were “not particularly 
diverse,” the management settled on a new strategy: 
The year I joined, they decided it was very important for hem to be 
completely biased (biased is not the right word) to really try and change the 
kind of people.  I had spent a decade essentially bumming around the world, 
but what I wrote on the application was that I built a boat, I went sailing, I 
wrote lots of poetry and published novels and sailing magazines a d stuff.  
They recruited someone who had just bicycled around China.  They recruited 
an officer from the Gherka regiment who had just spent a year in Nepal.  They 
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recruited a very, very young chap who was working in a warehouse in 
Chicago.  They were looking for people who had seen more of the world, 
perhaps, than the people they had recruited hitherto.  (British BBC journalist) 
Judging by the values articulated by the recruits brought into the BBC World 
Service under this kind of vision, it is apparent that the strategy made a significant 
impact within the organization.  Most of the BBC journalists I interviewed spent at 
least half of their interviews talking about interviewees or audiences in other 
countries.  They emphasized freshness, uniqueness, and exoticness, conveying a sense 
of delight in scouring the world for interesting tidbits and serving them up in a 
palatable and culturally universal mix.  A British BBC reporter told me that, if she 
were to compare her work to a dish,  
I’d want it to be a strong taste and not an insipid taste.  I’d want it to have 
something to chew in it.  And it would definitely be warm food rather than 
cold food.  (laughs)  So strong, sort of piquant, and warm.  Sounds sort of like 
a goulash, doesn’t it?  (BBC British female reporter) 
Spiciness was a major theme that emerged from all the five sets of journalists’ 
interviews, although the range of characterization of what spiciness meant was broad.  
A British BBC reporter described spiciness as “cutting edge,” and a Chinese 
colleague at the BBC told me that spicy represents something “not something 
completely risk-free but interesting enough to attract their (the audience’s) 
attention… so they get a lovely shock, but then hopefully it wouldn’t upset their 
stomach completely, you know.”   An American reporter at VOA thought along the 
same lines, describing her ideal work as “a spicy jambalaya dish, because I do like 
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some of the hot-button issues—gay marriage, the crisis in the Catholic church, those 
sorts of things.”  There is a sense of risk, of excitement, of pushing the envelope of 
human experience.  One Chinese reporter from China Radio International decided 
that he wants his reporting to be 
Strong-flavored dishes, like spicy Sichuan cuisine.  I don’t like bland dishes, 
like some Japanese dishes.  I think life is a process of pursuing excitement.  
Although I choose Sichuan cuisine today, I may choose Hubei c isine 
tomorrow, or Hunan cuisine the day after tomorrow, because they are all hot.  
The level of heat is different.  If I go to the northeast, I may want more salty 
and sour stuff.  But only with all kinds of flavors can I feel more excited.  
(Chinese CRI male journalist) 
It was common for Chinese reporters, both in China or abroad, to draw their 
food-reporting analogies from the eight main schools f Chinese cuisine—Sichuan, 
Guangdong (Canton), Hunan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, a d Fujian, each 
with its own distinct characteristics.  “China has a long food culture,” I was told, and 
“Confucius said the most important thing for people was eating.”  Because Chinese 
conceptions about food are so rich, evocative, and historically grounded, the Chinese 
reporters I interviewed were quick to draw on these established culinary notions in 
ways that belied many deeply-held conceptions about how reporting “should” be 
done.  A Chinese BBC reporter told me, 
My reporting can’t be Sichuan dishes, for I think my report is not that hot—
not that hot chili sort of type, because that’s not what I consider a BBC kind 
of report should be.  I myself like it, of course.  I amokay with different 
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styles.  If it is a hot chili type, that would be more appropriate for sports type 
of reporting or for commentary with guidelines.  Then, you can be appropriate 
for the kind of steamy taste of the comments.  But otherwise, for general 
reporting, that should be a kind of, you know, taste considered as sort of 
general statements or descriptions.  Maybe it’s like Shang i food, because I 
think this kind of food has an agreeable flavor, and it doesn’t go to extremes.  
It’s rather mild, occasionally sweet.  It has style; it has a kind of status.  
(Chinese BBC journalist) 
Sichuan food was by far the most frequently referenced cuisine by the Chinese 
journalists, invoked for its strong, spicy taste.  Although the above-mentioned 
Chinese reporter at the BBC felt that the “BBC style” might preclude him from 
producing general news programs that are too shocking, one of his female Chinese 
BBC colleagues told me matter-of-factly, “My programs are Sichuan cuisine, spicy.  
Leaders in China won’t be happy with the programs.”  Indigest on, for her, isn’t a 
problem, as long as it’s the right segment of the audience feeling the heat. 
Shanghai food was also mentioned by Chinese journalists for its lightness and 
sweetness, and Cantonese food for its freshness and simplicity.  A journalist with the 
Xinhua News Agency in Beijing told me that he specifically voids spicy stories: “I’d 
say our work is like Cantonese dishes.  Because it’s no very spicy, not very heavy, 
but simple and clear.  In general, I think you want to get as many readers as possible.”  
In other words, taking too many risks or presenting too much flavor can be a liability 
if it costs you listeners. 
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For the Chinese journalists I interviewed, propriety was often cited as a key 
element of good reporting.  A Chinese journalist at the BBC told me that, indeed,  
flavoring stories requires a certain degree of care: 
If I report stories with the milk of human kindness, these stories are like 
Shanghai dishes or something between Shanghai and Shanong dishes.  That 
is to say, my dishes are light or a little bit strong.  But they won’t be spicy or 
bitter.  I won’t add my own spices.  What I prefer is to use sounds and colors 
that are portrayed in others’ words to set off my stories.  I won’t add my 
commentary.  I let the original flavors play their roles.  If I do commentary 
news, for example, sports news or political reports, I will give my own 
comments.  Then, my programs would be like Sichuan dishes.  I want to make 
my programs thought-provoking. As for the Sichuan dishes, I will make them 
spicy if they have hot peppers themselves.  I mean, I do not want to add things 
in them.  I prefer to explore the flavors in the original materials.   
(Chinese BBC male journalist) 
Statements like these bring out the overlap between the categories of 
emotionality and justice—the space in which it is desirable to present excitement, 
sweetness, and human interest, as long as it is not artifici lly manufactured or 
contrived.  None of the journalists in any of the samples expressed any tolerance for 
“additives,” at least in ideal stylistic terms.  This knd of authenticity, of bringing out 
the “flavors in the original materials” with nothing added, was echoed by an 
American journalist at VOA who said, 
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I guess my style may be like a peanut butter and wildflower honey sandwich 
on really good peasant bread. The peasant bread for substance and honesty.  
The peanut butter for the flavor and comfort, and ease to make.  And the 
wildflower honey because it’s sweet, but also it’s wildflower honey, so it’s 
sweet in itself when it’s doing its own thing rather than being shaped or 
domesticated.  All together, it has substance, comfort, flavor, and a bit of a 
wild streak.  (VOA American male journalist) 
This notion of substance emerged also as a key theme betw en cultures—one 
that is universally acknowledged as important, and most often associated with 
protein.  Both in the East and in the West, protein in the form of meat or nuts was 
considered most substantive, with “carbs” in the form of sweet or starchy foods 
providing comfort and pleasure.  An American editor at VOA summed up this 
distinction with reference to the typical American diet: 
You know, meat and potatoes might be germane (to describe my work), 
because they are fundamental food stuffs.  So maybe I would go in that 
direction.  I would say it’s a high-protein diet.  A low-carb, but not no-carb 
diet.  The carbs are the sugary sweet things, the fillers.  It’s stuff that you 
need, but only in small amounts, and usually you get too much.  (VOA 
American male editor) 
A few American reporters, perhaps not surprisingly, alsossociated their work 
with what many consider to be the typical American staple meal, hamburgers.  One 
jovial program host, for instance, told me that if her wok was a dish, 
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It would be prime rib.  (spoken with great exaggeration)  No, it wouldn’t.  
(laughs)  I was going to say like a sirloin hamburger.  Fun to eat, but it’s 
substantial.  You know.  It’s packaged in a sort of chatty, more conversational 
way, and as a result people think our show is lightweight.  It’s because we’re a 
little sometimes silly, you know, in between spots.  Just a different approach; 
we’re trying to get younger listeners.  But we’re quite substantial. 
(VOA American female reporter) 
Chinese reporters at VOA picked up this same motif of substantial, but not 
heavy.  Two of them, one male and one female, summed up this erspective by 
likening their reporting to chicken salad.  One told me that c icken salad is a perfect 
metaphor “because it makes you feel full, but in the meantime, it will make you feel 
enjoyable.  It will not give a lot of burden because it won’t make you feel like, ‘Oh 
God, it is so heavy.’”  Her colleague echoed nearly the same sentiment: 
Because it tastes fresh although it has meat, chicken inside.  It still tastes very 
fresh.  It is different from other salads, but not enough for a whole meal.  You 
would like to have other things to eat if you just have a sal d.  However, 
chicken salad is enough for a lunch portion.  It is fresh, not very heavy.  So 
my stories are like this, very fresh and not very heavy.   
(VOA Chinese male reporter) 
Another stylistic issue I heard, particularly from male reporters who 
emphasized aesthetics as an important presentational value, was that of coherence—
making the various elements of the report flow together and develop a composite 
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flavor.  An American male reporter at VOA (who happens to report on health issues) 
found himself amused when he heard himself likening his reporting to chicken soup: 
I’m thinking it has to be something… coherence is really important to my 
stories.  I want them to flow together from beginning to end.  All the parts 
should be connected.  So for some reason, soup, just because it’s a liquid, 
should flow better.  Something that’s good for you, good nutrition, but also 
tastes good.  Goes down easy, but it has everything you need i  it.  Maybe 
chicken noodle soup.  (VOA American reporter) 
Along similar lines, an older VOA reporter who had described himself as “a 
typical white-bread American” compared his work to a casserole because it can hide 
elements for the purpose of providing surprise as the dish is consumed: “I think it’s a 
casserole… a little fattening sometimes, hopefully very tasty, with little morsels of 
surprise in there.  You don’t necessarily know the ingredients before you go into it.  
Satisfying, I hope.  Something like that.” 
A pattern that emerged among the journalists in China (but not among their 
Chinese colleagues in America or Britain) was the notio of certain flavors “growing 
on” the audience after prolonged experience.  Four of the ten reporters I interviewed 
in China expressed this strikingly similar concept: 
1)  It’s a dish whose taste lasts.  The taste can remain in your mouth for a long 
time.  Perhaps it’s like snack peas.  They seem very common, but the 
more you eat, the stronger the taste. 
2)  I think it’s like a fish-flavored vegetable in the south. Probably you haven’t 
heard of it. This kind of vegetable grows in Sichuan and Yunnan 
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Provinces.  I just love it. You may not like it in the bginning because 
of the fishy smell.  But one day, you might suddenly find it so 
delicious.  The more you eat, the more addicted you’ll become. 
3)  Maybe it’s like a glass of strong wine.  The stronger, the more tasty.  Our 
culture is like that.  The more you taste it, the more you’ll like it. 
4)  Bitter melon.  Because I think it does not taste good initially.  Likewise, if 
you expose some issue, it is not a happy experience.  But after a while, 
you will feel its benefits and think better of the taste. 
In all four cases, the journalists made the point that although the taster might 
not exactly enjoy the taste at first, repeated exposure brings a degree of appreciation.  
It appears that many Chinese broadcasters expect their audiences to be patient with 
their reporting and keep consuming it until they eventually come to appreciate the 
strong taste for its lasting qualities.  Because this idea emerged several times in the 
Chinese data, its connection to Chinese culture is worthy f further investigation. 
Because of noteworthy insights like these, I found the culinary metaphor to be 
a rich and evocative way to bring out a significant degre of depth and meaning from 
the journalists’ characterizations of their work.  A degree of commonality emerged 
between cultures in likening substance to protein and comparing the piquing of 
interest to adding spice.  Across cultures, the level of co king was important: “raw” 
elements are considered to be fresher, and flavors are valu d for being as close to the 
original, authentic flavor as possible with no additives.  Still there were important 
variations between “comfort food” reporters in the US, “discomfort food” reporters in 
China, and “fusion food” reporters in England.  This device is one that is worthy of 
 207 
 
further exploration for its ability to allow journalists to use common culinary 
metaphors to discuss the nitty-gritty of how they prefer to “serve up the daily feed” to 
consumers. 
What is World-Class Journalism? 
Through the process of interviewing fifty international broadcasters, it became 
clear that they have one pressing concern in common—struggling to preserve their 
space of integrity and independence from which they feel th y can constructively 
engage people around the world.  None of the journalists I spoke with felt that they 
themselves are producing propaganda, although some of the Chinese report rs I spoke 
with in Beijing indicated that they felt that their stories are occasionally twisted by 
institutional forces and that a lot of the truth is often left out.  Clearly, the emphasis 
on justice, objectivity, completeness, accuracy, and fairness that I eard so often from 
the Chinese reporters in the study has a great deal to do with the political realities 
they have had to work with throughout their lives.  Yet I believe that their articulated 
striving for greater balance can be taken as a good sign of things to come for the 
Chinese media system, as journalists in China are clearly aware that there is ample 
room to build their reputation for world-class objective journalism. 
Because international broadcasters hold a powerful and public microphone, 
there are pressures for political or economic forces to encroach upon this public 
sphere of discourse.  As institutional and market forces mount to make broadcast 
pieces shorter, snappier, and more attention-grabbing to compete for the increasingly 
scarce commodity of consumers’ attention, a process appears to be under way that 
many broadcasters call the “McDonaldsization” of the airwaves.  I heard real stress 
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from American, British, and Chinese reporters alike over th  pressures they feel about 
their programs being cut back, their services being threaten d, their role in the world 
potentially disappearing.  Funding support for international broadcasting is being 
called into question as members of the Cold War generation retire from positions of 
power, and the case to be made for maintaining “voices that can be heard around the 
world” is falling increasingly into commercial hands.  However, as I heard from 
broadcasters who try to stay tuned in to the pulse of world society, the need for 
maintaining open channels of communication free from politica  or corporate 
influence is more vital than ever.  A reporter at the BBC articulated the longing that I 
heard from many reporters: “It’s about ordinary people in their own voices of power 
around the world, being able to say what they feel without fear.” 
The culinary metaphor points to the vital role of interational broadcasters in 
preparing and providing intellectual nourishment for people who consume their 
programming.  It has been said that our modern society is “rich on convenience, but 
poor on nutrition,” and this trend appears to apply to how people feed our minds as 
well as how we feed our bellies.  Because the corporate m ndate that is dominant in 
today’s broadcasting causes media outlets to emphasize gaining ttention and selling 
it to advertisers, too little thought is given to the level of nourishment provided to 
consumers.  As funding for international broadcasting is increasingly called into 
question, it is important for practitioners, planners, and policy makers to seriously 




For example, in one interview a young American journalist t VOA tasked 
with covering health issues told me about what he feelswas one of the most 
important stories he has covered, fighting malaria in Africa: 
My God, so many people have malaria in Africa.  I try to do some real 
practical stuff to give them the information they need.  I went to a meeting in 
Philadelphia, and came back with a really nice piece about controlling 
mosquitoes.  It’s basic, you know, these researchers working in Africa just 
walked around people’s houses and found something really important.  In a lot 
of places, people will be doing some kind of construction, and they’ll have a 
basin just dug into the dirt where they’re mixing cement, a d after the 
construction they’ll just leave it.  So they’ll leave this basin, and the basin 
collects water, and the water is a breeding ground for mosquitoes.  But the 
people don’t make the connection, they don’t know about the connection 
between standing water and mosquitoes and these horrible fevers and chills 
and this disease that kills their children.  In some places, it coincides with the 
rainy season.  Like malaria season is the rainy season, which is also the season 
for some fruits.  So some people think if you eat too many mangos, you’ll get 
malaria, or if you stand out in the rain too long you’ll get malaria.  So I was 
talking to these researchers who had gone around and shown pe ple about 
mosquitoes.  If you get bitten by mosquitoes, you can get malaria.  They 
would take a little dipper, like a little glass jar and dip it into the pool of 
standing water, this little cement mixing basin.  They showed them the larvae 
and then would let them watch as mosquitoes grew and develop d and finally 
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came out of the water.  They had never seen this before.  And you know, just 
reporting on that was amazing.  They tell me what they learned in Africa, and 
then I can go tell the many people who listen about this.  And I hope that 
people hear it and they themselves go, “Ah, I didn’t know that.”   
 (VOA American male reporter) 
As I conducted my interviews, this story moved me tremendously.  Here was 
a useful story being delivered to people in Africa who desperately need to learn ways 
to fight the malaria that kills their children.  I was touched by the earnestness in the 
reporter’s voice as he spoke about how such a simple thing as teaching the connection 
between standing water, mosquitoes, and malaria could literal y save lives.   
However, before I finished my research, this reporter’s source of outside 
funding source dried up and he had left the organization.  VOA was still producing 
pieces on pop music and the Westminster Dog Show, but nothing more on malaria.  
The public service mandate is clearly eroding, and no one that I spoke with during the 
course of my dissertation seems to know how to get it back.  This was the most 
sobering realization of my research process.  I realiz d then that perhaps I need to 







Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
Major Findings 
There are five major findings from this study.  First, the ten-pronged category 
scheme characterizing presentational values that underlie broadcasters’ strategic 
decision-making has proven useful for examining journalistic contexts across 
cultures.  Second, the “inductive sandwich” method of using both qualitative 
interviews and systematic measures such as freelisting and a selection task has 
provided a level of validation for the findings and structured analysis to discover 
patterning that may not otherwise be as apparent in the journalists’ discourse.  Third, 
national origin emerged as the most significant predictor of differences between 
journalists, more than age, gender, organization, or journalistic training.  Fourth, the 
nature of the differences by national origin centered mostly n the justice value, as 
Chinese journalists have been shown to be more likely to articulate strivings for 
balance, objectivity, fairness, and accuracy than theirW stern counterparts.  Fifth, the 
culinary metaphor has proven to be a rich way to deepen jour alists’ understanding 
and expression of their own role in providing a “daily feed” for the consumption of 
others.  The following section discusses the implications of these findings. 
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First, to discover how presentational values affect broadcast decision-making 
in different cultural contexts, grounded tools such as thoe developed in this study can 
help researchers approach newsrooms and gain meaningful information from 
journalists’ discourse in a concise and systematic way.  Because newsworthiness 
values used in earlier gatekeeping studies focused mainly on characteristics 
theoretically situated within the news stories themselve, insufficient attention has 
been paid to the more subtle personal and strategic considerations at work in public 
communicators’ minds.  This study has contributed a ten-pro ged category scheme, 
grounded in the discourse of international broadcasters th mselves, that characterizes 
the various considerations that guide journalists’ presentatio al decision-making on a 
daily basis:  aesthetics, breadth, convenience, depth, emotionality, freshness, 
germaneness, helpfulness, incisiveness, and justice.  This category scheme was tested 
through application to the discourse of dozens of internatio l broadcasters in this 
study and was found to produce evidence of personal and cultural differences that 
could be validated through separate systematic measures.  Because the category 
scheme is thorough, alphabetical, and easy to apply, a useful heuristic model could be 
developed both for research and training to provide a vocabulary for journalists to 
more deeply understand the presentational values that inform their own reporting 
decisions. 
Second, the “inductive sandwich” method developed and tested for this study 
has proven valuable in gaining multiple layers of meaning from the data collected 
from journalists.  The freelisting task asked reporters to ar iculate and list the values 
that are most important to them within an open-ended, ideal sc nario; the selection 
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task asked them to consider the broader field of choices and the  narrow down and 
rank-order their values within their top three selected values.  These two measures 
provided a systematic approach that yields standardized results that can be compared 
across samples.  Both of these tasks were relatively quick, taking only five to ten 
minutes.  The bulk of the time spent with each journalist for this research was 
preserved for face-to-face interviews that provided more rich information on what 
journalists mean by these values and why they emphasize them as they do.  The 
standardized task provided understanding of where the journalists’ values come from 
and how they manifest in professional decision-making.  Using the simple 
standardized framework to guide the approach to the qualitative data provided a 
structure that allowed for more systematic and thorough analysis of the text than 
would be possible through interpretive analysis alone. 
Third, this study provided for analysis of the data to answer the question of 
whether or not national origin is the most salient source of differences within the 
journalists’ discourse as well as their selections in the open- and closed-ended tasks.  
Although examining the data through the lenses of gender, age, organization, and 
level of journalistic training did produce some noteworthy patterning within the 
responses, none of these factors resulted in either the breadth or depth of differences 
that stemmed from national origin, Chinese versus American or British.  It was 
apparent that national origin had more significant influence than professional context, 
insofar as Chinese working for the BBC in London or for VOA in Washington 
demonstrated more of the same thought processes as their Chinese counterparts in 
China than their own colleagues at VOA or the BBC.  Support was found for the 
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contention that there are nationality-based differences that manifest in journalistic 
decision-making, and although gender, age, training, and organizatio  also produced 
some patterns of difference, they were not found to be as significant as national 
origin, at least as far as presentational values are concerned.   
Fourth, this study revealed a notable emphasis among Chinese reporters on the 
justice value, which was the most significant finding to appear in the interview data, 
as well as in the freelisting and selection tasks.  Compared to their Western 
counterparts, Chinese were considerably more likely to reveal an emphasis on striving 
for objectivity, balance, accuracy, and fairness in their reporting.  Although American 
and British reporters were more willing to articulate th ir tendency to allow their own 
sense of right and wrong to appear in their reports, Chinese journalists were more 
likely to claim neutrality and state that they prefer to let the audience judge the merits 
of certain arguments and information on their own. Whether this difference stems 
from cultural factors inherent within Chinese society or fr m political factors arising 
from China’s current position on its developmental trajectory as a major international 
broadcaster remain to be explored. 
Finally, the culinary metaphor developed through this study yielded 
substantive insights about journalists’ perception of their choices in presenting their 
work for the consumption of others.  Some similar metaphors have arisen between 
cultures, such as equating protein with substance, for example, or sugar and spice 
with emotional appeal.  Journalists from all three cultures represented in the study 
were all most likely to refer to dishes from their own cultural repertoire, although 
journalists at the BBC World Service were most likely to talk about “fusion” cuisine 
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using elements from other cultures.  Chinese reporters made etaphorical use of the 
eight schools of Chinese cuisine, and were also likely to articulate striving for work 
that may start off less appealing but becomes more palatable over time.  Overall, the 
culinary metaphor proved to be a useful device for drawing out the presentational 
values that are most important to journalists, and may provide a useful tool for 
journalists and other communicators in the future to discuss and compare across 
cultures both the differences and similarities in their strategic presentational styles. 
Contributions 
The major contribution of this study is to provide tools for b th researchers 
and practitioners to systematically analyze producer intent.  Theoretically, this new 
framework extends gatekeeping theory by shifting conceptions of ewsworthiness 
from characteristics inherent in news items themselve to strategic values on the part 
of producers.  This framework is thus much more sensitive to contextual factors and 
hence more conducive to cultural theory-building.  Conceptually, this research 
delineates a ten-pronged value category scheme that has proven useful in structuring 
analysis of journalists’ discourse and searching for patterns by various demographic 
factors.  The conceptual categories provided in this framework help to illuminate both 
the ideals and the constraints that underlie journalistic decision-making across 
contexts, serving as a useful heuristic for understanding the value climates operating 
within organizations and providing a vocabulary for journalists to enhance their 
reporting, both individually and as part of a team.  Being trained within this grounded 
category scheme can be helpful for public communicators to increase their level of 
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reflexivity about their intent and thus approach their journalistic work with a higher 
degree of sensitivity.    
This study has also provided grounds for theoretical and conceptual linkage 
between the suggested ten-pronged value framework and a food metaphor that 
functions well in different cultural contexts to help journalists elaborate their values 
for comparative purposes.  Although traditional conceptions of media-making have 
been largely based in the commercial and political considerations that have driven the 
development of media infrastructures around the world, the food metaphor provides a 
less politically-charged and thus more universal set of concepts that may be used in 
any context to help communicators elucidate their strategic presentational values.  In 
this study, journalists from very different backgrounds shared common terms for 
basic culinary concepts (e.g., protein = substance, spiciness = shock or controversy, 
raw elements = news without editorial commentary), thusis metaphor can be 
expected to provide useful terms for dialogue and understanding within and across 
cultures.   
Although this study represents only a small fraction of the work that can be 
done to elucidate how and why differences emerge in the decision-making of 
journalists of different backgrounds, it provides a substantial umber of tools to help 
in organizing and analyzing qualitative data for comparative purposes.  This study has 
yielded both a new functional value category scheme, a systematic approach for 
exploring presentational values in both ideal and constraied contexts, and an overall 
methodological framework for making meaning from journalists’ discourse.  It is 
hoped that these tools may be useful both for research and for training purposes as 
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both scholars and practitioners gain a shared vocabulary to characterize producer 
intent and explore linkages between strategic values and actual journalistic products. 
The Meaning of Justice 
Because one of the most notable findings of this study centers on the Chinese 
participants’ relative emphasis on justice as compared with their Western 
counterparts, I spent a significant amount of time in follow-up interviews asking both 
Chinese and Western journalists what this value means to them.  I spoke with about 
half of the participants again after their initial intervi w about this issue, along with 
making formal presentations at both the BBC and VOA to invite all the journalists 
who had been involved in the study to have a look at my findings and to have a 
chance to contextualize the observable patterning in the data.  At the BBC, 15 out of 
the 20 journalists interviewed there came to hear the results, and at VOA, 12 out of 
the 20 were in attendance.  I was unable to do the same kind of presentation in China, 
because the journalists who had participated in the study there worked at three 
different agencies and were more sensitive about keeping their involvement in the 
study confidential. 
Each time I presented the journalists with graphical representations of the 
freelisting and selection task data organized by category, thee was notable interest in 
the consistently greater emphasis placed on justice by Chinese journalists.  I asked 
participants about their interpretation of this pattern, asking Chinese journalists in 
particular if they felt this finding was because justice is relatively abundant and 
emphasized within their cultural milieu or because it is relatively scarce in their 
society.  One hundred percent of the Chinese journalists to whom I posed this 
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question told me that they feel this emphasis is because justice and balance have 
always been scarce in the Chinese media.  I was told repeatedly that they grew up 
feeling skeptical of the official Chinese news reports they saw, because those reports 
typically presented a one-sided government-sponsored view of both domestic and 
international events.  After a lifetime of witnessing biased reporting served as 
standard fare, the Chinese journalists said that they have been left with a great desire 
to hear more sides of a story than just the official view.  As consumers, they want the 
freedom to hear a full range of opinions, so they feel obligated as producers to make 
this a standard principle in their reporting. 
When I asked Chinese journalists in follow-up interviews whether they 
thought that the Chinese emphasis on justice was more of a cultural or a political 
issue, a CCTV editor summed up the views I heard from many people that 
In terms of culture, China is quite open to the outside world now.  Many 
foreigners come and Chinese leave and return.  They bring with them some 
Western opinions.  Well-educated people, like me, expect objective 
information.  We have already realized that the Chinese sy tem is not quite 
transparent.  Many farmers and workers are busy with survival, hence they 
have little time to think about these issues.  However, p ople like me think 
more about our system.  The public wants more information from different 
sources.  They have come to realize this now.  So, it’s not a cultural issue. The 
influences of culture are less and less.  It is a systemic problem.   
(CCTV Chinese male editor) 
 219 
 
One point that I heard repeatedly in follow-up interviews with Chinese 
journalists, and resisted for quite some time for fear of being ethnocentric, was that 
the idea of objectivity in news reporting is considered to be a Western notion that 
Chinese society is coming to accept as part of its modernization.  Thus, in Chinese 
journalism circles, to be a modern, open-minded, world-class reporter has come to be 
synonymous with striving for balance and impartiality.  Journalists at Xinhua, CCTV, 
and CRI all spoke of Western role models, including authors, scholars, or former 
teachers, who taught them principles of objective reporting that they claim to be 
invaluable to their work.  This tendency helps to explain whythe justice value 
emerged so frequently in this study of journalists’ discourse, which tended to focus on 
ideals rather than actual practice. 
In contrast, the Western reporters I spoke with in follow-up interviews were 
more skeptical about a journalist’s ability to actually chieve absolute objectivity and 
impartiality in reporting events.  Their comments reflected more of a postmodern 
tendency to acknowledge the subjectivity of so-called “truth,” such that being aware 
of biases is better than pretending they do not exist.  Because the Western journalists 
did not report having grown up feeling dissatisfied with the level of objectivity in the 
media they consumed, they did not express the same sense of striving toward balance 
and impartiality as did the Chinese journalists.  They instead reported taking such 
principles for granted, assuming them as a very basic “bottom line” without which 
journalism is not journalism at all.   
There were more subtle differences in journalists’ notio s of justice than this 
study can fully characterize.  For example, a British reporter at the BBC commented, 
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“When we hear Americans in Western movies talking about ‘Justice,’ we know it's 
Old Testament justice, a necktie party, or howling bloodstained vengeance.  But the 
proper European idea of justice is law administered with mercy so as to satisfy 
people's idea of fairness.”  Because of the many rich subtleties that remain to be 
drawn out of international reporters’ conceptions of comparative justice, this topic 
will need to be dealt with further in future studies. 
Limitations 
One limitation of this research is that it was only able to address ways in 
which journalists think of and articulate the values and goals underlying their work.  
This study did not undertake any comparison of journalists’ stated values with actual 
content of the material they produce, focusing at the present time on the strategies 
themselves rather than on how the strategies influence journalistic products.  Because 
this project was designed to develop and test a new category scheme, efforts were 
concentrated on examining points of consonance between interview data and 
systematic freelisting and selection task data for the purpose of better understanding 
journalists’ strategic considerations within their work context.  With a fully 
elaborated category scheme, it will be possible in subsequent studies to allow 
journalists and journalism students to participate in coding their own work and thus 
provide researchers with a better window into the strategic producer intent that 
underlies the production of actual reports and broadcasts.   
As for this study, however, the potential discrepancy betwe n articulated and 
actualized strategic values is particularly important to note when evaluating data that 
lead to theoretical assumptions based on the journalists’ responses.  For example, in 
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the freelisting task there was a difference between the level of internalized, 
substantive values expressed by journalists who had majored in journalism and those 
who had learned all of their skills on the job:  74% of w rds listed by former 
journalism majors reflected internalized values related to their work as opposed to 
only 58% of responses from those who had learned exclusively on the job.  At least in 
terms of the words they articulate, these data suggest that participants who majored in 
journalism have thought through their role as journalists more clearly and thus have 
developed more deeply-ingrained notions about what constitutes good journalism, 
leaving them less dependent on external standards.  However, the difference noted 
between the two groups in this task may simply be due to anability to articulate 
journalistic values in words.  In other words, former journalism majors who have had 
to research and write papers about journalism may have develop d a richer 
vocabulary and may be able to talk about journalistic values more substantively.  
However, this training may make no difference when it comes to the actual practice 
of journalism on the job.  Future work will be needed to etermine the extent to 
which differences noted in how journalists talk about their work actually affect their 
story selection and treatment of subjects. 
Another limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size, especially 
in terms of analyzing the freelisting and selection tasks.  The percentages and 
numbers listed in the freelisting and selection task sections must be interpreted in 
light of the caveat that the sample sizes ranged between thirty and ten.  In particular, 
the small sample of international feature journalists in China should not be construed 
as representative of the entire Chinese international bro dcasting enterprise for a few 
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reasons: a) the participants were a self-selecting snowball sample of Chinese 
journalists who are relatively friendly to outsiders and open to research, b) the 
journalists who participated represent three organizations (China Central Television, 
China Radio International, and the Xinhua News Agency), thus no one organization is 
well represented, and c) there was a mixture of television, radio, and print journalists 
in this sample, in contrast to the journalists at VOA and the BBC, who were all radio 
feature reporters. 
One other sampling issue left unaddressed by this study was to examin  
differences between Chinese reporters from Mainland China and Taiwan.  Although 
three of the thirty Chinese journalists who participated in this study were Taiwanese, 
the small size of that sample made it unwise to generate conclusions based on such 
limited data.  Especially due to the highly politicized nature of the Mainland-Taiwan 
relationship, I chose to refrain from mentioning differenc s between the Taiwanese 
and Mainland samples, out of caution for these differences being overstated.  In the 
future, concentrating on similarities and differences btween reporters in Mainland 
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong will help to shed further light on whether the 
differences noted are more cultural or political in nature. 
Because this study caused journalists to engage in articulating strategic value 
considerations that often go unstated, it is possible that a degree of priming took place 
through the course of the interviews that may have affected what was salient in the 
minds of the journalists before they engaged in the freelisting and selection tasks.  
The decision was made in this study to begin with interviews in order to build rapport 
with journalists and allow them to mentally review aspects of their jobs that influence 
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or reflect on certain value considerations underlying their work before being faced 
with unfamiliar freelisting and selection tasks.  In this trial of the study, this ordering 
made sense in order to help participants gradually articulate their values in their 
native language over the course of a 45-minute interview before being asked to 
suddenly list words and make choices between values.  However, in future studies it 
may be worthwhile to vary the ordering of these tasks to examine any priming effects 
that may occur.   
This study focused on journalists employed by state-funded int rnational 
broadcast organizations, concentrating on reporters at VOA and the BBC in particular 
because it was possible to interview both Chinese and Western journalists employed 
by the same agencies.  This approach helped to control for organizational factors that 
may otherwise be conflated with cultural factors.  However, once a sufficient number 
of Chinese journalists at VOA and the BBC had been interviewed, a degree of 
generalizability was obtained by also interviewing their p ers employed in China by 
the Chinese official media.  Thus, the decision for this study to focus on 
governmental media provided a degree of utility in controlling for variables.  Future 
research should apply the tools developed in this study to commercial and public 
broadcasters in a broad variety of contexts around the world. 
In the future, now that a workable category scheme has been d veloped, the 
next step should be to take this scheme into both newsrooms and classrooms to 
explore how the value categories are articulated and actually m nifest in news 
reporting within different contexts.  Because this project worked mostly with ideal 
values that that most reporters would like to use (i.e., without limitations of time, 
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money, or resources), the convenience category was unfortunately not well developed 
in this study.  However, including convenience as one value among the ten allows 
future studies to address constraint issues, whether personal or professional, without 
negative judgment.  Because our category scheme is grounded in the lives of real 
media producers who often need to base their output decisions on a multitude of 
resource issues, the scheme can be used in such a way as to capture a broader 
spectrum of reasons why media producers do what they do.  As such, it becomes a 
tool to help both insiders and outsiders to the media producti n process better 
understand journalists’ ideals as well as their constraints, and to perhaps clarify how 
producers and managers can make their work environments more ideal. 
Future Research Directions 
Several avenues of research should be undertaken to allow this line of inquiry 
to reach its full heuristic potential.  First, the set of communication value categories 
produced in this research should be applied to the work that journalists and other 
communicators actually contribute to the public sphere.  Early studies along these 
lines should set up conditions for journalists to comment on the pieces they have 
produced in such a way as to reveal their reasoning for includi g certain story topics, 
narrative elements, and stylistic choices.  To characte ize the underlying value 
structure informing decisions made in newsrooms around the world, researchers will 
need to enter those newsrooms and observe journalists in actio  to better understand 
how their own personal values interact with constantly-changing institutional and 
market contexts.  Journalists and journalism students can be trained in these ten 
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categories to help them better understand and even code their own choices according 
the various demands that act on them. 
This line of inquiry will benefit from studying a wider range of newsrooms, 
commercial as well as publicly and privately funded, to explore the extent to which 
these value categories are operationalized and reveal patterning between and across 
cultures.   One obvious step would be to compare journalists in Mainland China with 
their counterparts in Hong Kong and Taiwan to gain more traction on the issue of 
whether the justice value is related to Chinese culture or more to the Mainland’s 
current historical moment.  If the question is to discover both human elements that 
unify reporters around the world as well as contextual elem nts that define and divide 
them, researchers should include cultures outside of East Asia, America, and 
Britain—hopefully as far as South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and 
southern and eastern Europe.  This breadth may also mean reaching beyond 
journalists to other kinds of public communicators, including speechmakers, 
educators, public relations professionals, diplomats, and others who are professionally 
involved in crafting strategic messages designed to attract and influence others.  
A possibly exciting avenue of research will be to conduct studies that present 
public communicators with actual case studies that reflect value choices to see how 
different operationalizations of various presentational values play out in day-to-day 
practice.  This line of inquiry could be valuable not only for investigative purposes, 
but also as a heuristic training tool for journalism students a d professionals.  
Undergraduate courses as well as in-service training sessions for journalists could be 
designed to highlight their own presentational values and explore how these interact 
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with their institutional contexts under various conditions.  Using exercises such as 
individual and group freelisting, individual and group selection tasks, and free 
discussions based on cross-culturally valid metaphors such as the culinary paradigm, 
journalists and journalism students can better understand th t newsworthiness is 
indeed in the eye of the beholder and develop skills to more reflexively comprehend 
their own decision-making process.  Rather than viewing themselves as merely 
gathering obvious news from pre-packaged recipes recommending certain bits of 
news as worthy of broadcast, journalists must be given the opportunity to craft their 
own menu and realize the important function they provide in a healthy civil society.  
As journalists become more aware of their role as meaning-makers and can better 
grasp the idea of their “daily feed” providing mental food for thought for their 
audiences, a deeper sense of public responsibility may be fostered that will leaven the 
field over time.   
Finally, as this line of research gains greater grounding qualitatively, I 
anticipate that greater quantitative use of the value scheme will allow for larger and 
broader sample sizes.  As this value framework is strength ed through future studies, 
issues such as the correlation between demographic factors and stated values, as well 
as between stated values and produced content, can be studied systematically in ways 
that can better address statistical significance and work toward greater external 
validity.  Over time, I hope to be able to develop this line of research into a large 
multi-national survey with journalists and other public communicators in different 
parts of the world.  As the category framework is refined an intercoder reliability 
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can be established, it will be possible to find out more about how these values play 
out in different cultures and contexts. 
Parting Words 
James Carey noted that the role of broadcast media is an “ nvention in 
historical time that, like most other human inventions, will dissolve when the class 
that sponsors it and its possibility of its having significan e for us evaporates”  
(Hanson & Maxcy, 1996, p. 238).  As current debates continue around the world 
about unipolarism versus multilateralism, as land and water and air are put up for 
ownership to the highest bidder, it is more critical than ever before to reflect on the 
role of our world’s great connector: international broadcasting.  As the World War II 
generation retires and passes from the halls of leadership, funding and support for old 
Cold War institutions such as the Voice of America and the BBC World Service are 
increasingly coming into question.  As these invisible threads of communication that 
have stretched between continents through the 20th century fall increasingly into 
commercial hands, are there ways to facilitate the international flow of information 
free of direct commercial or political influence? 
As developing regions of the world increasingly bring their ancient wisdom 
and ethics to bear on crafting modern societies, it is more important than ever for 
scholars to be involved in the debate over how internaio l communication channels 
are funded and staffed.  Large broadcast outlets such as Al-Jazeera and CCTV will 
increasingly become agencies to watch to understand how emerging broadcasters 
crystallize the structures and strategies of 20th century giants in the interests of 
engaging global audiences.  
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Cross-culturally valid tools need to be developed and refined to allow both 
practitioners and policy makers from different regions of the world to address the 
communication needs of the next generation.  As narrow-casting becomes more 
prevalent due to the Internet and the proliferation of media options in modern 
societies, bringing people together around common terms and concepts will become 
increasingly difficult.  Thus, academics will need to facilitate substantive discussions 
on the future of broadcasting to help better prepare broadcast professionals to 
consider their role in the world society.   Hopefully the value scheme developed 






English Interview Protocol 
 
1)  What do you consider to be your “cultural” background?  (e.g. where did you have 
your life’s most formative experiences, etc.) 
2)  How did you become employed with this organization?      
3)  Have you had formal journalistic training?  If so, what do you think was its aim? 
4)  What are the 3 most recent stories you’ve reported?  Why did you choose them? 
5)  How do you go about choosing feature stories to report? 
6)  Who benefits most from your work?  How? 
7)  What do you consider to be “effectiveness” in your wo k?  How do you achieve 
this effectiveness? 
8)  Do you have any particular role models in this field?   
9)  What other networks or news sources do you most respect in this field?  Why? 
10)  If you were to describe the style or “flavor” of the stories you write, how would 
you describe it?  If your reporting were a food, what would it be? 
11)  Do you think your background culture affects the style/flavor of your stories? 
12)  How does the style/flavor you strive for compare to that of other journalists or 
news organizations? 
13)  What do you know about the composition of your audience?  When you 
broadcast, whom do you imagine broadcasting to? 




15)  How does your target audience differ from other audiences around the world? 
16)  What kind of interactions do you have with your editor/b ss? 
17)  How does your place in your organization affect your work?   
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